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l)THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING
Pharmaceutical marketing effectiveness comprises the measurement of marketing efforts
of pharmaceutical firms towards doctors and patients. These firms spend billions of dollars
yearly to promote their prescription drugs. This dissertation provides empirical analyses and
methods to contribute to several substantial problems on pharmaceutical marketing effec -
tiveness. Using unique data in every essay, it studies the role of the firm, sales rep and
doctor in pharmaceutical marketing. The first essay evaluates the size of the sales force and
the allocation of sales calls among doctors. In particular, it provides a method to gauge a
yet-to-be-enacted firm-initiated policy shift. The second essay studies the effectiveness of
the information content provided in sales calls. The main questions evolve around the
discussion of positively biased drug information and the responsiveness of doctors to that.
In the third essay, the interplay between drug sales, marketing and scientific reviews is
studied in detail. 
The essays reveal important implications for academics and managers. For academics: (i)
a new alternative to gauge policy shifts is offered; (ii) a model is offered to analyze the
effectiveness of sales message content; and (iii) scientific reviews should be considered to
correctly measure pharmaceutical marketing effectiveness. The implications for managers
are: (i) the market leader is able to buck the trend in increasing sales forces; (ii) sales reps
discuss positively biased information too often, which is counterproductive in the long run;
and (iii) scientific reviews on products should be actively considered as a part of the
marketing mix.
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Introduction 
Healthcare costs constitute a substantial part of GDP around the world. In 2009, 
health expenditures in the U.S. accounted for 17.6% of GDP (more than $8,000 per 
person). This is the second highest in the world and the share is expected to rise in the 
coming years. Prescription drugs account for more than 10% of the healthcare 
expenditures. Global pharmaceutical sales of prescription drugs reach $880 billion in 2011, 
of which 38% is realized in the U.S. market (IMS Health). The pharmaceutical industry is 
an important contributor to the health and prolonged lives of people, but at the same time it 
is largely a for-profit industry. 
The pharmaceutical industry is a prime example of a life science industry 
(Stremersch and Van Dyck 2009). It has two main characteristics differentiating it from 
other industries: (i) it is highly regulated as it deals with people’s health and (ii) it is a 
science-based industry. 
Regulated Industry 
The pharmaceutical industry worldwide is one of the most regulated industries. In 
the U.S., the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) passed in 1906 the Pure Food and Drug 
Act. This allowed them to control the labels of drugs and is an important tool to safeguard 
the public health. It also regulates the marketing of prescription drugs in the interest of 
society and states that firms should provide balanced information about the risks and 
benefits of the drug.  
The strongly regulated nature of the pharmaceutical industry has two important 
implications for marketing research. First, research in the pharmaceutical industry requires 
industry-specific knowledge. While marketing research often asks for knowledge that is 
generalizable across industries, this might limit the understanding of specific industries 
(Stremersch and Van Dyck 2009). Regulations are in place for, amongst others, the 
approval process of new drugs, the scientific testing of these drugs, the patent protection 
system and the form and content of promotion efforts. These regulations are often different 
across countries and updated over time. In order to do rigorous research in the 
pharmaceutical industry these regulations need to be taken into account, which might 
subsequently limit the generalizability of the outcomes to different industries or markets. 
Second, the context-specific regulations also provide advantages for marketing 
research. Strict regulations might limit the number of variables that play a role for a 
particular problem. For example, the restriction of direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) 
in many countries allows the researcher to more easily isolate the effect of personal selling 
on prescriptions. The regulations also contribute to the structure and amount of data 
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collection in the industry. As regulations standardize industry practices, the industry often 
delivers high quality and consistent data. For example, the patent system allows the 
researcher to classify new products according to the type of innovation and subsequently to 
investigate the sources and consequences of different types of innovations (Sorescu et al. 
2003). In addition, to check the compliance with the regulations, structured and rich data is 
required. IMS Health, a main data provider for the industry, for example, collects data on 
the content of thousands of sales calls per year. The richness and structure of the data in 
the pharmaceutical industry provides many unique opportunities to study marketing 
phenomena in-depth, which can lead to generalizable insights in substantial marketing 
phenomena, such as innovations and product bundles. 
Science-Based Industry 
Science-based industries comprise a substantial part of the economy and are very 
important for economic growth (Narin et al. 1997). Examples of industries heavily 
dependent on science are biotechnology, chemicals, medical electronics, nanotechnology, 
pharmaceuticals and semiconductors (see Grupp 1996; Narin 2000). Products sold in 
science-based industries are markedly different from those in other industries. Products in 
science-based industries have a higher number of science papers cited in their patents 
(science linkage) as compared to products in other industries (Pavitt 1984; Narin 2000). In 
addition, scientific reviews appear prior to and during the lifecycle of a product providing 
information on the product. As the pharmaceutical industry is a prototypical example of a 
science-based industry, this has three consequences for pharmaceutical marketing research. 
First, it is important to investigate the role of scientific reviews in this industry 
(e.g. Azoulay 2002). Products are only approved to the market if they are sufficiently 
supported by scientific reviews, which subsequently also influence their success on the 
market. In addition, firms build on the scientific reviews in their marketing efforts as they 
provide important product information. Hence, it is important to take the role of science in 
this industry into account. 
Second, science-based industries are characterized by substantial investments in 
R&D. Pharmaceutical firms spend around 20% of their revenues on R&D (Shankar 2008). 
The rewards to R&D, in the form of an approved drug, can be very large as the drug is 
protected by a patent providing the firm with substantial market power (Scherer 2004). For 
example, Lipitor, the best selling drug in the world, generated almost $13 billion in sales in 
2007, while the production costs of the drug are small. However, the development costs of 
prescription drugs are also very high. DiMasi et al. (2003) estimate the average costs of 
developing an approved drug in 2000 to be $802 million and $1.3 billion for a biologic 
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(DiMasi and Grabowski 2007). Pfizer, for example, spent between 2000 and 2008 a 
staggering $60 billion on R&D, while only 9 new drugs were approved during that period. 
The industry suffers from a decline in new drug approvals, even though the R&D 
investments are higher than ever (Munos 2009). This requires pharmaceutical firms to 
focus on new forms of innovations. 
Third, the reliance of pharmaceutical products on science may influence demand. 
Demand is influenced as not the end consumer (the patient) decides on whether to buy a 
product, but an expert (the doctor). This also affects the pharmaceutical marketing 
allocation of firms. Pharmaceutical firms heavily spend on marketing (around 10% of their 
revenues, Shankar 2008) and personal selling – also referred to as detailing – is the main 
promotional instrument in the pharmaceutical market. It involves a sales person that details 
the (science-based) drugs of his company to the doctor. 
Overview of the Dissertation 
In this dissertation, I study relevant pharmaceutical marketing problems using 
empirical models. Figure 0.1 gives an overview of the essays of this dissertation and 
classifies them along the flow of pharmaceutical marketing on the horizontal axis and the 
type of data on the vertical axis. The flow of pharmaceutical marketing goes from the 
pharmaceutical firm (the initiator), by means of the sales rep (the intermediary) to the 
doctor (the decision maker). 
In the short discussion below on the three essays of this dissertation, I will give an 
overview of the type of data used to analyze various market players and the accompanying 
model used. In addition, I relate the essays to the two main characteristics of the 
pharmaceutical industry discussed above.  
Introduction 
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Figure 0.1: Overview of the Dissertation 
 
 
Essay 1: Gauging a Policy Shift 
Pharmaceutical firms invest heavily in their sales force, also referred to as 
detailing, and expenditures have more than doubled over the last decade to $25 billion in 
2005 (Donohue et al. 2007). There is an extensive debate in the academic literature in 
marketing about its effectiveness (see Essay 2). Public policy administrators and health 
care providers are concerned with the social welfare implications of intensive detailing to 
doctors. The public opinion, at large, is that pharmaceutical firms spend too much on 
marketing their products to doctors (USA Today 2008). Even multiple pharmaceutical 
firms such as AstraZeneca, BMS, GSK and Wyeth speculate that sales forces have grown 
too big and some publicly announced that they are considering dramatically cutting the 
size of their sales force (e.g. BusinessWeek 2007). One important reason why firms have 
not cut their detailing is that it is very challenging to predict the outcomes of a drastic 
change. In the first essay, I develop a framework – called data enrichment – to gauge the 
implications of a firm-initiated yet-to-be-enacted policy shift and apply that to various 
downward policy shifts in detailing. It requires the integration of revealed preference data 
on prescriptions and detailing at the doctor level, enriched with stated preference data on 
the detailing allocation of firms under different policy shift scenarios. The data enrichment 
framework not only provides valuable insight into the outcomes of a downward policy 
shift in detailing to end the detailing arms race, but also provides a framework for future 
analyses of a wide range of policy shifts. 
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Essay 2: Pharmaceutical Sales Message Content 
The marketing literature has found a large heterogeneity in pharmaceutical sales 
call effectiveness (e.g. see Fischer and Albers 2010; Kremer et al. 2008; Mizik and 
Jacobson 2004; Narayanan et al. 2005; Venkataraman and Stremersch 2007). While 
various explanations have been given for this heterogeneity no one has investigated the 
role of the information content provided in the sales message, while Churchill et al. (2000) 
consider the sales message to be the core of personal selling. In the second essay, I 
examine (1) how responsive doctors are to information provided across different product 
attributes; (2) whether firms present a positively biased information set to doctors; (3) 
whether doctors are more or less responsive to positively biased information in sales calls. 
This requires a model that estimates the effectiveness at the sales call level, while 
controlling for the possible endogeneity of sales call allocation and possibly the content of 
the sales call. To estimate the effectiveness at such a detailed level while controlling for 
endogeneity a hierarchical Bayesian vector autoregressive (VAR) model is used. Positively 
biased information is operationalized by linking the information content to scientific 
information on the drugs. This gives detailed insights in how firms can adjust their 
messaging to optimize doctors’ detailing responsiveness. In addition, it fits in a stream of 
research relating the advertising content to advertising responsiveness, conducted for 
television advertising (e.g. Anderson and Renault 2006; Chandy et al. 2001; Lodish et al. 
1995) and for print and banner advertising (e.g. Bertrand et al. 2010; Hanssens and Weitz 
1980; Lohtia et al. 2003; Wedel and Pieters 2000).  
Essay 3: Science-Based Markets 
The pharmaceutical market is a prototypical example of a science-based market. 
Products in science-based markets are largely supported by scientific reviews that appear 
prior to and during its lifecycle. As the outcomes of scientific reviews differ, in Essay 3, I 
investigate 1) how do scientific reviews affect marketing expenditures to users and experts 
and 2) to what extent do scientific reviews affect sales. It employs a comprehensive dataset 
on scientific reviews for an important category in the pharmaceutical industry and combine 
that with brand-level sales and marketing. A vector error correction (VEC) model is used 
to model the sales and marketing expenditures across brands as a function of scientific 
reviews. Limited data availability induces to pool the parameters across brands, while 
controlling for brand-specific factors. The essay gives not only important insights in how 
firms can use science as a marketing tool or to adjust their marketing mix, but also shows 
that omitting scientific evidence from the analysis biases marketing responsiveness 
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coefficients. In addition, it relates the role of scientific reviews to user and expert reviews 
to build a bridge with this popular stream of literature. 
Bucking the Trend in Pharmaceutical Detailing: Enriching 
Data to Gauge a Policy Shift 
Essay 1* 
*This essay is based on a paper in collaboration with Stefan Stremersch and Sriram Venkataraman.
 8 
 
Bucking the Trend in Pharmaceutical Detailing: Enriching 
Data to Gauge a Policy Shift 
 
Abstract 
In this study we evaluate the arms race in pharmaceutical detailing and gauge the 
consequences of various policy shifts that may be able to buck the trend. We provide an 
alternative decision support tool for firms and public policy makers that aids in gauging the 
implications of a policy shift ex ante. We combine revealed prescription and detailing data 
with stated detailing data obtained from managers through a conjoint experiment. Our 
approach offers an alternative to policy shift analyses involving either an all reduced-form 
approach or a fully structural approach. It also provides a more detailed and quantitative 
assessment of a policy shift than the general scenario planning approach. 
Our results show that small detailing changes are not able to buck the trend, but a 
drastic reduction in detailing by the market leader is needed to generate a profitable market 
outcome for all players. The initiator of the shift is always better off and the followers 
show mixed outcomes on profitability. Furthermore, initiating a downward policy shift 
always reduces the size of the market. Given the controversy surrounding this arms race, 
the results imply that market leaders should take responsibility, otherwise the government 
should consider intervention in the market. 
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“We don't need those large sales forces to do the job. We need them because the competition is doing it… We do 
believe there is an arms race out there in terms of sales forces and that if you were to redesign the system from 
scratch you would end up with smaller sales forces.” -- Jean-Pierre Garnier, CEO, GlaxoSmithKline (2005). 
Introduction 
Pharmaceutical firms invest heavily in their sales force, which is strategically 
allocated among physicians (Manchanda et al. 2004). Pharmaceutical sales force 
investments, also referred to as detailing, have more than doubled over the last decade to 
$25 billion in 2005 (Donohue et al. 2007). There is an extensive debate in the academic 
literature in marketing over whether such intensive detailing positively affects 
prescriptions, with some authors finding positive, but often modest, effects (e.g. 
Manchanda and Honka 2005; Mizik and Jacobson 2004), while others find that the effects 
can also be zero or negative (Kremer et al. 2008; Leeflang and Wieringa 2008; 
Venkataraman and Stremersch 2007). At the same time, public policy administrators and 
health care providers are concerned with the social welfare implications of intensive 
detailing to physicians. The public opinion, at large, is that pharmaceutical firms spend too 
much on marketing their products to physicians (USA Today 2008).  
Multiple firms such as AstraZeneca, BMS, GSK and Wyeth speculate that sales 
forces have grown too big and some publicly announced that they are considering 
dramatically cutting the size of their sales force (BusinessWeek 2007; Philadelphia 
Inquirer 2005; Wall Street Journal 2003). These announcements are a form of signaling, 
typically done to elicit competitive reactions (Heil and Robertson 1991). But bucking the 
industry trend can be a risky business as is also illustrated in the Wall Street Journal 
(2003): “Like cold war enemies, no drug company is willing to be the first to disarm its 
troops”. Firms need sound decision-support tools to gauge the consequences of a 
substantial policy shift before the policy shift is implemented (Ailawadi et al. 2005). A 
policy shift is a considerable change in an agent’s belief about how to attain its core goals 
reflected in the implementation of a sustained change in the agent’s actions. The policy 
shift can be triggered either by a firm or another player in the environment. The 
government might take its responsibility regarding the pharmaceutical detailing arms race 
as most stakeholders indicate it has escalated. While this can be done by regulations, ‘soft 
coordination’ is most commonly pursued, whereby the government talks with the different 
agents to coordinate a change. For these situations studies that help to gauge the 
consequences of a policy shift are very helpful. 
Our objective in this paper is to gauge the consequences of a downward policy 
shift in pharmaceutical detailing. We provide an alternative decision support tool for firms 
Essay 1 
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and public policy makers that aids in gauging the implications of a policy shift. This study 
also provides some validation exercises for our results. 
Our method entails the enrichment of revealed data on which we estimate a 
demand-supply system, with stated data. The stated data are inventoried through a 
managerial conjoint experiment under various conditions before and after a policy shift. 
Enriching the data gets around some of the assumptions inherent to the study of policy 
shifts with reduced-form and structural models using panel data only. Firms and academics 
have mainly focused on general scenario planning (Schoemaker 1995) to analyze policy 
shifts. Since research on gauging more specific policy shifts is lacking, firms often take no 
radical action during an arms race or resort to costly and time-consuming field 
experiments, which often lack generalizability to markets outside the test market. Our 
approach is particularly attractive to aid in decision making on a policy shift ex ante, 
without having to make any assumptions on inter-firm conduct.1  
The results show that when the market leader decreases detailing by 40%, all 
competitors follow its lead, leading to substantially higher profits for all firms in the 
market. Second, for every large-scale policy shift we consider, the initiator increases his 
profit margin in the long run. Third, we find that every downward policy shift reduces the 
category size. The results have important implications for managers and public policy. 
They show that market leaders should take their responsibility in the pharmaceutical arms 
race by cutting their detailing substantially. If the market players fail to take action, the 
government should respond by either coordinating marketing expenditure decreases 
together with the pharmaceutical firms or enacting lawa to restrict detailing.  
As our goal is to gauge a policy shift before it is initiated, we do not actually 
observe the outcome of the policy shift. Therefore we resort to several alternate approaches 
to validate our results. First, the empirical literature confirms the role of the market leader 
to set new competitive market conduct. Second, we compare our outcomes with other 
industries and another detailing shock in the pharmaceutical industry. Furthermore, the 
answers we received from the experts to whom we submitted our results shed further light 
on our findings. 
Our approach can also be used in other settings, such as gauging the consequences 
of the Dutch retailing price war Albert Heijn initiated (Van Heerde et al. 2008), the 
decision of a major oil company to invest heavily in alternative energy sources or a 
regulatory change in the U.S. capping total detailing expenditures. Such large policy shifts 
                                                        
1 In our model, we do not have to specify the conduct between firms, i.e. physician-specific Bertrand-Nash 
competition/collusion/share maximizing/sales maximizing model. Our approach is therefore agnostic to the nature 
of inter-firm conduct.  
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all have one thing in common, i.e. they shake up the market and historical patterns do not 
continue to hold anymore. In these cases, one should carefully consider which information 
from the past can be used to predict the future, and for which facets, additional information 
should be collected to come to sensible predictions on the consequences of a large policy 
shift.  
We proceed by presenting the conceptual background of our study, followed by a 
description of our revealed prescription and detailing data, our stated detailing data and the 
data enrichment procedure. We then discuss the model, results and validation and conclude 
with the conclusion and implications. 
Background 
Firms typically analyze future policy shifts using the general scenario planning 
approach, while the marketing literature has resorted to more quantitative models, both 
reduced form and structural. All have their own merits and demerits which we discuss in 
turn. We employ a data enrichment approach which combines the strengths of scenario 
planning and quantitative models and overcomes some of their limitations to gauge a 
policy shift. Next, we discuss three methods employed in the literature to gauge a policy 
shift and contrast them with the use of data enrichment.  
A first alternate method is to forecast the consequences of a policy shift from 
actual variation in pre-shift data, without any other input. However, data on actual and past 
behavior typically do not contain a policy shift, similar to the one under consideration, and 
hence one has to extrapolate beyond the policies observed in the data. This method suffers 
from the Lucas critique, which states that response parameters can change as a function of 
policy changes (Lucas 1976). Gauging future policy shifts may lead to inaccurate 
predictions, as response parameters may change (Chintagunta et al. 2006; Van Heerde et 
al. 2005). Reduced-from models can, however, be used to analyze past, rather than future, 
policy shifts. Excellent examples are Ailawadi et al. (2001), Chen et al. (2009) and Van 
Heerde et al. (2008).  
A second alternate method is to specify a structural model that explicitly models 
the market structure and the supply-side conduct of firms based on economic premises (for 
an overview, see Bronnenberg et al. 2005; Reiss and Wolak 2003). Such method 
overcomes the Lucas critique and can be used to forecast the consequences of a policy shift 
and/or a change in the market structure (Nevo 2000). Successful examples of full-
information-based structural models are Ailawadi et al. (2005), Chintagunta et al. (2003), 
Chu et al. (2007) and Nevo (2000). However, the usefulness of this method hinges on two 
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assumptions. First, it is dependent on the correct supply-side firm conduct specification, 
which otherwise results in inconsistent demand-side parameters.2 Second, these models 
assume already that firms act optimally according to the specified objective function, 
which is often in contradiction to the reason firms want to initiate policy shifts 
(Bronnenberg et al. 2005; Chintagunta et al. 2006).  
A third alternate method is scenario planning (Schoemaker 1993; 1995). Scenario 
planning includes ‘focused descriptions of fundamentally different futures presented in 
coherent script-like or narrative fashion’. This method is popular among major firms to 
anticipate changes in their environment, such as the credit crisis, globalization, innovations 
and deregulations (Hodgkinson and Healey 2008). It is found to be successful in 
structuring the minds of managers, in identifying strengths and weaknesses within a 
company and in improving firm performance (Phelps et al. 2001). However, the method 
lacks the details needed to implement specific strategies and more detailed quantitative 
extensions are needed to gauge the consequences of a policy shift. Cooper (2000) provides 
a successful extension of scenario planning, by means of a Bayesian network, to plan the 
marketing of radically new products. 
In contrast, our data enrichment approach offers a limited information alternative 
to evaluating policy shifts that borrows elements from the structural and scenario planning 
approaches discussed above. Like the structural approach, we estimate a structural demand 
model using revealed choice data. Akin to the scenario planning approach we present 
managers with various supply-side scenarios. However, unlike the traditional scenario 
approach our scenarios are presented to managers via a conjoint survey which allows us to 
quantitatively elicit their responses to different scenarios.  
Data enrichment3 usually refers to the statistical fusion of two or more datasets 
and has been successfully used by others. Among many other applications, it has been used 
to enrich panel data (Mark and Swait 2004; Swait and Andrews 2003), to improve the 
accuracy of the estimation (e.g. Albuquerque and Bronnenberg 2009; Imbens and 
Lancaster 1994) and to model markets with indirect network externalities (Gupta et al. 
1999). 
Our data enrichment approach allows us to complement revealed market data 
(both on the demand- and supply-side) with stated supply-side reactions to hypothetical 
market scenarios. Such an enrichment of revealed with stated data provides unique and 
valuable insights (see Louviere et al. 2000 for a full discussion and Whitehead et al. 2008 
for a multidisciplinary overview). Our modeling philosophy is easily portable to other 
                                                        
2 Provided the demand and supply-side models are jointly estimated. 
3 Data enrichment is sometimes also referred to as data fusion. 
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industry settings than the one here. It enables one to gauge policy shifts that cannot be 
generalized beyond the policy variation observed in the revealed data. Our approach 
requires the firm to gather new stated data, however, without having to incur the costs of 
running large-scale field experiments or rely on insights from possibly inconsistent 
structural analysis parameters. 
Compared to the methods discussed above our data enrichment approach provides 
three key advantages to gauge the outcomes of a policy shift ex ante. First, it allows us to 
account for competitive reactions without making any (optimality) assumptions on the 
nature of firm conduct. Second, it explicitly deals with the Lucas critique. Third, our 
approach allows us to combine the strengths of both types of data: the high validity (based 
on actual decisions) of revealed data and the good statistical properties (larger variation) of 
stated data.  
Data 
We obtain stated detailing data, from a conjoint experiment, to enrich revealed 
data on prescriptions and detailing obtained from a large physician panel. We discuss both 
datasets below, each in turn. We also explain how we transformed the conjoint data to 
allow the integration of both datasets. 
Revealed Prescription and Detailing Data 
We observe, in the statin category, the discrete number of monthly self-reported 
prescriptions and details for a U.S. panel of 1,585 general practitioners for the period 
August 2003 through May 2004. The panel, collected by a market research firm, is 
representative for the U.S. physician population, both in terms of practice size and 
geographically. In our analysis, we focus on the four major drugs in the market during this 
period, namely Lipitor (Pfizer), Zocor (Merck), Pravachol (BMS) and Crestor 
(AstraZeneca), which was introduced to the market in August 2003.  
Stated Detailing Data 
We have obtained stated detailing data from an online conjoint experiment, in 
which we presented practitioners with hypothetical policy shifts. Typical profiles of 
respondents are marketing or sales operations directors of major companies like GSK, 
Johnson & Johnson and Abbott.4  
                                                        
4 Note that our approach does not warrant the respondents of the stated-choice task to be managers in competing 
firms, i.e. needs competitor participation. The respondents can be consultants who have had experience in 
managing physician-directed detailing themselves or for their clients. The assumption is that our respondents 
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We presented them with the actual market situation of the four major drugs in the 
market, including information regarding the manufacturer, patent protection time and 
market share. To circumvent confidentiality and social desirability issues, our respondents 
did not inform us on their own company policy. They were asked to infer the detailing 
allocation behavior toward different physician types for two of the four major players in 
the statin category.5 We obtained a list of potential key informants from Quintiles 
Transnational Corporation, which is the largest provider of sales force services in the 
pharmaceutical industry. We contacted potential informants by phone or email to screen 
them on their involvement in pharmaceutical sales force allocation and size decisions. 
Ultimately, 26 respondents out of the 63 respondents who passed our initial screening 
participated, achieving a response rate of 41%. On average they have more than ten years 
of experience in the pharmaceutical industry. 
To consistently inform them, the respondents were first given some background 
information on the market situation and some pros and cons of hiring and firing sales reps. 
Following the guidelines of Ben Akiva et al. (1994), we provided respondents with a base 
scenario, in which they were asked to take the position of one firm in the statins category 
and allocate detailing across four physician types. The base scenario mimics the situation 
in the panel data and intends to measure the validity of the stated data. A physician type is 
described by three attributes, having three levels each, yielding 27 types. Given the limited 
number of types, we created a full-factorial design and used an interchange heuristic to 
minimize the correlation between attributes within a respondent’s profiles. The first 
attribute is the physician’s prescription volume, with levels: low (two prescriptions per 
quarter), middle (four prescriptions per quarter) and high (six prescriptions per quarter). 
The second attribute is the physician’s responsiveness to detailing, whether low, middle or 
high. The third attribute is competitive detailing, with levels low, middle and high, 
respectively corresponding to one, three and five details per quarter. The specific levels for 
prescription volume and detailing are informed by the revealed prescription and detailing 
data. We chose three-level attributes to allow for nonlinear effects and not succumb to the 
number-of-levels problem (Wittink et al. 1989). 
Next, we presented the respondents with three hypothetical policy shifts and asked 
them to indicate the expected percentage change in the total size of the firm’s sales force 
and, again, to allocate their detailing across four physician types. These three hypothetical 
policy shifts were randomly drawn from a total set of six such shifts, namely: (1) 10% 
                                                                                                                                            
know the nature of the supply-side conduct between firms and respond accordingly, but the econometrician has 
some uncertainty about the nature of inter-firm conduct. 
5 As a reviewer pointed out, this does not enable the respondent to extract private company information. 
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detailing reduction for Lipitor; (2) 25% detailing reduction for Lipitor; (3) 40% detailing 
reduction for Lipitor; (4) 10% detailing reduction for Pravachol; (5) 25% detailing 
reduction for Pravachol; and (6) 40% detailing reduction for Pravachol. 
Respondents, in total, go through three cycles of one base scenario and three 
hypothetical policy shifts. In order to reduce cognitive effort, the four physician types 
among which they need to allocate detailing remain constant within a cycle, but vary 
across cycles. See Appendix 1A for more details on the conjoint experiment. 
Enrichment Procedure 
To enrich the revealed data with stated data and allow for its joint estimation, we 
first need to transform both to the same scale. The dependent variable for both datasets is 
transformed into the average monthly number of detailing visits per physician. The 
explanatory variables for both datasets are dummies indicating whether the physician 
scores low, middle or high on the three attributes, prescription volume, responsiveness to 
detailing and competitive details received.  
To transform the revealed data, we calculated as our dependent variable the 
average number of detailing visits for each physician in the last three months of our panel 
data. Then we classified, based on the outcomes of our demand-supply model discussed 
below, each of the physicians as one of 27 types, based on their score (low, middle, or 
high) on each of the three attributes: prescription volume, responsiveness to detailing and 
competitive details. 
The stated detailing data is obtained from “allocation of points” questions (the 
conjoint tasks), where the respondents had to allocate 100 detailing visits over four 
different types of physicians. Per conjoint task, we multiplied the stated allocation with the 
total number of detailing visits these four physician types jointly received, on average, in 
the last three months of the panel data.6 For every respondent, the dependent variable is 
now the average monthly number of detailing visits under the base scenario. For the 
hypothetical policy shifts, we adjust these numbers by the specified increase/decrease in 
the size of the sales force. 
Next, we test whether the revealed and stated detailing data can be pooled under 
the base scenario by stacking both datasets and estimate the following equation: 
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6 Under the base scenario, both datasets have now the same number of average detailing visits. 
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where Det and X are detailing and the explanatory variables respectively and the subscripts 
revealed and stated refer to the data source. Į is a common constant for both datasets, μ is 
the scale factor and the vector ȕ contains source-specific coefficients. 
The two datasets have different sources of variation. First, the uncertainty about 
the attributes and decision environment may differ in both datasets. Second, the stated data 
reflect respondent heterogeneity while the revealed data contain implemented policies. 
Third, the stated data assume perfect targetability of respondents. To treat these data-
source-specific differences we allow for a scale factor and heteroscedastic errors in 
Equation (1.1) and conduct a two-step test for poolability. In the first step, we allow for an 
unrestricted scale factor μ for the stated data and conduct a Chow test on ȕrevealed=ȕstated. 
Conditional on acceptance of the Chow test, we can test whether μ is equal to one using a 
likelihood ratio test.7 
If both tests are passed, the datasets can be pooled directly. In case the models 
only differ by a scale factor μ, we can still pool the estimations and make forecasts based 
on our conjoint data, taking the scale factor into account. If the parameter equality test 
fails, we should impose fewer restrictions on the parameter equality and compute 
additional scale factors between parameters (see e.g. Mark and Swait 2004; Swait and 
Louviere 1993). The scale factor can be interpreted in the same way as the external effects 
adjustments in conjoint analysis (see Orme and Johnson 2006). Recognizing the various 
differences between the stated behavior of respondents and real-world behavior, they 
propose simple adjustments, such as a scale factor, to improve real-world predictions. 
An assumption underlying our policy shift simulations is that the demand side is 
stable over time, irrespective of the policy shift concerning detailing (i.e. not subject to the 
Lucas critique). We assume physicians to act in the patient’s best interest and to not 
change their decision process after a marketing policy shift.8 If one wishes to test or relieve 
this assumption within our framework, one could do so by collecting additional data about 
the behavior on the demand side after the policy shift.  
Model 
Our data enrichment approach combines a demand-supply model estimated on 
revealed data, which does not contain the anticipated policy shift, with a supply model on 
stated responses in a conjoint experiment to the policy shift. We first discuss the demand-
                                                        
7 Note, that our data enrichment approach does not require us to make any assumptions on inter-firm conduct.  
8 Structural models also make the same assumption while conducting counterfactual experiments. Because the 
model parameters in this approach are behavioral primitives, the Lucas critique may be allayed and probably not 
even hold. Since our demand-model is a structural model the same pros and cons of the structural approach 
pertaining to demand-side parameters hold in our model as well. 
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supply model calibrated on secondary data and its estimation. Then we turn to the stated 
supply model estimated on the conjoint data. We end by discussing the operationalization 
of the enrichment procedure. 
Demand-Supply Model on Revealed Prescription and Detailing Data 
Our demand-supply models physician’s prescription behavior and accommodates 
non-randomness in detailing allocation, to account for the fact that firms devote more 
energy to large volume physicians or physicians that are more responsive to detailing 
(Manchanda et al. 2004). The prescriptions are modeled by a multivariate Poisson 
regression model with a full (co)variance matrix allowing for overdispersion, as in Chib 
and Winkelmann (2001). We extend their model by allowing for individual-specific 
variables. The probability of l prescriptions, Rxijt, for physician i = 1…I, brand j = 1…J 
and month t = 1…T is given by: 
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Here Ȟ is the conditional mean that has to be positive, because we only observe 
positive outcomes of Rx. Det denotes the number of detailing visits (either own or 
competitive ones) received during the corresponding time period. To accommodate 
trending patterns and category growth, we include a linear-quadratic operationalization of 
the Trend variable. ȟ proxies for other variables that are observed by the physician but not 
by the researcher. These include but are not limited to: direct-to-consumer advertising 
(DTCA), symposium meetings and medical journal reading. The individual- and brand-
specific ȕ-parameters are distributed with brand-specific mean jEP  and a full within-brand 
covariance matrix .jE6  
The parameter ȕ0ij is a physician- and brand-specific constant capturing all time-
invariant factors influencing the physician’s prescription behavior for a certain brand. This 
Essay 1 
 
18 
 
parameter mainly reflects the physician’s base preference for a brand, but can also 
subsume other factors like the size of the practice and the types of patients the respective 
physician treats. This base prescription level of a physician for a certain brand is likely to 
influence the detailing effort directed to that physician by pharmaceutical firms.  
ȕ1ij is the physician’s responsiveness to detailing for brand j, which is also likely 
to be correlated with the detailing activity of pharmaceutical firms toward a physician.9 ȕ2ij 
measures the influence of competitive detailing, summed across all brands, on physicians’ 
prescription behavior.10 In order to accommodate carryover effects both in own and 
competing prescriptions, we include )1ln( 1, tijRx  and )1ln( 1, ¦
z

jk
tikRx respectively as 
additional covariates. ȕ3ij reflects the own-brand carryover effect for physician i and ȕ4ij 
measures the carryover influence of the competitive prescriptions.  
The trend variables ȕ5ij and ȕ6ij measure a physician- and brand-specific time trend 
to capture the dynamics caused by the introduction of Crestor, category expansion and 
other news affecting the drugs in the statins market. As Crestor was introduced at the start 
of our dataset, we also included the dummy IntroCrestor, which takes the value one for 
Crestor in the first month of our data and zero for all others observations.  
To ensure that the omission of unobserved demand drivers does not alter our main 
results, we capture these effects mainly by the inclusion of full covariance matrices jE6  
and Ȉȟ. The latter captures the contemporaneous correlations between brands observed by 
the physicians and firms but not observed by the researcher.  
To correct for the strategic behavior of firms concerning their detailing allocation per 
month, brand and physician, we specify an extra equation for detailing (supply) similar to 
Manchanda et al. (2004).11 We model the number of detailing visits by a Poisson model: 
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Here the conditional mean w of Equation (1.5) is a function of the constant in the 
prescription equation ȕ0ij, the response coefficient ȕ1ij and competitive detailing:  
                                                        
9 We use a log-log relation, which approximates a linear relationship between detailing and prescriptions. We 
have also specified a version of our model with detailing transformed to 1/(1+Det) to allow for decreasing 
marginal effects of detailing (see Dong et al. 2008). This transformation did not alter our results because 
physicians in our data usually receive less than two detailing visits per month. 
10 This model choice is driven by parsimony considerations. An extension that accommodates each competing 
brand separately is straightforward. 
11 Note, our detailing model does not assume any specific supply-side model of inter-firm conduct. Our detailing 
model simply accounts for non-random choice of detailing levels across physicians.  
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The response parameters ȕ0ij and ȕ1ij from the prescription response model are 
divided by 1-ȕ3ij to account for carryover effects. We can interpret these terms as the long-
term coefficients of base prescription volume and detailing responsiveness. Ȗ0j reflects a 
brand’s base detailing allocation, which we allow to differ across brands. Ȗ1j captures the 
influence of physicians’ base prescription volume for brand j on the mean number of 
detailing visits for the same brand. Ȗ2j measures the influence of physicians’ responsiveness 
to detailing of brand j and Ȗ3j the influence of competitive detailing visits from the last 
period. Note that in this extended version of the Manchanda et al. (2004) model, both the 
demand- and supply-equation include competitive activities, which is especially relevant 
when one considers a policy shift that likely changes the interactions between the market 
players. The error term ȗ is assumed to have a normal distribution for brand 1…J and is 
uncorrelated with the demand-side error ȟ. The demand and supply model in Equation 
(1.3) and (1.6) are however related to the common appearance of ȕ0ij, ȕ1ij and ȕ3ij. The 
complete estimation procedure, as specified above, is presented in Appendix 1B. 
Supply Model on Stated Detailing Data 
To estimate how competing firms reallocate their detailing after various policy 
shifts, we have to model the outcomes of the conjoint experiment. We separately model the 
allocation per brand and per scenario, which results in 18 scenarios, six for the two brands 
that do not initiate a policy shift and three for the two brands initiating a policy shift. 
Similar to the supply model on the revealed data, we make detailing a function of 
physicians’ prescription volume, detailing responsiveness and competitive detailing. 
Because the respondents have diverse backgrounds and insights, we allow for 
heterogeneity in their parameters by estimating a hierarchical linear model with the 
average number of details as the dependent variable.  
Results 
Results of Demand and Supply Model on Observed Data 
The results of the demand and supply model, estimated on our revealed 
prescription and detailing data for a sample of 1,585 physicians, are shown in Table 1.1. 
The first row of Table 1.1 shows the brand constants, which are proportional to the brands’ 
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market shares. The (own) detailing effect is positive for all brands, which means that 
detailing calls positively influence the number of prescriptions a physician writes for the 
brand. The long-term effects of detailing can be approximated by dividing the detailing 
coefficient by one minus the carryover effect, ȕ1ij / (1-ȕ3ij). These long-term detailing 
effects are: 1.34 for Crestor, .32 for Lipitor, .37 for Pravachol and .60 for Zocor. The 
detailing effect for the recently introduced brand, Crestor, is much higher compared to the 
other brands. This is in line with the conclusions of Narayanan et al. (2005) that the 
detailing effect is greater in the early stages of the product life cycle.  
The trend variables are scaled to be between zero and one. For Crestor we observe 
a positive trend and for the other brands we observe small trend coefficients, indicating 
almost no growth during the estimation period, which is supported by the monthly number 
of prescriptions we observe.  
The carryover effects are positive for all brands, being the largest for Crestor (.57) 
and the smallest for Lipitor (.38). The competitive carry-over effects in prescriptions are 
slightly positive, ranging from .08 for Lipitor to .15 for Zocor. The competitive detailing 
effects are negative for all brands, but only significantly so for Crestor and Pravachol. The 
effect is largest for the new brand, Crestor, which seems to be more vulnerable. The reason 
may be that physicians’ preference structure is more uncertain for new brands than mature 
brands.  
For Crestor, we also estimate a negative introduction dummy of -.1.02. The 
reason is that Crestor was approved on the 12th of August 2003 and thus the first period 
contains sales of only half a month.  
The covariance matrix shows that the variance/covariance is significantly positive 
between the incumbent brands. The covariance between Crestor and the incumbent brands 
is relatively large and negative, capturing switching behavior towards the new drug. While 
the competitive effects and long-term trend are already captured in the demand equation, 
the covariance captures the short-term variation in the market. The results of the 
covariance matrices jE6  can be found in Appendix 1C, Table 1C.1 till 1C.4. 
The estimates of the detailing model are given in the lower part of Table 1.1. The 
parameters indicate the strategic detailing behavior for the different brands. The constant 
indicates the base detailing level for all brands. Crestor shows the highest median value, -
1.41. It is quite common to see higher detailing levels around the introduction of a new 
brand, as detailing is found to be most effective in the introduction stage (Narayanan et al. 
2005; Neslin 2001; Osinga et al. 2010).  
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For all four brands, we find negative values for the parameter indicating the 
influence of physician’s base prescription volume on the number of details received. 
Remember that the effect of base prescription volume is given by ¸¸¹
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positive influence of phycicians’ prescription volume on the number of details they 
receive. The effect ranges from -.18 for Pravachol to -1.26 for Lipitor, in line with 
Manchanda et al. (2004).  
The results also show that physicians receive more detailing calls as their 
responsiveness to detailing increases. This effect is significant for all brands, and largest 
for Lipitor (1.76). Manchanda et al. (2004) earlier found that physicians receive fewer 
detailing calls as their responsiveness to detailing increases. While recognizing the lack of 
logic in this finding, they attributed it to the absence of competitive detailing in their 
dataset. Our data and model contain such competitive detailing efforts and thereby obtain 
more intuitive estimates. 
We also find that physicians receive more detailing calls as they receive an 
increasing number of competitive detailing calls (see Dong et al. (2009b) for a similar 
result). This effect is significant for the established brands Lipitor, Pravachol and Zocor, 
and the effect is largest for the last one, .37. Firms seem to mimic each others’ detailing at 
the individual level. Such effects could start a vicious cycle, very much along the 
agurments of GSK’s former CEO, Garnier, we cited at the start of this paper, and can lead 
to an overload of sales calls to physicians.  
Results of the Stated Detailing Data 
We start with some descriptive outcomes of our conjoint experiment. Compared 
to the base scenario, respondents changed the size of their sales force in 34% of the 
hypothetical market scenarios. In line with the competitive reactions literature (Leeflang 
and Wittink 1996; Steenkamp et al. 2005), respondents changed their sales force levels 
more often the larger the market share of the brand initiating the shift and the larger the 
size of the shift was. For example, when market leader Lipitor decreases its sales force by 
40%, 61% of the respondents changed their sales force size, while a 10% sales force 
decrease of Pravachol only leads to a change in sales force size in 4% of the cases. 
The respondents on average changed the allocation of their sales force in the 
hypothetical scenarios in 52% of the cases, compared to their allocation in the base 
scenario, indicating the importance of taking allocation into account instead of size only. 
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Again, we observe a pattern in which larger policy shifts induce more respondents to 
change their allocation. 
Results of Data Enrichment 
Before actually enriching the revealed data with the stated data, we test whether 
both datasets can be pooled. For every brand, we have estimated Equation (1.1) and allow 
in the first step for a non-one scaling factor. The results are shown in Table 1.2. For all 
brands, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of data pooling. Tests for a scaling factor 
equal to one cannot be confirmed. The resulting scale factors are given in Table 1.2 and are 
fairly consistent across brands.  
As the scale factor applied to the stated data is smaller than one, the allocation of 
the conjoint respondents is more extreme towards the low and high levels of the 
physicians’ attributes. A possible explanation is that in the stated data perfect targetability 
is assumed, while in reality there exists more uncertainty about the physician attributes. 
Based on these test results, we can pool the data across datasets and given the 
consistency of the scaling factors across brands, we conclude that the conjoint data have 
face validity. Under the assumption that the preference structure across base and 
hypothetical scenarios are the same, we can now safely apply the recovered scaling factors 
to the hypothetical market scenarios.  
We present the pooled estimates on the revealed and stated detailing data under 
the base scenario in Table 1.3. We obtain results that are similar to the estimates of the 
revealed preference model, as we find that high-volume physicians, detailing-responsive 
physicians and those who receive more competitive details, are detailed more than their 
counterparts that score low on these variables. For the last two variables we observe some 
evidence for nonlinearity. Table 1C.5 shows the estimations of the detailing allocation 
under all six hypothetical market scenarios, corrected by the firm-specific scale factor. 
These estimations are used in the market simulations to compute the detailing allocations 
after the policy shifts. 
Table 1.4 provides the outcomes of the market simulations after enriching the 
revealed data with the stated data under the different conjoint scenarios. It shows for each 
of the six hypothetical market scenarios the differences between the situation before and 
after the policy shift. The fourth column shows the relative change in details, the fifth 
column the relative change in prescriptions and column six gives the absolute change in 
market share. The absolute change in profit margin is given in the seventh column and the 
last column shows the relative change in market size. The absolute changes are calculated 
by: new value – old value; the relative changes are calculated by: (new value – old value) / 
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old value. As an example, the first row considers the implications for Crestor after a 10% 
decrease in detailing of Lipitor. This leads to a sales force increase for Crestor of 2.77%, 
an increase in prescriptions of 2.58% and a change in the market size of -.58%. The market 
share of Crestor increases .38 percentage points and its profit margin decreases .30 
percentage points. We calculated profit margins based on the costs of a detailing visit and 
the revenues of prescriptions. We use a value of $150 for the cost (all-in, except samples) 
of an average detailing call, based on company records of Quintiles Transnational 
Corporation, the largest provider of pharmaceutical sales services. We use values of $70 
for Crestor, $90 for Lipitor, $80 for Pravachol and $100 for Zocor, for the revenue of a 
single prescription, based on data from IMS Health and Consumer Reports12. We do not 
subtract a manufacturing cost, which is not available to us, but, at the same time, known to 
be very small.  
Table 1.4 leads to the following conclusions. First, it makes a big difference 
whether Lipitor or Pravachol initiate the policy shift. While a decrease in detailing for 
market leader Lipitor often triggers competitors to also decrease their sales force, a 
decrease in detailing for Pravachol typically triggers competitors more often to increase the 
number of detailing calls.  
Second, there is only one scenario that is beneficial for all four companies. When 
market leader Lipitor decreases its sales force by 40%, it will increase its profit margin by 
8.52%, while Crestor (12.62%), Pravachol (2.33%), and Zocor (7.00%) also all increase 
their profit margin. 
Third, for every policy shift the initiator increased its profit margin. This finding 
can be seen as evidence for ‘overdetailing’ in this therapeutic category (see also Montoya 
et al. 2009). The profits of competitors (e.g. Crestor) can either increase or decrease. 
Fourth, all downward policy shifts in detailing lead to a smaller category size 
ranging from a decrease of .58% when Lipitor lowers detailing by 10%, to a market-size 
decrease of 4.41% when Lipitor decreases its sales force by 40%. This finding shows that 
total market size of a category can shrink as a consequence of one brand reducing its 
detailing, but possibly only so when the detailing decrease is large enough. The latter part 
may explain the contrast between our findings and the findings of Narayanan et al. (2004), 
on a dataset with more limited variation in detailing supply. 
                                                        
12 IMS Midas price system and Consumer Reports best buy drugs: The Statin Drugs (January 2006). 
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Validation 
We internally validate our results by conducting various robustness checks on the 
demand-supply model and the model for the conjoint-derived outcomes. We have tested 
for a marginally decreasing effect of detailing in Equation (1.3) by transforming the 
detailing to 1/(1 + Det), as is done in Dong et al. (2009a). We also considered different 
forms for the trend terms and tested whether they are equal across brands. The robustness 
of the detailing equation is tested by including a lagged versus a contemporaneous effect of 
competitive detailing. We have estimated a model where we dropped the carryover effect 
from Equation (1.6). All these changes did not change our four main results substantially, 
which strengthens the confidence in our results. The results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
Concerning our market simulations, we recognize that our results are subject to 
the cost and revenue figures chosen. Therefore we run a sensitivity analysis for the 
scenario in which Lipitor decreases its sales force by 40%. We calculate the profit margin 
change under a low and high estimate for the cost of detailing, $100 and $200 respectively, 
and a low (20% lower) and high (20% higher) revenue per prescription. Table 1.5 shows 
that the outcomes are robust to the chosen numbers and that only the levels of the 
outcomes shift. 
For external validation, we distinguish between outcomes obtained by merely 
extrapolating outside the data range, but within the policies observed in the data, and 
extrapolating beyond the policies observed in the data. As our goal is to gauge the 
outcomes of a policy shifts before initiation we do not observe the actual outcomes of the 
shift and therefore we resort to alternative ways of validation. 
A 10% decrease in detailing can reasonably be considered as a form of data 
extrapolation. Hence, we compare the outcomes obtained with data enrichment to the 
outcomes without enriching the data. We do this by applying a single shock to the demand- 
and supply system in Equations (1.2)-(1.6). For the 10% decrease in detailing for 
Pravachol and Lipitor detailing decreases now for every firm, but the outcomes in terms of 
profits are mixed, similar to our main results. If we simulate a 40% sales force reduction of 
Lipitor without enriching the data, we obtain lower detailing levels for all companies, but 
mixed changes in profit margins. Compared to the main results, the detailing decreases for 
the followers are much smaller. We can also compare the outcomes with Berndt et al. 
(2003), who consider a detailing change of similar size, i.e. a 10% increase for all market 
players in the H2-antagonist antiulcer drugs category. They find mixed results in terms of 
profits across drugs and profit changes in a similar range as we find. 
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We identify four relevant external validation approaches, to validate the outcomes 
outside the policies observed in our data. First, the outcomes are validated by comparing 
them to the academic literature. Second, outcomes are compared with another policy shift 
in the pharmaceutical industry. Third, the outcomes are compared with similar situations in 
other industries. Fourth, the results are shown to a set of experts for evaluation. 
The academic literature supports our findings. The competitive reactions literature 
agrees that a larger policy shift elicits stronger competitive reactions, (e.g. Leeflang and 
Wittink 1996; Steenkamp et al. 2005). Furthermore, mainly big firms are able to change 
the norms of competitive conduct in the market (Scherer and Ross 1990). This is exactly 
what we find in our results where only a 40% decrease in detailing of market leader (and 
biggest pharmaceutical firm) Pfizer, triggers substantial and aligned competitive reactions. 
This policy shift likely changes the rules of competitive interaction (Thomas and Soldow 
1988).  
In the pharmaceutical market, firms signaled that the detailing arms race should 
be ended, and although it did not have an immediate effect, Pfizer announced on 
November 28, 2006 a large sales force cut (New York Times 2006a). Also fueled by two 
major patent expiries in the statins category earlier that year, detailing in the statins 
category decreased that same quarter by almost 15%, and the firms aligned their detailing 
decreases (ranging from 6 to 19%) similar to what we observe for the scenario in which 
Lipitor decreases its detailing by 40%.  
Comparing our results to other industries yields many similar solutions to end an 
arms race as we identified above. Arms races in the airline industry, cigarette industry, 
gasoline market, retailing, shaving industry and telecommunications have all come to an 
end at a certain point and some of them have done that by initiating a policy shift. The 
examples of P&G (Ailawadi et al. 2001; Ailawadi et al. 2005) and Philip Morris (Chen et 
al. 2009) are compelling examples of the effectiveness of a policy shift. They also show 
that a large shift by the market leader (in the cigarette industry, Philip Morris initiated a 
price shift of 20%) is able to buck the trend and set new competitive market conduct. 
We have also done a convenience survey among a new set of pharmaceutical 
managers to shed light on the results of our research. The main question was “If you agree 
that there is an arms race in the pharmaceutical industry, why is there no market leader that 
ends the arms race by making a major reduction in sales forces?” 92% agrees that there 
is/was an arms race in the pharmaceutical industry. Answers can be categorized into M&A 
solutions, sales force reductions due to other factors such as patent expiries, and risk 
aversion: ‘too risky to miss out any opportunity in the market’ and ‘no company wants to 
be the first to withdraw troops from the battlefield.’ They also recognized that some firms 
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have already been decreasing their sales forces. In general, these responses show much 
similarity to the lack of strategic competitive reasoning reported in Montgomery et al. 
(2005). 
Discussion 
In this paper, we gauge the consequences of a downward, firm-initiated policy 
shift in pharmaceutical detailing. The results indicate first that a large policy shift of the 
market leader (a 40% decrease in the sales force of Lipitor) was the only shift that was 
profitable for all firms in the market. This seems to explain part of the arms race in sales 
forces, where small changes in the sales force are apparently not able to buck the trend in a 
profitable way and a drastic reduction of the sales force of the market leader is needed. 
Second, the policy shift initiator always increased its profit margin by decreasing its sales 
force, while its competitors’ profits may both increase and decrease after the policy shift. 
Third, all downward policy shifts in detailing we consider lead to a decrease in category 
size. 
We also provide an alternative decision support tool for firms and public policy 
makers to gauge the firm-level consequences of large policy shifts, taking into account 
their impact on demand and competitive response. We use stated detailing data (obtained 
through a conjoint experiment) to complement past panel data on prescriptions and 
detailing. The idea behind our method can be extended to gauge any kind of policy shift 
before it is initiated, if the researcher collects additional data on the parameters that cannot 
be generalized beyond the policy observed in the data. The tradeoff for the researcher is 
how the costs of additional data collection compare to an experiment in a test market, and 
whether it offsets the limitations of the readily available data and methods.  
Implications for Managers and Public Policy 
Our approach and findings have several implications for managers and public 
policy. First, we show that only a large downward detailing policy shift by the market 
leader can buck the trend in pharmaceutical detailing in the entire category. Pharmaceutical 
companies share concern about how their industry is viewed by care providers, 
government and society at large. Excessive physician detailing is one main reason for the 
negative perceptions among these stakeholders. Our results provide support for market 
leaders to take their responsibility in curtailing detailing, as only they have the visibility 
needed to curb detailing levels in the entire category. If market leaders do not take their 
responsibility, governments should consider intervention by means of ‘soft coordination’ 
or by restricting detailing by law. Several states in the U.S. have already implemented laws 
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restricting pharmaceutical marketing and the U.S. government can also learn from the 
regulations across the world (see Stremersch and Lemmens 2009). 
Second, our results show that for many pharmaceutical firms reducing their 
detailing to physicians would be a profit-enhancing strategy. While considered by many 
firms, very few firms greatly reduced their detailing efforts. Our findings show that profit-
maximizing firms should reduce their sales forces. As lower profits imply lower R&D 
expenditures, government might also consider intervention. 
Third, we find that category size decreased with a downward policy shift in 
detailing. This finding can inform the public policy debate on the public health effects of 
detailing, as it shows that detailing does not only affect the market share of drugs within 
the category but also overall prescriptions in the category. Depending upon public policy’s 
goals, whether cost reduction or drug access enhancement, policy makers may consider 
curtailing detailing efforts of manufacturers. 
The literature has identified different routes to buck the trend in an arms race: (1) 
coordination among competitors (e.g. by information sharing), (2) setting a new market 
conduct by initiating a policy shift, (3) a firm-initiated change in the market structure, such 
as radical new product introduction or mergers and acquisitions, and (4) regulatory 
changes. If firms are in an undesirable market state, coordination within legal bounds is the 
first solution considered. This can be achieved by an external party like the government, 
another interest group, or the firms themselves. Firms often spread their opinions and hint 
on possible actions, called signaling. Signals are then often followed by an action of one of 
the market players. The government or other interest groups can have an interest in 
disseminating information to the market that can trigger companies or industries to change 
their practice or they can just negotiate directly with the relevant market players to obtain a 
more favorable market outcome. Setting a new market conduct by changing your own 
policy can also be a successful but risky way to buck the trend. Another possibility to buck 
the trend is to change the market structure, which partly explains the recent spur in mergers 
and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry, which was also mentioned by the 
managers involved in our study as a possible solution to the arms race. Finally, the 
government could consider interfering in a market with regulations. The U.S. federal 
government has not done much so far, which triggered the states to design their own 
regulations, restricting pharmaceutical marketing (Huffington Post 2008), such as 
compulsory licensing for detailers in D.C., restrictions in physician data (e.g. New 
Hampshire), prohibition of gifts (e.g. Vermont) and counterdetailing (e.g. Pennsylvania). 
Finally, the data enrichment methodology we develop can gauge the likely 
consequences of policy shifts ex ante. Whereas advanced econometric methods often 
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perform well in forecasting, managers tend not to accept these black boxes to base their 
decisions on (Little 1970). Our method can add to the use of sound quantitative methods to 
make important decisions, as it makes use of a standard demand-and-supply model and 
conjoint analysis that organizations are increasingly more familiar with. In case of the 
pharmaceutical industry, the different interest groups can use our approach as a 
coordination tool. Federal and state governments can use it as a ‘soft coordination’ tool to 
convince companies to scale down their detailing. For other interest groups like PhRMA (a 
trade group representing the pharmaceutical companies), the American College of 
Physicians (ACP) and the American Medical Association (AMA) it can also be very 
helpful to gauge the consequences of hypothetical policy shifts. 
Limitations and Future Research 
As with any new research endeavor, while much ground has been covered, much 
work remains. First, we do not consider all of the firms’ marketing efforts, restricting our 
model to detailing for simplicity. While marketing budgets are set across marketing 
instruments, it is unlikely that the targeting of these other instruments is in direct 
accordance to the detailing allocation within the same time frame. Direct-to-consumer 
advertising (DTCA) and journal advertising reach the physician in completely different 
ways than detailing. DTCA reaches the physicians via patients and journal advertising is 
based on physician reading behavior. Meetings are more likely to be set in accordance with 
detailing. However, meeting expenditures are relatively small (one-fifth of the detailing 
expenditures, see Donohue et al. 2007). And, moreover, they are often organized around 
special events of a drug, such as the approval of a new dosage or a new drug form. Thus, 
while the absence of other marketing instruments limits our insights, it may not yield any 
bias in the insights we gain on detailing. 
Second, we acknowledge that firms also allocate their sales reps across their 
products, so downsizing the sales force for a brand in one therapeutic category can affect 
the other brands of the firm. Such effects are not captured by the present study.  
A third limitation is that we consider the firm-initiated policy shift as fixed as the 
firm is not allowed to react to competitive reactions following its initiation. In reality, a 
large policy shift can involve different rounds with multiple competitive reactions such as 
in the Dutch retail price war (Van Heerde et al. 2008). The policy shift of Philip Morris 
(Chen et al. 2009), on the other hand, involved only one round. Philip Morris changed the 
prices of its products and after two to three months, the competitors followed suit. Studies 
extending our research to multiple-round interactions between firms seem valuable. 
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A fourth limitation is that the predictive validity of our conclusions hinges on the 
accuracy of conjoint respondents’ assessment of competitive responses to the initiated 
policy shift. While we have taken great care in key informant selection and the data we 
obtained from the conjoint experiment displays high face validity, given the results we 
presented before, our core argument is not that enriching conjoint data from key 
informants with revealed data delivers perfect forecasts. Rather, we show how such stated 
key informant data – as an imperfect guesstimate on future competitive reactions – can be 
consistently combined with revealed data to gauge the consequences of policy shifts. 
Future research can also fruitfully extend our present paper in other ways. Ideally, 
one compares the forecasts from our data enrichment method with a real future policy shift 
to evaluate the external predictive validity. It would also be valuable to test the strength of 
conjoint analysis to decompose hypothetical market scenarios into different attributes. Our 
current approach gauges the consequences of policy shifts that are determined upfront. A 
delineation of policy shifts in conjoint attributes and levels would allow the researcher to 
consider a much wider range of policy shifts. 
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Tables 
Table 1.1: Parameter Estimates for Revealed Prescription and Detailing Model 
 
Prescription Model Crestor Lipitor Pravachol Zocor 
Constant -1.11 (-1.49,-.80) 
-.28 
(-.40,-.15) 
-1.68 
(-2.30,-1.16) 
-.50 
(-.62,-.35) 
Ln(Own Detailing) .58 (.54,.65) 
.23 
(.16,.31) 
.19 
(.12,.26) 
.32 
(.28,.36) 
Ln(Competitive Detailing)  -.34 (-.44,-.22) 
-.01 
(-.07,.09) 
-.09 
(-.12,-.07) 
-.03 
(-.10,.02) 
Ln(Own Prescriptions (t-1)) .57 (.54,.61) 
.38 
(.36,.41) 
.48 
(.45,.51) 
.47 
(.44,.50) 
Ln(Competitive Prescriptions (t-1)) .11 (.07,.15) 
.08 
(.06,.10) 
.09 
(-.01,.17) 
.15 
(.10,.19) 
Trend  .44 (.36,.53) 
.09 
(.07,.11) 
-.01 
(-.03,.00) 
.07 
(.06,.09) 
Trend squared  -.35 (-.43,-.30) 
-.03 
(-.04,-.01) 
.01 
(.00,.02) 
-.07 
(-.08,-.06) 
Introduction Dummy -1.02 (-1.17,-.86)    
Covariance     
Crestor .28 (.20,.36) 
-.53 
(-.69,-.41) 
-.17 
(-.22,-.13) 
-.34 
(-.43,-.26) 
Lipitor -.53 (-.69,-.41) 
1.07 
(.78,1.38) 
.33 
(.24,.42) 
.66 
(.47,.85) 
Pravachol -.17 (-.22,-.13) 
.33 
(.24,.42) 
.12 
(.09,.15) 
.20 
(.15,.26) 
Zocor -.34 (-.43,-.26) 
.66 
(.47,.85) 
.20 
(.15,.26) 
.45 
(.33,.58) 
Detailing Model     
Constant -1.41 (-1.87, -1.17) 
-1.67 
(-1.84, -1.29) 
-2.13 
(-2.46, -1.96) 
-1.60 
(-1.87, -1.40) 
Rx Volume -.41 (-.71, -.17) 
-1.26 
(-1.51, -.69) 
-.18 
(-.44, -.03) 
-.63 
(-.75, -.44) 
Responsiveness .64 (.42, .90) 
1.76 
(1.41, 2.47) 
.88 
(.63, 1.13) 
.74 
(.54, 1.16) 
Ln(Competitive Detailing (t-1)) .19 (-.04, .32) 
.24 
(.13, .31) 
.35 
(.29, .42) 
.37 
(.31, .41) 
Note: The 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles are given in parentheses.
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Table 1.2: Data Can Be Pooled Up to a Non-One Scale Factor 
 
 
1RWH7KHFULWLFDOYDOXHLVEDVHGRQDQĮRI 
 
  
 
Chow Test Statistic with Scale Factor Scale Factor 
Crestor .74 .38 
Lipitor 1.56 .57 
Pravachol 1.48 .52 
Zocor 1.24 .31 
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Table 1.3: Pooled Estimates of the Detailing Model, Based on Revealed and Stated Detailing Data (95% 
confidence interval in brackets). 
 
    
Crestor Lipitor Pravachol Zocor 
Constant 
  
.10 (.05, .14) .18 (.13, .22) -.03 (-.06, .01) .33 (.26, .40) 
Prescription 
Volume 
Low -.17 (-.20, -.11) -.19 (-.25, -.10) -.07 (-.13, -.03) -.07 (-.11, -.02) 
Mid -.10 (-.14, -.05) -.07 (-.11, -.02) -.04 (-.09, .01) -.05 (-.10, .00) 
High .27 (.21, .34) .26 (.18, .33) .11 (.06, .17) .12 (.07, .20) 
Responsiveness 
to Detailing 
Low -.09 (-.12, -.06) -.04 (-.09, .00) -.06 (-.11, -.01) -.06 (.-10, .01) 
Mid .02 (-.02, .05) -.04 (-.07, .00) -.03 (-.06, .01) -.02 (-.05, .02) 
High .07 (.03, .11) .08 (.01, .12) .09 (.04, .12) .08 (.02, .12) 
Competitive 
Detailing 
Levels 
Low .00 (-.04, .04) -.02 (-.06, .03) -.03 (-.06, .00) -.04 (-.06, -.02) 
Mid -.03 (-.06, .00) -.04 (-.07, .01) -.02 (-.06, .00) -.01 (-.04, .02) 
High .03 (-.01, .07) .06 (.01, .09) .05 (.01, .09) .05 (.02, .09) 
Note: The results are estimated using effects coding.
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Table 1.4: Outcome Measures after the Policy Shifts 
 
  
Market Changes after Policy Shift 
Shift in 
Detailing 
Shift 
Initiator Company Details Prescriptions 
Market 
Share 
Profit 
Margin 
Market 
Size 
-10% Lipitor 
Crestor 2.77% 2.58% .38% -.30% 
-.58% 
Lipitor -10.00% -3.87% -1.53% 1.73% 
Pravachol -.24% -4.14% -.50% -1.82% 
Zocor -3.65% 5.29% 1.65% 3.60% 
-25% Lipitor 
Crestor 1.02% .48% .34% -.90% 
-2.36% 
Lipitor -25.00% -4.14% -.84% 5.37% 
Pravachol -1.02% -2.64% -.04% -.75% 
Zocor -6.75% -.47% .54% 2.67% 
-40% Lipitor 
Crestor -9.12% -1.70% .34% 12.62% 
-4.41% 
Lipitor -40.00% -7.63% -1.56% 8.52% 
Pravachol -8.87% -3.86% .08% 2.33% 
Zocor -16.95% -.50% 1.14% 7.00% 
-10% Pravachol 
Crestor -.76% -.93% .02% -.30% 
-1.06% 
Lipitor 3.92% -2.09% -.48% -1.47% 
Pravachol -10.00% 1.83% .41% 4.73% 
Zocor -5.87% -.85% .06% 2.15% 
-25% Pravachol 
Crestor 16.68% 2.78% .46% -22.64% 
-1.02% 
Lipitor -5.33% -3.63% -1.22% .42% 
Pravachol -25.00% -1.46% -.06% 1.29% 
Zocor 6.09% 1.90% .83% -1.74% 
-40% Pravachol 
Crestor 18.58% -.49% .04% -32.09% 
-.86% 
Lipitor 3.65% -2.09% -.57% -1.40% 
Pravachol -40.00% -3.84% -.42% 16.51% 
Zocor 4.13% 2.49% .95% -.68% 
Note: The differences for details and prescriptions and market size are relative differences (new outcome – old 
outcome)/(old outcome). While the market share and profit margins are differences in share points (new 
percentage – old percentage).  
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Table 1.5: The Main Results Are Stable to Changes in Detail Costs and Revenues per Prescription  
 
  
Profit Margin Change after Policy Shift 
Policy shift Company Revenues -20% Detail costs 100 
Revenues -20% 
Detail costs 200 
Revenues +20% 
Detail costs 100 
Revenues +20% 
Detail costs 200 
Lipitor -40% 
Crestor 1.52% 21.04% 7.01% 14.02% 
Lipitor 7.10% 14.20% 4.73% 9.47% 
Pravachol 1.95% 3.89% 1.30% 2.59% 
Zocor 5.83% 11.67% 3.89% 7.78% 
 
  
Bucking the Trend in Pharmaceutical Detailing 
 
35 
 
Appendix 1A 
Here we provide the instructions for the conjoint experiment we conducted. 
Participants were shown the following introduction. 
 
“In the United States, physicians – both specialists and general practitioners – 
are often visited by representatives from pharmaceutical companies. These so-called sales 
reps are detailing the products of their company to the physicians.  
In this questionnaire, some scenarios of the pharmaceutical market are posed. 
You are asked to consider yourself as the decision maker concerning the size and 
allocation of the sales force in the different scenarios presented below. 
Background information: 
When firms consider strategic decisions concerning the size and allocation of 
their sales force, not only the costs and responsiveness of the physicians play a role. 
Reducing the sales force substantially brings along other problems. Firms have to deal 
with the people who lose their job often with generous severance packages. Those people 
carry intimate company knowledge with them and are (especially in the pharmaceutical 
industry) potential whistleblowers, which have cost the pharmaceutical industry enormous 
amounts of money. 
Increasing the sales force also brings some practical issues, such as the 
recruitment of suitable sales reps and their training.” 
 
Although the respondents all indicated that they were familiar with the allocation 
and size of the sales force, we presented them with both the benefits and downsides of 
increasing or decreasing the sales force to place the respondents in the desired decision 
environment (information acceleration). Next the respondents were shown an example 
page to become familiar with the conjoint tasks.  
 
“Below is an example of the tasks to perform in the rest of the questionnaire. 
Each time you have to act as one firm in the market. You are asked to make decisions in 
three different environments. Each environment contains one allocation task for the 
current market situation and then 3 general reactions and allocation questions after a 
policy shift of one of the competitive firms in the market.  
Imagine you are in the following situation of the U.S. market of statin drugs: (see 
Table 1A.1) 
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The firm for which you have to decide is shaded gray. The allocation concerns 
100 sales visits, which have to be divided among 4 different types of physicians.” 
 
Then the respondents were presented with 12 different allocation questions. They 
started with a base scenario mimicking the situation in the panel data (see Figure 1A.1). 
This was followed by three market scenarios, where one of the competing firms decreased 
the sales force. In those scenarios, the respondents were also asked how they would react 
with the size of the sales force (see Figure 1A.2). 
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Table 1A.1: The Market Situation Shown to Conjoint Respondents 
 
Company Drug Goes off Patent in Market Share 
Pfizer Lipitor 5 years 40% 
Merck Zocor 2 years 20% 
AstraZeneca Crestor 2 years 10% 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Pravachol 13 years 5% 
Note: The market share is the share that the drug of a firm has in the statins market (based on information in our 
panel data and in IMS Health aggregate-level data). 
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Figure 1A.1: Example of a Conjoint Task under the Base Scenario 
 
Environment 1 
 
Below the physician types are defined on 3 characteristics: 
1) Their prescription volume for the drug of your firm in the quarter before the 
policy shift. 
2) Their responsiveness to detailing visits. 
3) The number of competitive detailing visits they received in the last quarter. 
 
 
QUESTION: 
 
How would you divide the sales force for BMS’s Pravachol under the current market 
situation (as in the table above)? 
Divide 100 visits among the following 4 physician types. 
 
 
Prescription 
volume (number 
last quarter) 
Responsiveness 
to detailing 
Competitive 
detailing (number 
last quarter) 
# of visits of 
BMS in current 
market 
Type 1 Middle (4) High High (5)     
Type 2 High (6) Middle Middle (3)     
Type 3 Middle (4) Low Middle (3)     
Type 4 High (6) Low Low (1)     
    = 100 
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Figure 1A.2: Example of a Conjoint Task under a Policy Shift Scenario 
 
Environment 1, Scenario 1 
 
Imagine that Pfizer decides to cut back its sales force by 25 percent: 
 
How would BMS react for its brand Pravachol? Keep in mind that the other competitors 
are also likely to react at the same time. Pick one of the following answers and specify 
the change in sales force: 
 
  We (BMS) would decrease our sales force for statins with . . . . . percent. 
 We (BMS) would not react. 
 We (BMS) would increase our sales force for statins with . . . . . percent. 
 
 
Divide 100 visits among the following physician types after Pfizer has cut back its sales 
force for Lipitor by 25 percent: 
 
 Characteristics before policy shifty 
# of visits of 
BMS after 
sales force cut  
Prescription 
volume (number 
last quarter) 
Responsiveness 
to detailing 
Competitive 
detailing (number 
last quarter) 
Type 1 Middle (4) High High (5)     
Type 2 High (6) Middle Middle (3)     
Type 3 Middle (4) Low Middle (3)     
Type 4 High (6) Low Low (1)     
    = 100 
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Appendix 1B 
All parameters for our demand-supply model (Equations 1.2-1.6) are estimated 
using the sampling scheme below. The sampler ran for 40,000 iterations with the first 
20,000 discarded for burn-in. The prior structure for each ȕij is specified by 
,ijjij KGE         (1B.1) 
with įj a parameter vector, of 1 by K, to estimate, and Șij ~ NkȈȘM), for j = 1…J. The 
prior parameters are distributed as follows. 
),,(~ 00 RrIW[6
      
(1B.2)
 
),,(~| 1,0,
6'6' AN jjj KK  for j = 1…J.   (1B.3) 
),,(~ 00, KKK RrIWj6   for j = 1…J.   (1B.4) 
),,(~ 0 JJJ 6Nj    for j = 1…J.   (1B.5) 
with known hyperparameters r0, R0, ǻ0, A, rȘ, RȘ, Ȗ0, ȈȖ and IW(·,·) an Inverted Wishart 
distribution with r degrees of freedom and scale matrix R. 
We employed diffuse but proper priors with hyperparameters: r0 = 7, R0 = r0·I, ǻ0 
= 0, A = I, rȘ = 10, RȘ = rȘ·I, Ȗ0 = 0, ȈȖ = I, where I refers to the identity matrix of the 
appropriate size. 
The complete data likelihood for individual i is defined as follows: 
           
,
),|(
),,,|(
),,|,,,,(
,
,   6'6
tj jijijt
ijtjijijtijt
jjjijtijii Detf
DetRxf
DetRxp JE
[JEJ[E K[
 
(1B.6) 
with f(Rxijt|·) = Poisson(Rxijt) and f(Detijt|·) = Poisson(Detijt).  
Multiplying the likelihood now with the prior gives the posterior for the complete data 
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where we denote the priors with a bar below and the posterior with a bar above to 
distinguish both. We simulate from this distribution by sampling six parameter blocks 
using their conditional distributions.  
 
Step 1: The latent error term ȟijt can be drawn conditional on the betas and the posterior 
covariance matrix [6  by using a Metropolis-Hastings step. The log conditional posterior 
density kernel for ȟit is given by: 
  ,5.0)ln(),,|(ln '1 itit
j
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(1B.8) 
whereby a new candidate )( c
it
[S is accepted with probability  
^ `)1((/)(,1min  
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(1B.9) 
and otherwise the draw of the previous iteration )( )1(
it
[S is kept.  
Step 2: In the second step, the individual- and brand-specific parameters ȕij are sampled.13 
We can see Equation (1B.1) as the prior for ȕij. The posterior is also influenced by 
Equation (1.2) and (1.5) and the posterior for ȕij is sampled by a Metropolis-Hastings step 
having the following log conditional posterior density kernel: 
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(1B.10) 
Step 3: Then we can sample [6  from an inverted Wishart distribution by conditioning on 
the ȕ’s and the latent errors ȟ: 
).',(~,
,
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ti
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(1B.11) 
Step 4: Now the matrices j' are sampled conditional on the ȕ’s from step 1 and the 
covariance matrix j,K6 . Conditional on these parameters, this simplifies to a multivariate 
                                                        
13 For notational simplicity we have not distinguished here between the ȕij that differ over brands and the ȕi that 
are equal across brands. 
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regression model of which the conditional distribution is drawn by using the Gibbs 
algorithm: 
),)(),()((~, 1',0
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(1B.12) 
where in our case z is a vector consisting of ones. 
Step 5: This step samples the covariance matrices of the second layer of the model 
conditional on the individual ȕ-parameters and the posterior parameters for the individual 
characteristics .j'  Just as in step 4, we can easily draw the covariance using a multivariate 
regression model.  
).,(~, ,00, jijj SRNrIWj KKKK E '6     (1B.13) 
Here SȘ is given by 
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Step 6: This step samples the Ȗ-parameters by using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, 
where the log conditional posterior density kernel is given by: 
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Appendix 1C 
Table 1C.1: Covariance of the Demand Parameters for Crestor 
 
 
Con-
stant 
De-
tailing 
Com-
petitive 
Detail-
ing 
Own 
Prescrip-
tions 
Compe-
titive 
Prescrip-
tions 
Trend 
Trend 
squared 
Intro-
duction 
Dummy 
Constant 
.05 
(.04,.07) 
.02 
(.01,.04) 
.01 
(.00,.02) 
.01 
(.01,.03) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
.00 
(-.01,.00) 
.00 
(-.01,.00) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
Own 
Detailing 
.02 
(.01,.04) 
.05 
(.03,.06) 
.01 
(.00,.02) 
.01 
(.00,.02) 
-.02 
(-.03,-.01) 
-.01 
(-.01,.00) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
-.01 
(-.02,-.01) 
Compe-
titive 
Detailing 
.01 
(.00,.02) 
.01 
(.00,.02) 
.03 
(.02,.04) 
.01 
(.00,.02) 
-.01 
(.00,-.02) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
-.01 
(-.01,-.02) 
.00 
(.00,.00) 
Own 
Prescrip-
tions 
.01 
(.01,.03) 
.01 
(.00,.02) 
.01 
(.00,.02) 
.04 
(.02,.05) 
.00 
(.00,-.02) 
.00 
(-.01,.00) 
.00 
(-.01,.00) 
.01 
(.00,.01) 
Compe- 
titive 
Prescrip-
tions 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
-.02 
(-.03,-.01) 
-.01 
(.00,-.02) 
.00 
(.00,-.02) 
.04 
(.02,.05) 
.01 
(-.01,.01) 
-.01 
(-.01,.00) 
.00 
(.00,.00) 
Trend  
.00 
(-.01,.00) 
-.01 
(-.01,.00) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
.00 
(-.01,.00) 
.01 
(-.01,.01) 
.04 
(.03,.04) 
-.02 
(-.02,-.01) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
Trend 
squared 
.00 
(-.01,.00) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
-.01 
(-.01,-.02) 
.00 
(-.01,.00) 
-.01 
(-.01,.00) 
-.02 
(-.02,-.01) 
.03 
(.03,.05) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
Intro-
duction 
Dummy 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
-.01 
(-.02,-.01) 
.00 
(.00,.00) 
.01 
(.00,.01) 
.00 
(.00,.00) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
.02 
(.02,.03) 
Note: The 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles are given in parentheses. 
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Table 1C.2: Covariance of the Demand Parameters of Lipitor 
 
 
Constant Detailing 
Competitive 
Detailing 
Own 
Prescriptions 
Competitive 
Prescriptions 
Trend 
Trend 
squared 
Constant 
.14 
(.12,.17) 
.02 
(.01,.04) 
.00 
(.00,.02) 
.01 
(.01,.02) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
.01 
(.00,.02) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
Own 
Detailing 
.02 
(.01,.04) 
.07 
(.06,.09) 
.02 
(.02,.03) 
.01 
(.01,.02) 
-.01 
(-.02,-.01) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
Competitive 
Detailing 
.00 
(.00,.02) 
.02 
(.02,.03) 
.08 
(.07,.10) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
-.02 
(-.03,-.02) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
Own 
Prescriptions 
.01 
(.01,.02) 
.01 
(.01,.02) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
.06 
(.05,.08) 
-.01 
(-.02,.00) 
-.01 
(-.01,-.02) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
Competitive 
Prescriptions 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
-.01 
(-.02,-.01) 
-.02 
(-.03,-.02) 
-.01 
(-.02,.00) 
.07 
(.06,.07) 
.01 
(-.01,.03) 
-.01 
(-.01,,00) 
Trend  
.01 
(.00,.02) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
-.01 
(-.01,-.02) 
.01 
(-.01,.03) 
.05 
(.04,.06) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
Trend 
squared 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
-.01 
(-.01,,00) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
.05 
(.04,.06) 
Note: The 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles are given in parentheses. 
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Table 1C.3: Covariance of the Demand Parameters of Pravachol 
 
 
Constant Detailing 
Competitive 
Detailing 
Own 
Prescriptions 
Competitive 
Prescriptions 
Trend 
Trend 
squared 
Constant 
.02 
(.02,.04) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
.01 
(.00,.02) 
.00 
(-.01,.02) 
-.01 
(-.02,.00) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
.01 
(.01,.02) 
Own 
Detailing 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
.03 
(.02,.05) 
.02 
(.02,.03) 
.01 
(.00,.02) 
-.02 
(-.02,-.01) 
.00 
(-.02,.00) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
Competitive 
Detailing 
.01 
(.00,.02) 
.02 
(.02,.03) 
.03 
(.02,.04) 
.02 
(.01,.02) 
.00 
(-.02,.02) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
.00 
(-.01,.00) 
Own 
Prescriptions 
.00 
(-.01,.02) 
.01 
(.00,.02) 
.02 
(.01,.02) 
.04 
(.03,.04) 
.00 
(-.02,.01) 
.00 
(-.01,.00) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
Competitive 
Prescriptions 
-.01 
(-.02,.00) 
-.02 
(-.02,-.01) 
.00 
(-.02,.02) 
.00 
(-.02,.01) 
.02 
(.02,.03) 
.01 
(.00,.02) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
Trend  
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
.00 
(-.02,.00) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
.00 
(-.01,.00) 
.01 
(.00,.02) 
.03 
(.02,.05) 
.00 
(-.02,.00) 
Trend 
squared 
.01 
(.01,.02) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
.00 
(-.01,.00) 
.00 
(-.00,.01) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
.00 
(-.02,.00) 
.04 
(.03,.04) 
Note: The 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles are given in parentheses. 
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Table 1C.4: Covariance of the Demand Parameters of Zocor 
 
 
Constant Detailing 
Competitive 
Detailing 
Own 
Prescriptions 
Competitive 
Prescriptions 
Trend 
Trend 
squared 
Constant 
.07 
(.06,.07) 
.01 
(-.01,.02) 
.01 
(.01,.03) 
.02 
(.01,.03) 
-.01 
(-.02,.00) 
.02 
(.02,.03) 
.00 
(-.02,.01) 
Own 
Detailing 
.01 
(-.01,.02) 
.05 
(.05,.07) 
.02 
(.02,.04) 
.01 
(-.01,.02) 
-.01 
(-.03,.00) 
.01 
(.00,.01) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
Competitive 
Detailing 
.01 
(.01,.03) 
.02 
(.02,.04) 
.07 
(.06,.09) 
.03 
(.02,.05) 
-.02 
(-.03,-.01) 
.01 
(.00,.01) 
-.01 
(-.01,.01) 
Own 
Prescriptions 
.02 
(.01,.03) 
.01 
(-.01,.02) 
.03 
(.02,.05) 
.06 
(.05,.07) 
.00 
(-.01,.02) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
.00 
(.00,.00) 
Competitive 
Prescriptions 
-.01 
(-.02,.00) 
-.01 
(-.03,.00) 
-.02 
(-.03,-.01) 
.00 
(-.01,.02) 
.05 
(.04,.05) 
.00 
(-.01,.00) 
.00 
(.00,.02) 
Trend  
.02 
(.02,.03) 
.01 
(.00,.01) 
.01 
(.00,.01) 
.00 
(.00,.01) 
.00 
(-.01,.00) 
.05 
(.04,.07) 
-.01 
(-.01,.01) 
Trend 
squared 
.00 
(-.02,.01) 
.00 
(-.01,.01) 
-.01 
(-.01,.01) 
.00 
(.00,.00) 
.00 
(.00,.02) 
-.01 
(-.01,.01) 
.09 
(.06,.11) 
Note: The 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles are given in parentheses. 
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Table 1C.5: Results of the Detailing Allocation Equation after the Different Policy Shifts 
 
   Con-
stant Prescription Volume 
Responsiveness to 
Detailing 
Competitive 
Detailing Levels 
Shift 
size 
Shift 
Initiator 
Com-
pany 
 Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High 
10% Lipitor Crestor .06 -.17* -.11* .28* -.06 -.03 .09* -.02 -.01 .03 
25% Lipitor Crestor .02 -.02 -.05* .07* -.11* -.03 .14* -.02 -.16* .18* 
40% Lipitor Crestor .32* -.02 -.03 .05 -.05 -.02 .07* .08* -.10* .02 
10% Pravachol Crestor .15* -.04 -.02 .06 -.07* -.05 .12* -.01 -.05 .07* 
25% Pravachol Crestor .06* -.13* -.08* .21* -.08* .00 .08* -.05 -.02 .07 
40% Pravachol Crestor -.16* -.24* -.09 .33* -.04 -.02 .06 -.12 -.02 .14* 
10% Pravachol Lipitor -.03 -.16* -.03 .19* -.13* .02 .11* -.06 -.04 .10* 
25% Pravachol Lipitor -.03 -.14* .03 .11 -.10* -.05 .15* -.07* -.04 .11* 
40% Pravachol Lipitor -.12* -.21* -.03 .24* -.13* .02 .11* -.07 -.07 .14* 
10% Lipitor Prava-chol -.11* -.05 -.01 .06 -.12* -.05 .17* -.01 -.02 .03 
25% Lipitor Prava-chol -.03 -.07 .01 .06 -.09* -.03 .12* .00 -.01 .02 
40% Lipitor Prava-chol -.05 -.07 -.02 .08 -.04 -.05 .09 .00 -.03 .03 
10% Lipitor Zocor .31* -.11* .04 .07 -.05 -.03 .08 -.04 -.03 .07* 
25% Lipitor Zocor .19* -.18* -.02 .20* -.07* -.07* .14* -.10* .09* .00 
40% Lipitor Zocor .21* -.18* .06 .12 -.07 .05 .01 -.06 -.04 .10* 
10% Pravachol Zocor .24* -.03 -.04 .07 -.04 -.02 .07* -.12* .00 .12* 
25% Pravachol Zocor .04 -.11* -.03 .14* -.04 -.02 .06 -.05 -.15* .20* 
40% Pravachol Zocor .14* -.12* -.03 .15* -.09 -.09 .19* -.05* -.04 .09* 
* Zero is outside the 95% confidence interval 
Note: The results are estimated using effects coding. 
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The Detrimental Influence of Providing Positively Biased 
Information to Doctors in Pharmaceutical Sales Calls 
 
Abstract 
The scholarly literature has heavily debated the responsiveness of doctors to 
pharmaceutical sales calls. Unfortunately, it has overlooked an important firm decision of 
great managerial and public policy relevance, namely the information content that is 
provided in sales calls. This paper examines: (1) how responsive doctors are to information 
provided across different product attributes; (2) whether firms present a positively biased 
information set to doctors; (3) whether doctors are more or less responsive to positively 
biased information in sales calls. We use a hierarchical Bayesian VARX model to estimate 
the effect of information content (i.e. the drug attributes presented) in sales calls on 
doctors’ responsiveness. We find that: (1) firms do not provide information on the right 
product attributes at their optimal frequency; (2) sales calls include discussion of positively 
biased information; (3) discussion of positively biased information lowers sales call 
responsiveness in the long term. Our results imply that firms need to adjust their 
messaging to optimize doctors’ detailing responsiveness and hence ease public concerns 
on the discussion of positively biased information with doctors. 
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Introduction 
The scholarly literature has heavily debated the responsiveness of customers to 
sales calls in various industries and its measurement (Albers et al. 2010; Hanssens et al. 
2001). Unfortunately, it has largely overlooked an important firm decision, namely the 
information content that is provided in sales calls and its effects on customers’ sales call 
responsiveness. This lack of attention to information content in the personal selling 
literature contrasts sharply with the attention it received in the advertising literature. 
Studies relating advertising content to advertising responsiveness have been conducted for 
television advertising (e.g. Anderson and Renault 2006; Chandy et al. 2001; Lodish et al. 
1995) and for print and banner advertising (e.g. Bertrand et al. 2010; Hanssens and Weitz 
1980; Lohtia et al. 2003; Wedel and Pieters 2000).  
This paper examines information content provided in sales calls in the 
pharmaceutical industry; an industry in which scholars have found a particularly large 
heterogeneity in sales call effectiveness (see Fischer and Albers 2010; Gönül et al. 2001; 
Kremer et al. 2008; Manchanda and Chintagunta 2004; Manchanda and Honka 2005; 
Mizik and Jacobson 2004; Narayanan et al. 2005; Venkataraman and Stremersch 2007). In 
this industry, representatives of pharmaceutical firms visit medical doctors to promote 
prescription of their firm’s drugs (a practice, typically referred to as pharmaceutical 
detailing).  
This industry presents an ideal context to examine information content in sales 
calls for several reasons (Stremersch and Van Dyck 2009). Pharmaceutical detailing 
expenditures are very large ($6.3 billion in 2009 in the U.S. according to IMS Integrated 
Promotional Services, which does not include sampling costs). In the drug category (i.e. 
statins) we examine, a handful of firms spend more than $400 million annually on 
detailing. Pharmaceutical detailing is also very well documented by data suppliers, such as 
IMS Health, which has reliable data on information content in detailing visits.  
Information content in pharmaceutical sales calls and doctors’ responsiveness is a 
primary public policy concern and of high managerial interest. On multiple occasions, 
people have expressed concerns that the information in pharmaceutical sales calls consists 
of a positively biased, sometimes even illegal, subset of drug information (Anderson et al. 
2009; Meier 2007; Roughead et al. 1998; Tipton et al. 2009). Also firms are grappling with 
the optimal information content in detailing visits (Weintraub 2007). The industry, under 
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increasing societal scrutiny, is considering a new sales model that should provide the 
doctor with exactly the right information more effectively.14 
In the only initial explorations of detailing content of which we are aware, Ziegler 
et al. (1995) analyze the accuracy of 106 statements of sales representatives about drugs 
and find that 12 of those statements are incorrect and cast the promoted drug in a more 
favorable light. Molloy et al. (2002) asked 5 sales representatives to experimentally 
provide details of low, medium, or high quality to 135 doctors, who subsequently self-
reported the extent of learning from the detail. Steinman et al. (2007) examined market 
research forms on 116 detailing visits in the context of the promotion of off-label usage of 
gabapentin, which also includes self-reports of doctors’ intentions to prescribe.  
This paper investigates information content, i.e. which drug attributes are 
discussed, from a unique database, obtained from IMS Health – a prime supplier on 
doctor-level data. The database contains 5,011 details to 600 doctors in the U.S., who 
collectively wrote 728,829 prescriptions for the top three brands in the statin category, in 
the period between 2002 and 2005, and estimates doctors’ responsiveness from their actual 
prescription behavior. By our knowledge, this is the first large-scale study that examines 
the impact of information content in detailing on actual prescription behavior. It aims to 
answer three specific questions.  
First, how responsive are doctors to information across different product 
attributes? We quantify doctors’ responsiveness to information on the following product 
attributes (1 if the attribute was discussed; 0 if it was not): efficacy, indications, price, side 
effects, and interactions.15 Second, do firms present positively biased information in their 
detailing calls to doctors? We combined our database with scientific information from the 
FDA, the IMS Midas database that includes price information, and a working paper of 
Sood and Stremersch (2010) on the drug profile across the attributes we examine. 
Accordingly, we can determine whether attributes indicating that the drug outperforms the 
competition (i.e. competitive superiority) and attributes about which positive news (e.g. 
extension of the number of approved indications) or negative news (e.g. new side effects 
appearing on the label) is released are discussed and the extent to which they are discussed 
during sales calls. The variation across drugs in their scientific profile allows us to 
operationalize competitive superiority of the drug, while the variation across time allows 
us to operationalize whether there is negative or positive news. In this paper, we refer to a 
                                                        
14 Pharma 2020: Marketing the Future: Which Path Will You Take? PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009. 
15 Note that a drug may be characterized by additional attributes, such as mechanism of action, patient profile, 
safety, formulary status, cost effectiveness, and dosing, among others. However, objective (i.e. scientific) data 
was not available, very complicated or showed no time-variation on these attributes for the drugs we analyzed. 
Contact with IMS Health revealed that they assessed our selection of attributes as covering the most important 
product attributes. 
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sales call containing positively biased information, as a conversation in which 
competitively superior attributes or attributes with positive news are more often discussed 
than non-superior attributes and attributes with negative news, respectively. The third 
question we pose is whether doctors are more or less responsive to positively biased 
information in sales calls. 
To estimate the effect of information content in sales calls on prescriptions, we 
develop a hierarchical Bayesian VARX model with latent dependent variables (i.e. 
prescriptions and detailing). The model corrects for the possible endogenous allocation of 
sales calls and the information content discussed in such sales calls. The model also allows 
us to estimate the dynamic effects of every detailing visit. We compute generalized 
impulse response functions, which enable us to explicitly disentangle the immediate and 
total effects of detailing. We explain the immediate and total effect of detailing by the 
information content discussed. We include fixed effects per doctor and brand to correct for 
salesperson-specific effects. We also estimate another model that allows for heterogeneous 
effects across different segments of doctors. 
We find that the firms in our sample do not provide information on the right 
product attributes at their optimal frequency to maximize the responsiveness of doctors to 
sales calls in their prescription behavior. While the most frequently discussed attribute, i.e. 
drug efficacy, and side effects are discussed too frequently, indications, price, and 
interactions are discussed not frequently enough. Second, we find that sales calls include 
discussion of positively biased information. Attributes on which the respective drug is 
competitively superior or for which there is positive news, are discussed more frequently 
than non-superior attributes and those with negative news. Third, we find that the inclusion 
of such positively biased information in sales calls may lower the responsiveness of 
doctors in their prescription behavior. Firms should discuss more balanced (new) product 
information. 
The paper continues by discussing the research context and data. Then, we 
discuss the model and results, before we conclude with a discussion of the implications, 
limitations and future research. 
Research Context and Data 
Research Context 
The largest promotional expense made by pharmaceutical firms for branded 
prescription drugs is to send sales representatives to doctor practices to convince doctors to 
prescribe their drugs to patients. This practice is commonly known as detailing and the 
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length of a visit varies from one minute to one hour, but takes, on average, a few minutes. 
In the U.S. alone, there are approximately 100,000 sales representatives in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Sales representatives receive extensive training and presentation 
materials from their firm to steer what they discuss with the doctor to sustain or increase 
the doctor’s prescriptions of the firm’s drug, Another reason of this training is to ensure 
that the information they provide to doctors falls within the ethical policy set by the firm 
and is within the law. Pharmaceutical firms have a code of ethics for their sales reps.  
In the U.S., the FDA regulates prescription drug marketing including detailing. 
According to the law, drug marketing must be accurate, balance the risk and benefit 
information, and is consistent with the FDA approved prescribing information. The 
promotional materials that sales representatives use should only include information 
supported by strong evidence from clinical studies. To enforce this law, the FDA has a 
separate division, called the Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and 
Communications (DDMAC). The DDMAC routinely checks direct-to-consumer 
advertisements, journal advertising and other promotional materials. However, it is tougher 
for them to check the content of detailing calls as these take place behind closed doors 
(Roughead et al. 1998). Thus, it is much harder to collect evidence on systematic 
violations of the law based on private conversations between the sales rep and the doctor. 
Our empirical inquiry is situated in the statin category, between September 2002 
and December 2005. Statins (HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors; ATC code C10aa) lower 
excessive cholesterol levels in the blood, particularly low density lipoprotein (LDL) 
cholesterol.16 We study the three main drugs in this category, Lipitor, Pravachol and Zocor. 
These are the best selling drugs during the data period and make up more than 80% of the 
unit sales in the statin category and more than 90% of the total dollar sales. In our data, on 
average, within the set of the top 3 brands, Lipitor has a 65% share of unit prescriptions, 
Zocor has a share of 21%, and Pravachol has a share of 14%.  
In particular, our data set, obtained from IMS Health, includes the monthly 
detailing efforts directed to and monthly number of total prescriptions written by a panel of 
600 doctors, representative of the universe of office-based doctors in the continental U.S. It 
contains 728,829 prescriptions and 5,011 detailing visits. The doctor panel reports online 
on the detailing visits they receive, the drug attributes that are discussed and the duration 
of the visit. IMS Health has created a special website to collect this information and gives 
                                                        
16 Statins may, to a minor extent, also increase high density lipoprotein (HDL) cholesterol and decrease excessive 
triglyceride levels. Recent evidence has documented pleiotropic effects of statins beyond LDL reduction (i.e. anti-
inflammatory properties) (e.g. Liao and Laufs 2005). 
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the highest priority to collect accurate and complete data.17 IMS Health is a prime analytic 
partner, specifically for the pharmaceutical industry and services many pharmaceutical 
firms. The prescriptions reported by IMS Health are ‘projected’ prescriptions; this 
projection corrects for the non-exhaustive coverage (approximately 70%) of pharmacy 
outlets through an algorithm that is unknown to the researcher, which yields a different 
multiplier for each month, doctor, and brand. Hence, our prescription data includes zeros 
and continuous values of one or greater. An average pharmaceutical sales call in our data 
lasts 4.11 minutes. Table 2.1 shows the various product attributes and the rate at which 
they are discussed for our three focal statins. Efficacy is discussed in 74% of the sales 
calls, while, for example, price is discussed in 16% of the sales calls.  
In addition, we have collected data on the strength of various product attributes 
for the top-3 brands in the category mentioned above, from the FDA, the IMS Midas 
database, and the working paper of Sood and Stremersch (2010). 
Information Content in Sales Calls 
Our first research question investigates how responsive doctors are to information 
across different product attributes. Our data include, for each detailing observation, the 
product attributes that the sales representative and doctor discussed, as reported by the 
doctor, after the sales call. We distinguish the following product attributes: efficacy, 
indications, price, side effects and interactions (see Table 2.1 for a description). In our 
empirical application, we include dummies indicating the discussion of the specific 
product attribute in that sales call, which we denote for these five product attributes by: 
Information_Efficacy, Information_Indications, Information_Price, 
Information_Side_Effects and Information_Interactions. 
Our second and third research question combine the discussion of various product 
attributes with the scientific evidence that exists for those attributes. The notion of 
“positively biased information” is then operationalized by interacting the effect of 
discussing various product attributes with the scientific evidence for the attributes that are 
discussed. Regarding the drug’s scientific profile, we have collected monthly data on the 
strength of the product attributes we study (e.g. see Azoulay 2002; Cockburn and Anis 
1998). We operationalize drug efficacy as the time-varying mean efficacy of statins, 
                                                        
17 IMS Health strives for high quality data by using several mechanisms. First, panel members are personally 
trained before participation and receive retraining if necessary. Second, to stimulate doctors to report complete 
and accurate information, they also participate in a compensation program, which they only qualify for when the 
data is reported before the deadline and doctors are contacted over the phone or receive reminder emails to report 
the data frequently. Third, extensive quality control checks are run from recruiting panel members to data 
collection and verification to sample design to projection and in instances the doctor is contacted to check his 
reported information. 
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measured as the mean reduction in LDL cholesterol across all scientific studies at and prior 
to a certain time period (from Sood and Stremersch 2010). We have collected the time-
varying number of indications, number of side effects, and number of interactions for all 
statins, from the FDA website. We obtained drug prices from the IMS Midas database. 
Table 2.2 shows the mean and standard deviation for all product attributes.  
From the scientific profile of the drug and the attributes discussed in the sales call, 
we obtain the attribute-level variables on information content, competitive superiority 
(from comparing the scientific information on the drug attributes across drugs), negative 
news and positive news (from comparing the scientific information on the drug attributes 
over time).  
Competitive superiority is measured as the number of attributes discussed in a 
sales call, on which the drug is competitively superior in that month, according to the 
scientific evidence we obtained. As we have data on five product attributes, this variable 
potentially ranges from 0 (the sales call did not include any competitively superior 
attribute) to 5 (the sales call included all attributes and the drug is superior on all 
attributes). In our data set, this variable takes a maximum value of 4, as no brand is 
superior on all product attributes at any moment during our data period. We denote this 
variable as Information_Competitive_Superiority. 
Negative news is the number of attributes discussed in a sales call, for which 
negative information is released in that same month, denoted as 
Information_Negative_News. Positive news is the number of attributes discussed in a sales 
call, for which positive information is released in that same month, denoted as 
Information_Positive_News. Based on scientific evidence, negative (resp. positive) 
information can be a decrease (resp. increase) in the efficacy, a decrease (resp. increase) in 
the number of indications, an increase (resp. decrease) in price, an increase (resp. decrease) 
in side effects, or an increase (resp. decrease) in the number of interactions. The variables 
measuring positive and negative news range from 0 to 3 in our data set. 
Other Variables 
As we are interested in the effect of positively biased information, we need to 
control for the amount of new information released (i.e. the number of attributes new 
information is released on), which we will denote as Information_New. To obtain this 
variable, we first standardize the product attributes across brands, then compute the 
absolute differences in the standardized attribute value for month t compared to month t-1, 
after which we sum these absolute differences for the attributes discussed in a sales call for 
the focal brand. For example, side effects are discussed in a particular sales call and in the 
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same month the FDA has updated their label with regards to side effects. If two side 
effects are added to the label, there will be more new information than if only one side 
effect is added. The Information_New variable has mean .02 and ranges from 0 to 1.01 (a 
sales call for Pravachol, in which efficacy, indications, and price were discussed, in a 
month with substantial changes for those attributes). We also control for the duration of the 
sales call in minutes, denoted as Duration.  
Model 
To model the effect of information content in the sales call on detailing 
responsiveness, we want to estimate the determinants of the dynamic effects of detailing. 
We posit a model that allows estimating a separate immediate and total effect for every 
detailing call and subsequently relates these effects to the content of detailing. Thereby we 
also need to account for the endogeneity of detailing and detailing content, which is 
discussed in more detail later. A vector autoregressive model with exogenous variables 
(VARX) is ideally suited to account for endogeneity, by jointly modeling prescriptions and 
detailing, and is able to capture the dynamic effects of each individual sales call. The 
model accounts for heterogeneity, by incorporating individual-, brand- and time-specific 
variables. An extra challenge is that, due to the nature of the data, the model needs to 
handle latent dependent variables. Recent applications of VAR models in marketing are 
Luo (2009) and Slotegraaf and Pauwels (2008), among many others.  
As our VARX model does not capture the immediate and total effect of detailing 
on prescriptions directly by separate coefficients, we use impulse response functions to 
compute this effect over time. Subsequently, we estimate the effect of information content 
on the immediate and total detailing responsiveness. Ideally, we would perform these steps 
in an integrated procedure (e.g. Fok et al. 2006). However, given that our model has latent 
dependent variables, such an integrated procedure is not feasible. While our approach 
generates unbiased coefficients (given that it satisfies various standard assumptions, such 
as homoscedastic errors), it loses some estimation efficiency. We compensate for this by 
our large estimation sample. 
Prescription and detailing model: Below we specify our model consisting of J=3 
brands (Lipitor, Zocor and Pravachol). In our model, doctors are indicated by i = 1…I and 
time by t = 1…T. The prescriptions are a continuous variable, truncated from below at 
zero, and detailing is a count variable. Therefore, we model the latent values for both, 
indicated by *ijtRx  and 
*
ijtDet , in a VARX(P) system with P lags.  
Information Content in Pharmaceutical Sales Calls 
 
58 
 
,
)1ln(
)1ln(
)1ln(
)1ln(
)1ln(
)1ln(
000000
000000
000000
000000
000000
000000
)ln(
)ln(
)ln(
)1ln(
)1ln(
)1ln(
6
5
4
3
2
1
1
,3
,2
,1
,3
,2
,1
666564636261
565554535251
464544434241
1
,3
,2
,1
,3
,2
,1
363534333231
262524232221
161514131211
636261
535251
434241
333231
232221
1211
*
3
*
2
*
1
*
3
*
2
*
1
»»
»»
»»
»»
¼
º
««
««
««
««
¬
ª

»»
»»
»»
»»
»
¼
º
««
««
««
««
«
¬
ª






»»
»»
»»
»»
¼
º
««
««
««
««
¬
ª

»»
»»
»»
»»
»
¼
º
««
««
««
««
«
¬
ª
»»
»»
»»
»»
¼
º
««
««
««
««
¬
ª

»»
»»
»»
»»
¼
º
««
««
««
««
¬
ª






 
»»
»»
»»
»»
»
¼
º
««
««
««
««
«
¬
ª



¦
¦
 






 






ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
P
p
pti
pti
pti
pti
pti
pti
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
P
p
pti
pti
pti
pti
pti
pti
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
p
it
titii
titii
titii
titii
titii
ti13tii
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
Det
Det
Det
Rx
Rx
Rx
Det
Det
Det
Rx
Rx
Rx
orIntroCrestTrend
orIntroCrestTrend
orIntroCrestTrend
orIntroCrestTrend
orIntroCrestTrend
orIntroCrestTrend
Det
Det
Det
Rx
Rx
Rx
H
H
H
H
H
H
JJJJJJ
JJJJJJ
JJJJJJ
JJJJJJ
JJJJJJ
JJJJJJ
EEE
EEE
EEE
EEE
EEE
EEE
    
(2.1) 
with Ȉ the covariance matrix of the residuals [İi1t İi2t İi3t İi4t İi5t İi6t]’. The observed 
number of details Detijt is Poisson distributed: 
   
,1for             ,
!
exp
)|Pr(
**
* Jj
l
DetDet
DetlDet
l
ijtijt
ijtijt  ¸¸
¸
¹
·
¨¨
¨
©
§     (2.2) 
and allows for overdispersion through the covariance matrix Ȉ (Chib and Winkelmann 
2001). 
We take the natural logarithm of detailing as the dependent variable to ensure 
positivity in Equation (2.1) and therefore we need to split the matrix with autoregressive 
parameters in two parts. Where necessary, we add one to the log-transformed variables to 
prevent evaluation problems due to zeros (see also Manchanda et al. 2004). The variable 
Trend indicates a linear trend for prescriptions and for the detailing equations, we include a 
logarithmic trend. As the Poisson model uses a log-link function, the trend will have an 
approximately linear effect on the number of details. IntroCrestor is a dummy taking the 
value one after the introduction of Crestor to the market in August 2003, and 0 otherwise.  
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The ȕ-parameters are individual-specific and multivariate normally distributed  Bllil B : ),(vecMVN)(vec E  for l = 1…2J, with ȍBl a full covariance matrix within 
dependent variable l. The Ȗit are individual- and time-specific of size 2Jx2J with  *:* ),(vecMVN)(vec itJ  ZKHUHȍī is a (2J)2x(2J)2 diagonal matrix. The estimation 
steps are discussed in detail in Appendix 2A. 
Immediate and total effects of detailing: We calculate the immediate and total 
effects of detailing using generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs), measuring the 
time profile of a shock of one additional detail to the system on future values at any given 
point in time (Pesaran and Shin 1998).  
),|(E),|(E),,( 1,1,1   tntijtntijtijt IYIYInGIRF GG    (2.3) 
),|(E),|(E),( 111   tijttijttijt IYIYIIE GG    (2.4) 
.)|(E),|(E),(
0
1,1,1 ¦f
 
  
n
tntijtntijtijt IYIYITE GG   (2.5) 
Here IE and TE denote the immediate and total effect, respectively, following the 
terminology used in Fok et al. (2006) and Pauwels et al. (2002). n represents the number of 
periods over which the effect is measured, į is the shock given to the system and It-1 is the 
information set containing all the known variables at time t-1. Note that the total effect 
includes the immediate effect and the objective of firms should always be to optimize the 
total effect.  
We use the GIRF as it is invariant to the ordering of the variables in the model 
(Pesaran and Shin 1998). To compute the effect of one additional detailing visit we set į 
equal to one for the dependent variable we are shocking and the other elements are equal to 
ımlıll for ,lm z  due to the immediate effects of detailing (Dekimpe and Hanssens 1999). 
We only compute the effect for the months in which at least one detail took place. Hereby, 
we take the nonlinearity and truncation of our dependent variables into account. Hence, we 
consider the effect of an increase in detailing of one unit at time t. Using the draws of the 
MCMC estimation, we naturally account for all types of uncertainty around the GIRF 
outcomes (Koop 1992).  
Detailing allocation has been found to be based on doctors’ prescription volume, 
the level of competitive detailing and detailing responsiveness (Fugh-Berman and Ahari 
2007; Manchanda et al. 2004). This might create an endogeneity problem. Our VARX 
model treats detailing as an endogenous variable and hence corrects for firms’ strategic 
detailing allocation across doctors. We directly correct for the dynamic effects of strategic 
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allocation based on prescription volume and competitive detailing by including past 
prescriptions and competitive details in the detailing equation and a full covariance matrix 
between own detailing, competitive detailing and prescriptions (Dekimpe and Hanssens 
1999). The VARX structure also controls for possible endogenous information content 
based on observable characteristics, such as prescription behavior and past detailing. This 
form of endogeneity might arise if firms target information content towards different 
doctors and this is subsequently more effective. We can not directly control for the 
endogeneity of detailing responsiveness as its effect can only be obtained by impulse 
response functions. However, its effect is partly controlled for by the other variables. The 
part of detailing responsiveness correlated with prescription volume, competitive detailing 
and the carryover effect of detailing and prescriptions is corrected for by the model. The 
advantage of our model is that all three measures are time-varying and they correct for 
possibly changing detailing preferences over the data periods. Nevertheless, we cannot be 
sure that we fully control for strategic detailing allocation based on detailing 
responsiveness, which gives the risk of overestimating the responsiveness to detailing. We 
control for this possible overestimation by taking a doctor-brand fixed effect of detailing 
responsiveness in the second part of our model, which we discuss below.  
In a second step, we estimate the effect of the content of the sales message on the 
individual-, brand- and time-specific GIRFs. We use a Bayesian weighted linear regression 
to account for the uncertainty around the GIRFs, which otherwise creates heteroscedastic 
errors. We weight the dependent and independent variables by one divided by the standard 
deviation of the individual-, brand- and time-specific GIRF. 
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with ȟijt ~ MVNȄ. The independent variables are defined and discussed in the data 
VHFWLRQEHIRUHǻIEijt DQGǻTEijt) are the differences to the individual- and brand-specific 
PHDQ LPPHGLDWH DQG WRWDO HIIHFWV RI GHWDLOLQJ DQG ǻ LQGLFDWHV WKDW ZH take first 
differences, to allow for fixed effects. We use doctor-brand fixed effects estimation to 
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correct for all time-invariant characteristics that influence the doctor’s responsiveness to 
detailing for a specific brand. This accounts for various possible forms of endogeneity. 
First, as mentioned above, the endogenous allocation of detailing based on the doctor’s 
responsiveness might create an upward bias in the size of the detailing effect. As far as this 
upward bias is present, the doctor-brand fixed effect controls for eliminates it. Second, 
some sales representatives, because of training or idiosyncratic qualities, may be better in 
discussing certain types of information than others, and may discuss that more frequently. 
If this is true, it may lead the model to overestimate the effect of information content on 
prescriptions. The fixed effects control for the quality of the sales representative, under the 
assumption that doctors are visited by the same sales representative over time for a specific 
drug. According to discussions with pharmaceutical managers, this assumption is valid.. 
Third, the fixed effect captures other time-invariant doctor preferences for information, 
which might be used by the sales rep to discuss specific information to which the doctor is 
more responsive. Hence, the estimation of the effect of information content is now based 
on deviations from the average sales call and delivers unbiased and consistent estimates of 
the effect of information content on detailing responsiveness. 
Results 
This section starts by introducing the basic results of our models. Then, we turn to 
the three research questions we posed at the outset of this paper. This is followed by an 
extra analysis that examines the heterogeneity in doctors’ reactions to positively biased 
information. We end by presenting the results for the other variables and the robustness 
tests we conducted.  
Basic Results 
Before estimating the VARX model of Equation (2.1), we test for unit roots. We 
use the unit root test for heterogeneous panels of Im et al. (2003). Using time-invariant 
parameters, the results for the test, including an intercept and no deterministic trend terms, 
strongly reject the presence of a unit root (P = .002). We select a lag length of 1 as the 
VARX(1) is already flexible due to the individual-, brand- and time-specific variables. The 
dynamic effects of detailing on prescriptions and vice versa cannot be easily interpreted 
from the VARX(1) model as it contains immediate and lagged effects of both, which are 
partly hidden in the error terms. The estimation results, from Equation (2.1) and (2.2), are 
given in Appendix 2B (Table 2B.1-2B.5) and are based on 600 doctors over 40 months.  
For interpretation of the effects, we extract the immediate and total effect of 
detailing on prescriptions for every doctor, brand and month. Based on the GIRFs, we can 
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calculate the average fixed detailing effects across all doctors (Table 2.3). Figure 2.1 
shows the average GIRFs. The immediate fixed effects (column 2 in Table 2.3) are the 
effect of one additional detailing visit on the number of prescriptions for the month in 
which the detailing visit took place. The total fixed effects (column 3 in Table 2.3) are the 
cumulative effect of one additional detailing visit on the number of prescriptions over the 
current month and all the future months. The immediate fixed effects range from .13 for 
Lipitor to .16 for Pravachol. The total effects are substantially higher for all brands. One 
detailing visit for Lipitor leads to .44 extra prescriptions in the long term. For Zocor and 
Pravachol these effects are .29 and .56, respectively. These total effects last at most for 10 
months. The total effects are relatively small and are in line with the literature on 
pharmaceutical marketing (cf. Mizik and Jacobson 2004; Stremersch and Van Dyck 2009). 
It is important to note though that on each visit, which costs the firm between $120 and 
$150, a sales rep typically promotes three brands, instead of just one.  
Table 2.4 gives the results for the immediate (column 2) and total (column 3) 
detailing responsiveness. These estimates are based on 3,496 sales calls. The R2 for 
immediate detailing responsiveness model is .29 and for the total detailing responsiveness 
.46. 
Doctors’ Responsiveness to Information on Product Attributes 
Table 2.4 shows the effects of discussing the five product attributes (efficacy, 
indications, price, side effects and interactions) on detailing responsiveness. The estimates 
represent the average effect of discussing a certain product attribute across doctors. 
Discussing drug efficacy in the sales call has a negative impact on the immediate (-.10) 
and total (-.10) detailing responsiveness. Discussing information about indications or price 
has a significantly positive effect on both the immediate and total detailing responsiveness, 
ranging from .06 to .12. Discussing side effects decreases the immediate (-.06) and total (-
.05) detailing responsiveness. Discussing interactions has an insignificant immediate 
effect, but its total effect on detailing responsiveness is positive (.06). 
We can contrast the effects of discussing various product attributes with the rate 
at which they are discussed. Efficacy is the most discussed attribute (see Table 2.1), but 
has a negative effect on total detailing responsiveness (see Table 2.4). Thus, under the 
assumption of marginally decreasing effects of discussing product attributes (i.e. the effect 
of discussing a product attribute on prescriptions decreases the more often it is discussed), 
sales representatives discuss the efficacy of a drug too often. The opposite is true for price, 
which is among the least discussed attributes (see Table 2.1) (see also Allan et al. 2007), 
but has the most positive impact on total detailing responsiveness (see Table 2.4). We 
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conclude that sales representatives in our data window in this category do not discuss 
product attributes at their optimal frequency to maximize doctors’ responsiveness. 
Positively Biased Information in Pharmaceutical Sales Calls  
Table 2.5 shows the extent to which sales calls contain positively biased 
information, i.e. contain information on attributes on which the brand is superior compared 
to competitors or for which positive (vs. negative) news for the brand is released. Columns 
2-4 show the rate at which positive or negative news is discussed in a sales call at the 
brand level. The last column shows the rate of discussion averaged across brands. Note 
that the rate of discussion for competitively superior attributes is only defined over brands 
and not for each brand separately. The percentages for discussing attributes on which there 
is negative or positive news are conditional on the fact that the type of product information 
is available (i.e. that that kind of news is released).  
If an attribute is superior to its competitors, it is 3 percentage points more likely to 
be discussed that month than the same non-superior attributes of the competitors are 
discussed by sales representatives of those competitors.18 When negative information about 
a product attribute of Lipitor is released, Pfizer sales reps discuss this attribute in 59% of 
Lipitor’s sales calls that same month, while they discuss positive information in 64% of 
their sales calls. Across all brands, we observe a similar pattern that when positive 
information about a drug attribute is released, sales reps detailing such drug discuss it more 
often than when new negative information is released. Therefore, we conclude that 
pharmaceutical sales reps provide positively biased information in terms of the attributes 
they discuss in a sales call.  
Effect of Positively Biased Information on Sales Call Responsiveness 
Rows 6-8 of Table 2.4 show the effect of information content – as operationalized 
by discussing competitively superior attributes and attributes on which negative or positive 
news is released – on detailing responsiveness. The immediate effect of discussing 
competitively superior attributes on prescriptions is .03, while its total effect is -.06. The 
sign of this effect changes one month after the sales call to the doctor. Discussing attributes 
on which negative news is released has a negative immediate effect (-.05), while its total 
effect is positive (.09). The direction of this effect changes one month after the sales call 
occurred. Discussing attributes on which positive news is released has an insignificant 
immediate and total effect. Overall, we can conclude that discussing positively biased 
                                                        
18 Note that there is quite some variation over time on which drug is superior on an attribute. For example, in our 
data period, all three drugs score at a certain point best on the mean efficacy across various clinical studies about 
these drugs that are released over time. 
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information (competitively superior attributes and more positive than negative new 
attribute information) in a sales call may lead to positive immediate effects on detailing 
responsiveness, but in the long run it leads to detrimental effects. As the total effect in our 
model includes the immediate effect, our findings document suboptimal behavior by 
pharmaceutical sales representatives.  
The contrast between the immediate and total effects may be related to the 
persuasive and informative effect of sales calls (Hurwitz and Caves 1988; Narayanan et al. 
2005). If the persuasive effect prevails, the positive immediate effect for the discussion of 
competitively superior attributes and the negative immediate effect of discussing negative 
new product information might, among other things, be explained by the stimulus-response 
compatibility effect (e.g. Levin et al. 1998). That theory states that the general tone of the 
message is transferred to the product under discussion. In the longer term, we find that 
these effects are reversed, very likely because they negatively affect the credibility of and 
trust in the sales representative (Darke and Ritchie 2007; Doney and Cannon 1997). Etgar 
and Goodwin (1982) show a parallel to this finding in the advertising literature for new 
products (our sample contains mature products), as they find that a two-sided advertising 
message yields a more favorable attitude towards the brand than a one-sided message. 
They argue that a two-sided message increases the credibility of the message and 
immunizes customers to future attacks of competitive products.  
Heterogeneity in Positively Biased Information 
Pharmaceutical firms do not approach all doctors in a similar way. Doctors are 
generally targeted based on their prescription behavior, detailing responsiveness and 
competitive detailing (Fugh-Berman and Ahari 2007; Manchanda et al. 2004). Below we 
explore how the discussion of positively biased information and its effect on detailing 
responsiveness differs across these three target dimensions.  
We divide doctors into different target groups according to three characteristics: 
(i) their prescription volume, (ii) their responsiveness to detailing, (iii) the number of 
competitive details they receive. For all three dimensions, we create two groups: the 
doctors that belong to the top 10% on that dimension and the rest.19 
Table 2.6 shows how often the various firms discuss negative and positive 
information across these different groups. First, we observe that the differences between 
segments are larger for negative than for positive new information. This suggests that sales 
representatives actively differentiate on whether they discuss negative new product 
                                                        
19 This split is in line with the decile system of pharmaceutical firms. We split the sample at the top decile as the 
number of details is heavily skewed towards the doctors that prescribe more, are more responsive and receive 
more competitive details. In this way, we get groups of relatively equal size.  
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information with a doctor. Second, the sales representatives for Zocor do not seem to tailor 
the content based on these segments, while the other two brands target the information 
based on all three dimensions. Interesting to note is that the targeting strategies of Lipitor 
and Pravachol are not different from each other. 
Table 2.6 also shows the rate of discussion for competitively superior and non-
superior drug attributes. The differences across target dimensions are small. Noteworthy is 
that competitively superior (vs. non-superior) attributes are 7 percentage points more likely 
to be discussed with doctors that are highly responsive to detailing.  
We have also estimated the effects of positively biased information on detailing 
responsiveness for the various target groups. The results are in Table 2.7. The R2 of these 
models is higher than the models without heterogeneity, .35 for the immediate effects and 
.51 for the total effects. The parameters that are not interacted with the segments are very 
similar to the results discussed earlier.  
The effect of discussing competitively superior attributes, for doctors that are 
highly responsive to detailing (-.15) and doctors that receive many competitive details (-
.11), on total detailing responsiveness is more negative than average. The effect of 
discussing negative new product information also differs substantially across the segments. 
The positive effect of discussing negative new information is higher for high-volume 
prescribers both on the immediate (.09) and the total (.13) detailing responsiveness. 
Doctors that receive many competitive details also show a higer immediate (.06) and total 
(.11) effect when new negative product information is discussed. This provides evidence 
for the argument of Etgar and Goodwin (1982) that it is better for a firm to discuss 
negative new information by itself rather than a competitor. For positive new information 
we only observe a significant effect for high prescribers (-.14). 
Comparing these results to firm behavior, we observe that only Lipitor sales reps 
are exploiting this heterogeneity in a somewhat profitable way. The sales representatives 
of Lipitor discuss negative new information more than average with the target groups for 
which it has the most positive effect, the high prescribers and the doctors that receive many 
competitive details. 
These results give two main insights. First, there is substantial heterogeneity in 
the type of doctors with whom positively biased information is discussed and its 
subsequent effects on detailing responsiveness. Second, we observe that firms deal very 
differently with this heterogeneity. Lipitor seems to exploit it, Zocor does not do anything 
with it and Pravachol seems to use it in a counterproductive way. 
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Other Effects 
The determinants of immediate and total detailing responsiveness also include 
some control variables, shown in Table 2.4. Discussing attributes about which new 
information is released has an insignificant immediate and total effect. If we combine the 
linear and quadratic effect of the duration of the sales call, it does not have a significant 
influence on the immediate and total detailing responsiveness This is in contradiction with 
Weitz and Bradford (1999). However, we correct for the type and amount of information 
content of the sales message, which they do not. The result is more in line with the study of 
Singh and Cole (1993) on the length of television commercials. They find that 
informational ads of 15 or 30 seconds can have the same effect, while for persuasive ads 
longer ads are more effective.  
Robustness 
We have conducted various robustness checks on the functional form of our 
equations. In Equation (2.6), we have included interaction effects between the information 
content and the age, gender and geographic location of the doctors. We found little 
evidence for these interaction effects to be present. We have also estimated the effect of 
information content in Equation (2.6) per brand. Here, we observed several differences 
between Lipitor on the one hand and Zocor and Pravachol on the other hand. For example, 
the total effect of discussing price was positive, but insignificant, for Lipitor, and 
significantly positive for the other two brands. In our final specification, we have chosen 
not to include these attribute-brand interactions as it caused some multicollinearity 
problems for the full equation. Our main results, however, did not change across these 
models. 
We have also tested the robustness for the operationalization of the variables 
Information_New, Negative_New_Information, Positive_New_Information and 
Competitive_Superiority. Their effect does not only have to apply in the month that the 
new information about the drug attributes was released, but can have an effect if it is 
discussed in the months after. Therefore, we have operationalized all three variables also as 
moving averages over 2 to 4 months. We find that such operationalizations do not change 
our main results, they mainly increase the uncertainty around our estimates. 
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Conclusion, Implications and Limitations 
Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate the role of information content in personal selling. 
Information content has been overlooked in the personal selling literature, while the same 
literature considers the sales message to be the core of the interaction between sales 
representative and customer (Churchill et al. 2000). In the pharmaceutical industry, the 
context of this research, large heterogeneity has been found in the effect of personal 
selling, also referred to as detailing, on prescriptions. We investigate the role of 
information content in this context, answering the following three research questions. 
First, we investigate how the information content that sales representatives 
discuss with the doctor affects doctors’ responsiveness to the sales call. We find that sales 
reps do not discuss product attributes at their optimal frequency. Sales reps discuss drug 
efficacy in about 75% of the sales calls, while discussing this attribute has a negative 
immediate and total effect on detailing responsiveness. They also discuss side effects of 
the drug too frequently. On the other hand, discussing indications, price and interactions of 
the drug increase the sales call effectiveness and, hence, sales reps should discuss them 
more often.  
The second and third research question investigate whether firms present a 
positively biased information set to doctors, and if they do, whether it pays off for firms in 
terms of larger responsiveness to sales calls. We find that firms are more likely to discuss 
positive new information about a drug than negative new information. Also, they discuss 
competitively superior attributes more often than their non-superior counterparts. Our 
findings show that this strategy is successful in the short term, but not so in the long term. 
To maximize the return to detailing in the long term, it is more effective to discuss more 
balanced new product information and more often non-superior product attributes.  
Managerial Implications 
The findings reported above are highly relevant for managers and public policy 
administrators. We offer a model for managers to assess the impact of the information 
content in a detailing call on the detailing responsiveness. In the category we study, statins 
from 2002 to 2005, we find that firms’ detailing was suboptimal in the frequency at which 
positive information (i.e. attributes on which a drug is competitively superior and on which 
there is positive news) and specific product attributes (e.g. efficacy and price) are 
discussed. This finding underlines that monitoring and subsequently optimizing 
information content in detailing calls is worth the effort. 
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Firms can optimize information content in detailing calls in several ways. First, 
firms typically compensate sales reps on the basis of achieving short-term objectives for 
their own region. Such policy, given the contrast between immediate and total effects in 
our model, may actually stimulate sales reps to present positively biased information, 
endangering a trusting relationship between sales rep and doctor, which is in the firm’s 
best interest in the long run (Weitz and Bradford 1999; Wotruba 1991). Therefore, firms 
should match short-term objectives with long-term objectives in their compensation 
schemes for sales reps. Some firms are conceiving a change in their sales rep 
compensation strategy in line with our recommendation – GlaxoSmithKline is an example 
going public on such plans for 201120 – by using doctor feedback, through surveys or 
personal interviews, for this purpose. Our model shows an alternate or complementary 
route for such long-term evaluation, namely the estimation of a dynamic model, including 
information content, on IMS Health data. 
Second, how to build trust between sales rep and firm, on the one hand, and 
doctors, on the other hand, may depend upon the type of doctors. Each pharmaceutical 
firm has a different way to segment its doctors. Among brand preference, prescription 
volume, these segmentation criteria may include intrinsic motivations of the physician, e.g. 
whether the physician is especially triggered by scientific evidence, empathy towards the 
patient or business considerations. Obviously, from this perspective, doctors may need 
different information content. Our model allows mapping the effectiveness of information 
content to different doctor profiles, which would enable firms to customize its information 
content to the doctor profile (an example for doctor profiling according to volume, 
responsiveness and competitive detailing, is available from the authors upon simple 
request). 
Third, pharmaceutical firms have been used to detail on the drug’s scientific 
profile (mainly effectiveness and side effects) and not on the drug’s price. Doctors 
typically did not account for price in their prescription choice (Gonul et al. 2001; Gonzalez 
et al. 2008; IIzuka and Jin 2007). However, pharmaceutical costs are the fastest growing 
component of healthcare costs in developed countries and especially given the ageing of 
the population, in recent years increasing attention has been paid by the government to the 
sustainability of healthcare expenses. Over the last decade, patients have become also more 
involved in the prescription decision process (McNutt 2004; Alexander et al. 2005). These 
development has led doctors to focus more and more on the price of the prescription drugs. 
                                                        
20 GlaxoSmithKline press release, “GlaxoSmithKline to Implement New Compensation Program for U.S. Sales 
Professionals”, July 26, 2010. Accessible at http://us.gsk.com/html/media-
news/pressreleases/2010/2010_us_pressrelease_10067.htm. 
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Our data is from an interesting time period during which this shift in attention took place. 
Thus, firms will need to shift their detailing model and discuss price and reimbursement 
considerations with doctors to enhance their responsiveness to detailing. 
Fourth, from an ethical viewpoint, the positive bias in information content may 
damage the degree to which doctors, but also society at large, trust the pharmaceutical 
industry. The industry should take more measures to safeguard the ethics of its large 
salesforces and the messaging that they undertake. Even though the pharmaceutical 
industry has done a lot already in terms of ethics in recent years, more ethics training to 
sales reps, better monitoring of message content and a stricter code of sales ethics industry-
wide may be required to further improve the trust of doctors and society in the industry.  
From a public policy viewpoint, our findings are reason for concern. Using a 
similar methodology as ours, it would be valuable for public policy administrators to 
assess whether a positive bias in information content also exists in other categories and is 
still present in more recent years (e.g. 2009-2010). If it is, appropriate action would be to 
partner with the industry on an improvement program, rather than the FDA’s current 
strategy of unilaterally enforcing more regulation.21 There are two reasons for this. First, 
detailing content is harder to monitor than advertising. Second, our model findings show 
that the interests in a balanced sales call of the regulator are aligned with the long-term 
interests of the industry. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
This study contains the following limitations. First, a sales call is an interaction 
between the firm and the client. This means that the sales representative does not have the 
power to fully determine the information content of the sales call. However, we do observe 
consistent differences among firms in the content they discuss with different types of 
doctors, implying that firms do have the power to influence the sales message content.  
Second, our results are limited to the pharmaceutical industry and to the 
information content we observe in our data. However, it is not unlikely that they can 
extend to other industries as well. One can find case evidence of myopic selling in other 
industries, where it may lead to similar detrimental effects. A recent example is the 
banking industry. The financial crisis has uncovered that sales representatives in this 
industry were selling financial derivatives without explaining the risks sufficiently to their 
clients to maximize sales in the short run. Hence, we deem it fruitful for future research to 
                                                        
21 E.g. the FDA has launched in 2010 the ‘Bad Ad’ program, which educates doctors on how to recognize 
misleading information. The goal is to make detailing truthful and balanced and the program encourages doctors 
to report practices that go against this. 
Information Content in Pharmaceutical Sales Calls 
 
70 
 
investigate the role of information content in other industries where personal selling plays 
an important role.  
Beyond addressing specific limitations of the present research, there are also 
many other possible avenues for future research in this area. First, research could establish 
differences in the effectiveness of information content in sales calls over new and mature 
products. For example, Narayanan et al. (2005) find that the informative effect prevails in 
the beginning of a product’s life cycle, while the persuasive effect is stronger later on. 
Hence, it is interesting to investigate how these two effects are related to the sales message 
content. Second, it would be valuable to look at competitive effects as well, e.g. how does 
information content counteracts competitive information content and how does 
information content influence competitive sales. As drugs within a therapeutic category are 
often strongly competing with each other, drugs try to differentiate from each other. For 
example, Dong et al. (2009a) find significant competitive detailing effects between most 
brands and it would be valuable to investigate how the size is driven by the detailing 
content. Third, future research may examine how the effect of information content 
interacts with sales person characteristics and the characteristics of the relation between 
sales person and customer, as these have been shown to be important determinants of the 
trust in the salesperson (Doney and Cannon 1997; Weitz 1981). This information can be 
used to instruct and train sales reps at the individual level. Overall, we call for more 
research that links the responsiveness to a sales message to its information content. 
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Tables 
Table 2.1: Frequency of Information Content in Detailing Calls for All Attributes 
 
 
Content 
 
Explanation 
Rate at which the 
Attribute Is Discussed 
Efficacy The ability of a drug to produce the desired therapeutic effect. 74% 
Indications The diseases or symptoms for which the drug can be prescribed. 52% 
Price The costs of the treatment, including price reductions. 16% 
Side 
Effects 
Problems that may occur when the treatment goes beyond the 
desired effect, or coincides with the desired therapeutic effect. 22% 
Interactions Interactions between a drug and other substances that prevent the drug from performing as expected. 13% 
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Table 2.2: Scientific Profile (Mean and Standard Deviation in parentheses) of Lipitor, Zocor and 
Pravachol, for All Attributes 
 
 Efficacy Indications Price Side Effects Interactions 
Lipitor 31.99 (5.17) 6.98 (1.61) 216.71 (12.44) 145.08 (.27) 15.00 (.00) 
Zocor 34.62 (3.01) 19.50 (5.08) 128.58 (5.80)a 82.00 (.00) 16.35 (.77) 
Pravachol 26.74 (.24) 12.90 (.44) 283.68 (21.27) 88.15 (.36) 18.00 (.00) 
Note: Efficacy is measured as the percentage of LDL reduction. Indications measures the number of indications 
approved. Price is given in dollars per prescription (usually a 90-day prescription). Side Effects is the number of 
FDA-approved side effects. Interactions denotes the number of interactions of the drug with other substances. 
aNote that Zocor is the only brand that has a 5mg dosage of its pill on the market. All brands have further dosages 
of (10, 20, 40 and 80mg). As a smaller dosage is cheaper, this lowers the average price of Zocor. 
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Table 2.3: Immediate and Total Average Detailing Effects, Based on the GIRF 
 
 Immediate Fixed Effect Total Fixed Effect 
Lipitor .13 .44 
Zocor .14 .29 
Pravachol .16 .56 
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Table 2.4: Estimates for the Determinants of Immediate and Total Detailing Responsiveness 
 
 Immediate Total 
Efficacy -.10 -.10 
  (-.15, -.04) (-.16, -.03) 
Indications .08 .10 
 (.05, .10) (.03, .16) 
Price .06 .12 
 (.01, .11) (.02, .22) 
Side Effects -.06 -.05 
  (-.06, -.05) (-.06, -.03) 
Interactions .02 .06 
  (-.03, .07) (.00, .12) 
Competitive Superiority .03 -.06 
  (.02, .05) (-.07, -.05) 
Negative News -.05 .09 
 (-.08, -.03) (.03, .15) 
Positive News .03 .00 
  (-.01, .06) (-.06, .08) 
New Information .05 .15 
  (-.03, .13) (-.05, .35) 
Duration .01 .01 
  (.00, .01) (.01, .02) 
Duration^2 -.00 -.00 
  (-.00, -.00) (-.00, -.00) 
   
R2 .29 .46 
 N=3,496 N=3,496 
Note: The 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles are given in parentheses. 
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Table 2.5: Discussion of Positively Biased Information in Pharmaceutical Sales Calles 
 
 Lipitor Zocor Pravachol All Brands 
Competitively Superior Attributes    33% 
Competitively Non-superior Attributes    30% 
Negative News 59% 58% 50% 57% 
Positive News 64% 61% 56% 61% 
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Table 2.6: Percentage of Calls in which Various Types of Information Content Are Discussed, Split to 
Different Doctor Types 
 
  Lipitor Zocor Pravachol All 
Superior Attributes 
All    33% 
High-volume prescribers    33% 
Low-volume prescribers    33% 
High responsiveness    34% 
Low responsiveness    33% 
High competitive details    32% 
Low competitive details    34% 
Non-superior 
Attributes 
All    30% 
High-volume prescribers    31% 
Low-volume prescribers    30% 
High responsiveness    26% 
Low responsiveness    33% 
High competitive details    29% 
Low competitive details    32% 
Negative 
All 59% 58% 50% 57% 
High-volume prescribers 68% 58% 47% 60% 
Low-volume prescribers 57% 58% 52% 57% 
High responsiveness 46% 57% 53% 52% 
Low responsiveness 62% 59% 43% 58% 
High competitive details 66% 59% 54% 61% 
Low competitive details 49% 57% 42% 51% 
Positive 
All 64% 61% 56% 61% 
High-volume prescribers 67% 61% 58% 63% 
Low-volume prescribers 63% 61% 56% 61% 
High responsiveness 62% 60% 56% 60% 
Low responsiveness 65% 62% 58% 63% 
High competitive details 65% 62% 57% 63% 
Low competitive details 63% 59% 55% 60% 
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Table 2.7: Estimates for the Heterogeneous Effect of Superiority and Negative New Information on 
Immediate and Total Detailing Responsiveness 
  
 Immediate Total 
Efficacy -.12 -.07 
  (-.19, -.07) (-.12, -.01) 
Indications .07 .10 
 (.04, .10) (.01, .19) 
Price .06 .12 
 (-.01, .12) (.02, .23) 
Side Effects -.05 -.04 
  (-.06, .05) (-.05, -.03) 
Interactions .01 .05 
  (-.04, .06) (-.03, .13) 
Competitive Superiority .08 .02 
  (.06, .09) (-.03, .07) 
Competitive Superiority High Prescribers .04 -.02 
 (-.03, .09) (-.11, .07) 
Competitive Superiority High Responsiveness .04 -.15 
 (-.00, .08) (-.26, -.04) 
Competitive Superiority High Comp. Detailing .08 -.11 
 (.04, .11) (-.21, -.03) 
Negative News .09 .05 
  (.03, .15) (-.11, .21) 
Negative News High Prescribers .09 .13 
 (.02, .17) (.03, .24) 
Negative News High Responsiveness .03 .00 
 (-.02, .09) (-.13, .15) 
Negative News High Comp. Detailing .06 .11 
 (.00, .11) (.01, .20) 
Positive News .01 .07 
 (-.06, .08) (-.11, .25) 
Positive News High Prescribers -.07 -.14 
 (-.15, .01) (-.24, .-04) 
Positive News High Responsiveness .04 .03 
 (-.02, .10) (-.04, .11) 
Positive News High Comp. Detailing -.06 .01 
 (-.13, -.00) (-.08, .09) 
New Information .06 .33 
  (-.06, .18) (.02, .64) 
Duration .01 .01 
  (.00, .01) (.01, .02) 
Duration^2 .00 .00 
  (-.00, -.00) (-.00, -.00) 
   
R2 .35 .51 
 N=3,496 N=3,496 
Note: The 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles are given in parentheses. 
. 
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Figures 
Figure 2.1: Average Generalized Impulse Response Function of Detailing on Prescriptions for Lipitor, 
Zocor and Pravachol 
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APPENDIX 2A 
This appendix explains the estimation steps of the VARX(P) system for J brands and P 
lags. We have taken 220,000 draws and used the first 160,000 for burn-in. In particular, we 
used a very large thinning value of 300 to store for every draw individual- and time-
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The other parameters are distributed as follows: ),0(MVN~}1,{ 6  Jjijtit HH , 
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rī, Rīand IW(·,·) an Inverted Wishart distribution with r degrees of freedom and scale 
matrix R. 
The parameters are now drawn by the following sampling scheme: 
Step 1: Generate .PoitH  Using Metropolis-Hastings, the candidate is evaluated by the 
posterior probability: 
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Information Content in Pharmaceutical Sales Calls 
 
80 
 
.exp
1
, ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§
 ¦
 

Po
it
Po
it
Po
i
P
p
pti
Po
it
Po
it XY HEJO     (2A.4) 
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for JJj 21  and -j refers to all brands except brand j. 
 
Step 3: Generate .itī  These are drawn using the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm: 
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Step 4: Generate )(*vec  and .*:  Using the Gibbs algorithm, these are drawn from a 
multivariate normal distribution. 
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Step 5: Generate ȕi. These are drawn with a Metropolis Hasting step. 
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Step 7: Generate Ȉ. This is drawn from an inverted Wishart distribution. 
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Appendix 2B 
The results from the hierarchical Bayesian VARX(1) system, with latent 
dependent variables, in Equation (2.1) and (2.2), based on 600 doctors over 40 months, are 
given below. The estimates for the covariance matrix Ȉ are given in Table 2B.1. The 
diagonal elements reflect the size of the dependent variables, where prescriptions have a 
higher variance than details. Table 2B.2 shows the estimates for the time-invariant 
coefficients. The constants for prescriptions range from -.38 to 7.29, roughly reflecting the 
market shares for the different brands. The trend in prescriptions for Lipitor is significantly 
positive, while the prescription trend for Zocor and Pravachol is negative. This can be 
explained by the stage of the drugs in the life cycle; while Zocor and Pravachol are nearing 
their patent expiry in 2006, Lipitor’s patent only expires in 2011. The trend in detailing is 
negative for all brands. The introduction of Crestor has a significant negative effect on the 
number of prescriptions of Lipitor (-.38) and Zocor (-.23), while it is positive for Pravachol 
(.10). Its effect on detailing is negative for all brands. Table 2B.3 provides the covariances 
of these variables per dependent variable and shows that there is large heterogeneity in the 
population. 
Table 2B.4 shows the average own-carryover effects and cross-carryover effects. 
The carryover effects for prescriptions are in line with the literature and range from .45 for 
Lipitor to .65 for Pravachol. The effect from lagged detailing on prescriptions is positive 
for all brands, but smallest for Zocor (.02). We also find positive effects of lagged 
competitive detailing. Finally, Table 2B.5 describes the heterogeneity in the population of 
these effects. 
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Table 2B.1: Covariance Matrix for the Prescription and Detailing Equation 
 
Covariance 
 Rx Lipitor Rx Zocor Rx Pravachol Det Lipitor Det Zocor Det Pravachol 
Rx Lipitor 3.10 .23 .34 .06 .08 .12 
 (2.93, 3.27) (.10, .32) (.24, .47) (.00, .16) (-.01, .16) (.05, .25) 
Rx Zocor  3.00 .27 .00 .16 .11 
  (2.93, 3.09) (.21, .34) (-.13, .10) (.12 .20) (.07, .18) 
Rx Pravachol   2.69 -.06 09 .24 
   (2.55, 2.81) (-.11, .03) (.02, .17) (.13, .35) 
Det Lipitor    .17 .01 .01 
    (.15, .19) (-.00, .03) (-.01, .04) 
Det Zocor     .16 .03 
     (.14, .19) (.02, .06) 
Det Pravachol      .23 
      (.17, .32) 
Note: The 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles are given in parentheses. 
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Table 2B.2: Estimates of the Time-Invariant Parameters 
  
Time-Invariant Variables 
 Constant Trend Intro Crestor 
Rx Lipitor 7.29 2.98 -.38 
 (5.48, 9.59) (1.58, 3.54) (-.78, -.11) 
Rx Zocor .84 -.83 -.23 
 (.39, 1.35) (-1.65, -.25) (-.38, -.07) 
Rx Pravachol -1.46 -.81 .10 
 (-1.71, -1.21) (-1.26, -.60) (.03, .21) 
 Constant Ln(Trend) Intro Crestor 
Det Lipitor -3.60 -.90 -.64 
 (-3.77, -3.47) (-.97, -.83) (-.68, -.58) 
Det Zocor -3.73 -.88 -.61 
 (-3.78, -3.65) (-1.00, -.79) (-.68, -.56) 
Det Pravachol -3.84 -1.13 -.87 
 (-3.91, -3.73) (-1.24, -1.01) (-.98, -.78) 
Note: The 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles are given in parentheses. 
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Table 2B.3: Estimates for the Population Variance of the Time-Invariant Parameters 
 
Covariance Lipitor Prescriptions 
 Constant Trend Intro Crestor 
Constant 657.13 -219.29 -91.63 
 (605.78, 716.28) (-241.24, -192.97) (-104.12, -78.96) 
Trend  344.46 21.13 
  (312.09, 373.96) (13.23, 29.67) 
Intro Crestor   47.36 
   (46.33, 54.96) 
Covariance Zocor Prescriptions 
 Constant Trend Intro Crestor 
Constant 86.52 -49.45 -6.35 
 (82.81, 97.89) (-54.53, -45.28) (-8.34, -4.53) 
Trend  74.16 2.00 
  (69.22, 77.31) (.89, 4.43) 
Intro Crestor   7.54 
   (6.63, 8.09) 
Covariance Pravachol Prescriptions 
 Constant Trend Intro Crestor 
Constant 25.63 -17.85 -.73 
 (23.42, 27.75) (-20.82, -15.21) (-1.37, -.33) 
Trend  34.72 -2.74 
  (29.88, 37.81) (-3.39, -2.08) 
Intro Crestor   2.79 
   (2.48, 3.26) 
Covariance Lipitor Detailing 
 Constant Ln(Trend) Intro Crestor 
Constant 2.81 .02 .57 
 (2.53, 3.27) (-.05, .14) (.52, .67) 
Ln(Trend)  1.09 .02 
  (.99, 1.17) (-.08, .09) 
Intro Crestor   .65 
   (.55, .74) 
Covariance Zocor Detailing 
 Constant Ln(Trend) Intro Crestor 
Constant 2.85 -.30 .62 
 (2.53, 3.11) (-.424, -.0348) (.55, .72) 
Ln(Trend)  1.95 .09 
  (1.72, 2.23) (-.01, .23) 
Intro Crestor   .50 
   (.46, .60) 
Covariance Pravachol Detailing 
 Constant Ln(Trend) Intro Crestor 
Constant 1.75 -.10 .74 
 (1.51, 1.86) (-.25, .01) (.65, .83) 
Ln(Trend)  .93 -.48 
  (.82, 1.06) (-.53, -.39) 
Intro Crestor   .66 
   (.61, .73) 
Note: The 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles are given in parentheses. 
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Table 2B.4: Estimates of the Time-Varying Carry-Over Effects 
 
Carry-Over Variables 
 
Lagged Rx 
Lipitor 
Lagged Rx 
Zocor 
Lagged Rx 
Pravachol 
Lagged Det 
Lipitor 
Lagged Det 
Zocor 
Lagged Det 
Pravachol 
Rx Lipitor  .45 .11 .03 .20 -.02 .03 
 (.44, .45) (.10, .11) (.03, .03) (.19, .21) (-.03, -.01) (.02, .05) 
Rx Zocor  .01 .48 .07 .04 .02 -.03 
 (.01, .02) (.47, .48) (.07, .07) (.04, .05) (.01, .03) (-.04, -.03) 
Rx Pravachol .01 .05 .65 .06 .04 .13 
 (.01, .01) (.05, .05) (.65, .66) (.04, .07) (.03, .05) (.12, .14) 
 Lagged Rx Lipitor 
Lagged Rx 
Zocor 
Lagged Rx 
Pravachol 
Lagged Det 
Lipitor 
Lagged Det 
Zocor 
Lagged Det 
Pravachol 
Det Lipitor -.01 -.02 -.03 .03 .02 .01 
 (-.01, -.01) (-.02, -.01) (-.03, -.03) (.03, .04) (.02, .03) (-.00, .02) 
Det Zocor -.01 -.01 -.01 .11 .02 .05 
 (-.01, -.01) (-.01, -.01) (-.01, -.01) (.10, .11) (.02, .02) (.05, .06) 
Det Pravachol -.01 -.02 -.02 .16 .09 .03 
 (-.01, -.01) (-.02, -.02) (-.02, -.02) (.15, .17) (.09, .10) (.03, .04) 
Note: The 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles are given in parentheses. 
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Table 2B.5: Estimates for the Population Variance of the Carry-Over Effects 
 
Variance Carry-Over Variables 
 
Lagged Rx 
Lipitor 
Lagged Rx 
Zocor 
Lagged Rx 
Pravachol 
Lagged Det 
Lipitor 
Lagged Det 
Zocor 
Lagged Det 
Pravachol 
Rx Lipitor .12 .01 .01 .22 .32 .21 
 (.11, .12) (.01, .02) (.01, .01) (.21, .22) (.30, .34) (.20, .23) 
Rx Zocor .00 .07 .00 .18 .17 .18 
 (.00, .00) (.07, .08) (.00, .00) (.18, .19) (.16, .17) (.17, .19) 
Rx 
Pravachol .00 .00 .07 .24 .14 .25 
 (.00, .00) (.00, .00) (.07, .08) (.23, .25) (.13, .14) (.24, .26) 
 Lagged Rx Lipitor 
Lagged Rx 
Zocor 
Lagged Rx 
Pravachol 
Lagged Det 
Lipitor 
Lagged Det 
Zocor 
Lagged Det 
Pravachol 
Det Lipitor .00 .00 .00 .03 .07 .10 
 (.00, .00) (.00, .00) (.00, .00) (.03, .03) (.06, .07) (.09, .10) 
Det Zocor .00 .00 .00 .05 .05 .12 
 (.00, .00) (.00, .00) (.00, .00) (.04, .05) (.05, .05) (.11, .13) 
Det 
Pravachol .00 .00 .00 .11 .06 .09 
 (.00, .00) (.00, .00) (.00, .00) (.11, .12) (.06, .07) (.08, .09) 
Note: The 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles are given in parentheses. 
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Sales Success in Science-Based Industries:  
Uncovering the Role of Scientific Reviews on Sales and 
Marketing Expenditures to Users and Experts 
Abstract 
 
Firms in science-based industries support the sales of their products with both 
scientific reviews and marketing expenditures to users or experts. We discern three 
summary metrics to characterize the body of scientific reviews – valence, dispersion and 
volume. We differentiate scientific reviews from user and expert reviews and show 
theoretically and empirically how the summary metrics of scientific reviews impact the 
marketing expenditures and sales for products in science-based industries. Using a 
comprehensive dataset of prescription drugs (cholesterol-lowering statins), we show that 
higher valence increases marketing to both users and experts, while higher dispersion leads 
to a reallocation of marketing. Higher volume only affects marketing to experts. Product 
sales are positively affected by both valence and volume. We show that omitting scientific 
reviews leads to an upward bias in the estimates of marketing responsiveness parameters. 
Our findings allow firms to anticipate and counteract marketing strategies of competitors 
given the results of a scientific review of a competitive product. Our method also allows 
firms to assess the return on investments in scientific reviews. 
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Introduction 
Science-based industries (e.g. biosciences, chemicals, medical electronics, 
nanotechnology, pharmaceuticals and semiconductors) comprise a substantial part of the 
economy and are very important for economic growth (Grupp 1996; Mansfield 1991; 
Narin 2000; Narin, Hamilton and Olivastro 1997)22. Firms in science-based industries have 
higher R&D-to-sales ratios, rely on R&D from both in-house and independent sources 
(e.g. universities), and outperform their counterparts with a weaker science base (Deng, 
Lev and Narin 1999; Zucker, Darby and Brewer 1998). Products in science-based 
industries have a higher number of science papers cited in their patents (science linkage) as 
compared to products in other industries (Narin 2000; Pavitt 1984). Such products are 
usually tested in scientific reviews that appear prior to and during the lifecycle of a 
product. Scientific reviews are product reviews prepared by trained experts through 
systematic observation, measurement, and experimentation of a product using the scientific 
method.  
Scientific reviews differ from both user and expert reviews on two important 
dimensions – target audience and level of subjectivity. First, scientific reviews often 
contain more complex and technical content, which requires more expertise to understand 
them than expert or user reviews. Thus, scientific reviews are meant for a primarily expert 
audience in contrast to both user and expert reviews, which target potential users. User 
reviews are generated by consumers after the consumption of a product and detail their 
personal experiences for the benefit of other users (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006). Expert 
reviews23 originate from a smaller group of influential people that regularly monitor new 
or modified products and publicize reviews that have the potential to influence a large 
number of users (e.g. Mossberg in the Wall Street Journal, David Pogue in the New York 
Times, or Oprah Winfrey in her talk show) (Liu 2006; Tellis and Johnson 2007).  
Second, scientific reviews are based on tests that use standardized protocols, 
under controlled conditions, to create scientifically valid results. On the other hand, user 
and expert reviews do not necessarily adhere to formal scientific testing procedures and are 
based on consumer product usage experience. As a result, scientific reviews are more 
                                                        
22 See for detailed information on the role of science in the following science-based industries: biotechnology 
(Pisano 2006; Zucker, Darby and Armstrong 2002), nanotechnology (Darby and Zucker 2003), pharmaceuticals 
(Stremersch and Van Dyck 2009), semiconductors (Holbrook et al. 2000). 
23 Alternative names used to refer to expert reviews are critic, professional and third-party reviews. 
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objective (i.e. based on well-established industry standards), whereas user and expert 
reviews are, at least partially, subjective24.  
While there is an emerging literature in marketing on the evolution and impact of 
user and expert reviews on product sales (e.g. Chen and Xie 2008; Zhu and Zhang 2010), 
relatively little is known about either the impact of scientific reviews on sales or how firms 
use the outcome of scientific reviews to adjust marketing expenditures. We fill this gap by 
theoretically and empirically analyzing the interplay between scientific reviews, sales and 
marketing in science-based industries. Inspired by the prior literature on user and expert 
reviews, we use three metrics to summarize the available body of scientific reviews – 
valence, dispersion and volume (e.g. Chintagunta, Gopinath and Venkataraman 2010; Moe 
and Trusov 2011; Zhu and Zhang 2010). Valence of reviews refers to the average outcome 
across all available reviews. Dispersion of reviews refers to the variance across all 
available reviews. Volume of reviews refers to the total number of reviews available. 
Prior research suggests that user and expert reviews have the potential to affect 
sales (e.g. Dellarocas, Zhang and Awad 2007; Liu 2006; Moe and Trusov 2011) and 
marketing (Chen and Xie 2008). In a theoretical study, Chen and Xie (2008) argue that 
reviews help consumers identify the products that best match their idiosyncratic 
preferences and, hence, act as an element of the marketing communication mix. In science-
based industries, new scientific reviews appear over the product’s lifecycle and provide 
heterogeneous outcomes on the same product. A reason for this heterogeneity may be that 
the reviews originate from different sources, manufacturer, independent researchers and 
competitors, choosing different study designs. Also, manufacturers may sponsor or design 
new studies intended to showcase higher performance of their products as compared to 
products of its competitors, e.g. by testing the product in a benevolent environment.  
While, scientific reviews may influence sales directly (see Azoulay 2002), firms 
may also adjust their marketing mix based on the available information (Ippolito and 
Mathios 1990). Due to the nature of the products, firms in science-based industries often 
make two types of marketing expenditures – directed to users and to experts. For example, 
pharmaceutical firms, such as Pfizer, often allocate their marketing budgets for a product 
across marketing to users (e.g. TV advertising) and experts (e.g. personal selling to 
physicians). Similarly, DSM, a life sciences and materials sciences-based company, 
advertises its nutritional ingredients directly to food supplement companies and to end 
consumers, but also publishes scientific reviews on their products to convince both experts 
(e.g. dietary supplement companies) and users of the quality of their products. Often this 
                                                        
24 We acknowledge the existence of scientific misconduct in a small percentage of scientific reviews, where 
results are falsely reported (New York Times 2006).   
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demarcation between target audiences is more significant in cases where the decision 
maker differs from the consumer of the product either because of usage (e.g. B2B 
manufacturer of a science based product vs. consumer) or competence (e.g. physician vs. 
patient)  
This study answers the following research questions. How do scientific reviews 
affect a firm’s marketing expenditures to users and experts? To what extent do scientific 
reviews affect sales? To achieve this, we collect a comprehensive body of scientific 
reviews for an important category of science-based products, namely statins (which are 
cholesterol-lowering drugs), in the pharmaceutical industry, a prototypical example of a 
science-based industry (Narin 2000; Stremersch and Van Dyck 2009). We collect all 
scientific reviews published in top journals by manufacturers, competitors and independent 
researchers, both prior to and after FDA approval and summarize the body of scientific 
reviews using three metrics - valence, dispersion and volume. Next, we model the impact 
of valence, dispersion and volume of scientific reviews on sales, marketing to users 
(patients) and to experts (physicians) by a vector error correction (VEC) model.  
This study has the following contributions: we are the first to comprehensively 
analyze the role of scientific reviews on sales and on marketing expenditures in science-
based industries. We differentiate the impact of scientific reviews on marketing to users 
from the impact on marketing to experts. We also extend prior literature on user and expert 
reviews and show how current metrics of valence, dispersion and volume of scientific 
reviews may be used to investigate a product’s marketing expenditures and its sales.  
We have the following key findings: A higher valence of the body of scientific 
reviews increases marketing to both users and experts, while a higher dispersion of the 
body of scientific reviews leads to a reallocation of marketing expenditures directed 
towards users to marketing expenditures directed towards experts. A larger volume of the 
body of scientific reviews has no effect on marketing expenditures directed towards users, 
but increases marketing expenditures directed towards experts. A higher valence and larger 
volume of the body of scientific reviews leads to an increase in sales, while the dispersion 
of the body of scientific reviews has no direct effect on sales. Furthermore, we find that 
excluding these dimensions of the body of scientific reviews from a sales response model 
leads to an overestimation of the responsiveness of sales to marketing expenditures. 
Our findings allow firms to anticipate what competitors may do given the results 
of a scientific review and to counteract their marketing efforts to their own advantage. 
Thus, we provide insights for product managers in pharmaceutical firms to understand and 
react to marketing strategies of competitors. Second, our method and study provides 
insights on the value of a scientific review on sales. Firms can use this to assess the return 
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on investments in scientific reviews. Third, we develop and propose metrics on how to 
analyze marketing strategy towards users and experts under conditions of changing 
product performance of both the focal product and competitor products. This distinction is 
especially relevant for science-based industries, due to the nature of the product and 
complex nature of scientific reviews. We show how managers can monitor cumulative 
scientific evidence on a scientific product from multiple sources to evaluate the differential 
effects of volume, valence, and dispersion on sales and modify the marketing expenditures.  
We proceed by discussing the theory on scientific reviews and create hypotheses 
on their effect on sales and marketing. Then, we present the context, followed by the 
model and results. We end by discussing the implications of our results. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Scientific reviews are an essential component marketers should consider in setting 
marketing expenditures and may have a substantial effect on sales. There are two main 
ways of how scientific reviews affect the marketing expenditures of the underlying 
product. First, scientific reviews may affect the confidence of a firm to change marketing 
expenditures. Positive scientific reviews increase the confidence managers have in the 
quality of their products and help them to justify allocation of higher marketing budgets.  
Second, scientific reviews affect the amount of information that the firm can 
provide in its marketing communications. The technical content of scientific reviews 
requires higher substantive expertise for comprehension of the content and its implications. 
Therefore, firms may distinguish between general users and experts as two separate target 
markets. In addition, when many scientific reviews are released over time or when 
customers do not have the time to read these scientific reviews, firms may need to put in 
efforts to convey, clarify or stress the new findings to users or experts. They can do that by 
providing the customers with a verbal discussion of the content, by summarizing the 
findings or by just facilitating access to the scientific reviews. The firm may also 
strategically choose what type of information they emphasize. 
There are also two main ways of how scientific reviews affect the sales of the 
underlying product. First, scientific reviews affect sales by changing consumer perceptions 
about the quality of scientific products. Products in science-based industries are often 
experience goods (e.g. gecko tape, a nanotechnology-based tape with directional adhesion) 
or credence goods (e.g. genetically modified vitamin supplements). Assessing the quality 
of these types of products before purchase involves high costs. In addition, customers 
engage in more rational decision making during the purchase decision for such products, 
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which creates a higher demand for high quality, objective evaluation of the product 
(Dranove and Jin 2010). Scientific reviews provide such information on the performance 
of the product to consumers. 
Second, scientific reviews affect sales by changing the overall uncertainty about 
the performance of a product in different usage conditions. Firms in the science-based 
industries place much greater emphasis on the development of new capabilities and the use 
of intellectual property. Firms face greater competition with respect to the rate at which 
new products are being introduced and being customized. As a result, there is increased 
threat of faster obsolescence, changing consumer requirements and uncertain consumer 
demand, (Pavitt 1984; Narin 2000). Scientific reviews help to address concerns related to 
consumer education. At the same time, ambiguous or contradicting information might 
withhold consumers from buying a product. 
Building on the arguments given above, we develop six hypotheses on the 
influence of the valence, dispersion and volume of scientific reviews on marketing 
expenditures and sales. 
Impact of Valence of Scientific Reviews on Marketing Expenditures and Sales 
Valence of reviews refers to the average outcome across all available reviews 
(Basuroy, Chatterjee and Ravid 2003; Chintagunta, Gopinath and Venkataraman 2009; 
Dellarocas, Awad and Zhang 2004). The valence of the review may be influenced by the 
chosen design, for which different sources have different incentives. Often a manufacturer 
attempts to initially identify the best usage conditions for a product and simulate laboratory 
conditions to test the performance under such conditions. Over time, manufacturers or 
independent researchers may focus their attention on testing the product under different 
conditions that may yield different levels of performance, leading to a change in the 
valence of the total body of reviews. During the product’s lifecycle, competitors may also 
compare their own products with other products, resulting in performance assessments of 
both their own product and competitive products.  
If the performance reported in more recent scientific reviews is higher than the 
average performance reported in the past, the firm may want to communicate its advantage 
(Ippolito and Mathios 1990). An increasing valence enables the firm to communicate a 
stronger message, which provides the firm’s audience, users and experts, with more 
positive information on the product’s performance. Hence, firms have a strong incentive to 
increase marketing expenditures to both users and experts. In addition, an increase in 
valence of scientific reviews over time also enhances the firm’s confidence in the product, 
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allowing marketers to get higher marketing budgets to support the product. Hence, we 
posit the following hypothesis,  
H1: A higher valence of the body of scientific reviews leads to a) an increase in 
marketing expenditures to users and b) an increase in marketing expenditures to 
experts. 
 
Scientific reviews on a science-based product are a technical assessment of the 
product’s quality. Higher valence may signal higher product quality or actually confirm the 
underlying product quality. Product quality is shown to be positively related to sales 
(Tellis, Yin and Niraj 2009). Thus, more positive scientific reviews on a science-based 
product may increase its sales. Indeed, in the few studies relating information from 
scientific reviews to sales, it is the only summary measure used and generally has a 
positive effect on sales (Azoulay 2002; Ching and Ishihara 2010; Chintagunta, Jiang and 
Jing 2009; Cockburn and Anis 2001). Hence we propose: 
H2: A higher valence of the body of scientific reviews leads to an increase in sales. 
 
Impact of Dispersion of Scientific Reviews on Marketing Expenditures and Sales 
Dispersion of reviews refers to the variance across scientific reviews (Godes and 
Mayzlin 2004; Sun 2010; Zhu and Zhang 2010). If multiple reviews report consistent, 
respectively inconsistent, performance, the dispersion is low, respectively high. Dispersion 
of reviews may have several origins, such as the source of the review (e.g. manufacturer, 
competitor or independent researchers) or the testing conditions. 
Prior research suggests that reviews sponsored by manufacturers are more likely 
to favor their product, because they choose to fund research projects with a higher 
likelihood of positive results (e.g. involving a weaker competitor or a more favorable 
testing condition) and may choose to stop a review before completion if initial results are 
unfavorable (Lexchin et al. 2003). On the other hand, independent researchers or 
competitors may have an incentive to balance these positive outcomes by testing the 
product in less favorable conditions. For example, the real life of a rechargeable electric 
car battery can differ greatly from the manufacturers’ claims because of differences in 
parameters like vibration, shock, heat, cold, and sulfation of their lead plates, each of 
which may differ from the laboratory test conditions.  
An increasing dispersion across scientific reviews increases the complexity of 
product information, which may trigger the firm to change its marketing expenditures, 
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either to promote aggressively or defend passionately. Reviews deviating positively from 
past reviews may be heavily promoted, while reviews deviating negatively may require the 
communication of more detail on the specific (e.g. unfavorable) testing conditions. 
However, firms realize that users and experts may differ in their absorptive capability of 
increasingly dispersed information.  
Experts are more interested in the scientific information about the product, while 
users may consume the product with a more limited knowledge of the underlying 
complexities (John, Weiss and Dutta 1999). Whereas the increase in uncertainty, caused by 
higher dispersion across reviews, can be explained to experts to ensure they understand the 
implications of the different review designs on effectiveness, it may not be optimal to 
inform the less-educated user in a similar fashion as they have often difficulties in 
processing scientific information on the product (cf. France and Bone 2009). Therefore, 
with increasing information complexity, driven by higher dispersion, the firm may increase 
its marketing expenditures to experts, while decreasing its marketing expenditures to users. 
While experts have a high absorptive capacity and can be informed by face-to-face sales 
calls force under increasing dispersion, informing users, often through mass media, 
becomes exceedingly difficult. Hence we propose that, 
H3: A higher dispersion of the body of scientific reviews leads to a) a decrease in 
marketing expenditures to users and b) an increase in marketing expenditures to 
experts. 
 
Higher dispersion may signal higher uncertainty about the quality of the 
underlying product and a higher perceived heterogeneity in product performance under 
different circumstances. For example, if scientific reviews of a drug contradict each other, 
physicians may abstain from prescribing the drug and patients may refrain from using the 
drug. Whatever the reasons for higher dispersion, the increase in contradictory reports over 
time may lead to higher skepticism among customers and lower sales (Dellarocas, Awad 
and Zhang 2004; Chintagunta, Gopinath and Venkataraman 2010; Moe and Trusov 2011; 
Zhu and Zhang 2010). Hence we propose that, 
H4: A higher dispersion of the body of scientific reviews leads to a decrease in sales. 
 
The Impact of Volume of Scientific Reviews on Marketing Expenditures and Sales 
Volume of reviews refers to the total number of reviews available (Basuroy, 
Chatterjee and Ravid 2003; Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Eliashberg and Shugan 1997; Liu 
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2006). A higher volume of reviews implies a larger amount of information on the 
product’s quality (Liu 2006), especially as scientific reviews are unlikely to be published 
without any new information. The higher volume of the body of scientific reviews may 
also serve as a signal of the scientific credibility of the product to the users (McFadden and 
Train 1996). Each review creates an opportunity for the firm to inform the customers of the 
new findings. If the new findings support earlier findings, they help to strengthen the 
positioning; if the new findings contradict earlier findings, they need to be put in 
perspective and explained to both the users and experts.  
Users and experts may react different to a higher volume of scientific reviews. To 
users, a higher volume of the body of scientific reviews enhances the salience of the 
product. Firms increase their marketing expenditures during these times to synchronize 
their marketing messages to be in line with new information being released through the 
scientific reviews. The higher levels of salience are also optimal times to achieve higher 
brand switching. On the other hand, to experts, a higher volume of reviews may yield new 
incremental information about the performance of the product in different conditions, some 
of which may be uncommon, complicated, or applicable to only special circumstances. 
These incremental findings may be of special interest to experts only and increased 
marketing expenditures to experts can help to inform the experts. To summarize, even 
though the messages delivered to users and experts may differ, as the volume of reviews 
increases, firms increase the marketing expenditures. Hence, we propose that, 
H5: A higher volume of the body of scientific reviews leads to a) an increase in 
marketing expenditures to users and b) an increase in marketing expenditures to 
experts. 
 
The number of reviews on a product may increase the awareness and salience 
(exposure) of a product, which may, in turn, enhance customers’ preference for the product 
and enhance sales (Dellarocas, Awad and Zhang 2004; 2007; Dhar and Chang 2009; Duan, 
Gu and Whinston 2008; Eliashberg and Shugan 1997; Liu 2006; Moe and Trusov 2011). 
This effect is likely to be enhanced by the increased word of mouth that occurs through the 
publication of new reviews. This word of mouth occurs both online and offline and is 
facilitated by the attention that these scientific reviews often receive in the press. A higher 
volume of scientific reviews also signals higher market potential to consumers, which may 
influence their likelihood to buy the product. Taken together, these arguments imply the 
following, 
Essay 3 
 
99 
 
H6: A higher volume of the body of scientific reviews leads to an increase in sales. 
 
Institutional Context and Data 
We test the hypotheses posited above in a prominent science-based industry 
(Narin 2000; Stremersch and Van Dyck 2009), namely the pharmaceutical industry. 
Regulatory bodies demand scientific reviews before commercialization given the potential 
impact on public health of pharmaceutical drugs. Such reviews pre-commercialization are 
later followed by many post-launch reviews, for instance, to test the drug on larger or 
different patient samples, to test new administration methods or dosages of the same drug, 
and the source of the reviews (e.g. manufacturers) may have a financial stake in the drug. 
The reviews may be conducted by the manufacturer, by competing manufacturers, or by 
independent researchers. 
We focus on one important therapeutic category in the pharmaceutical industry, 
i.e. statins, which are drugs prescribed to patients with high cholesterol. Cholesterol can 
cause the buildup of plaque on the inside walls of arteries. Plaques can grow large enough 
to significantly reduce the blood flow through an artery. But most of the damage occurs 
when plaques become fragile and rupture. Plaques that rupture cause blood clots to form 
that can block blood flow. If such clots block a blood vessel that feeds the heart, a heart 
attack may occur. If it blocks a blood vessel that feeds the brain, a stroke may occur. And 
if blood supply to the arms or legs is reduced, it can cause difficulty walking and 
eventually gangrene or issue death.  
Statins represent the biggest therapeutic category in the U.S. in dollar sales 
(Donohue, Cevasco and Rosenthal 2007). Statins (HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors; ATC: 
C10AA) influence the rate-limiting enzyme in cholesterol synthesis and, thereby, lower 
excessive cholesterol levels in the blood, particularly low density lipoprotein (LDL) 
cholesterol.  
Reviews show that, to a minor extent, they may also increase high density 
lipoprotein (HDL) cholesterol and decrease excessive triglyceride levels, while expert 
interviews with physicians revealed limited benefits in practice. To achieve HDL increase 
and triglyceride decrease, physicians may use other classes of drugs, such as Omega-3 
fatty acids or niacin for HDL and, fibrates or niacin for triglycerides, possibly in 
combination with a statin (for LDL reduction). For this reason, this paper will focus on 
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LDL reduction as the primary product performance measure for statins.25 LDL reduction is 
expressed as the level of LDL in patients at the end of a clinical review over the LDL in 
those same patients at the start of the clinical review. LDL reduction is an exact measure of 
product performance. Except for medical meta-analyses, Cockburn and Anis (2001) is the 
only study in the marketing or economics literature that also uses the exact outcomes in 
scientific reviews.26  
Lovastatin was the first statin to be commercialized under the name Mevacor in 
1987 by Merck & Co. Over time, new statins entered the market: Pravastatin (by Bristol-
Myers Squibb and marketed under the name Pravachol), Simvastatin (by Merck & Co and 
marketed under the name Zocor), Fluvastatin (by Novartis and marketed under the name 
Lescol), Cerivastatin (by Pfizer and marketed under the name Baycol), Atorvastatin (by 
Pfizer and marketed under the name Lipitor), and Rosuvastatin (by AstraZeneca and 
marketed under the name Crestor).27 We collect reviews of the seven main drugs in this 
category (approval dates in parenthesis): Lovastatin (1987), Pravastatin (1991), 
Simvastatin (1991), Fluvastatin (1993), Atorvastatin (1996), Cerivastatin (1997), and 
Rosuvastatin (2003). Pitavastatin was excluded as it is not approved in the U.S yet, at the 
time this study was conducted. 
Scientific Reviews 
The data we gathered for this study is drug performance reported in clinical trials 
at various stages of its development and commercialization, by both manufacturers and 
independent researchers, from the category’s inception in 1982 until 2007. To inventory all 
scientific reviews for statins, we use electronic bibliographic databases, such as Medline, 
EMBASE, the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR), the Cochrane Central 
Register of Controlled Trials (CCTR), the Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects 
(DARE), the Science Citation Index, the NHS Economic Evaluation Database (NHS 
                                                        
25 We acknowledge recent reviews (e.g. Liao and Laufs 2005) that show so-called pleiotropic effects of statins 
beyond LDL reduction (i.e., anti-inflammatory properties). It is suggested that especially such pleiotropic effects 
of statins would explain the decrease in mortality statins cause. 
26 Drug effectiveness has been measured in the literature using two other types of data. First, perceived measures 
are used that operationalized product quality as a composite measure of multiple dimensions like patient 
satisfaction and indicators of drug effectiveness (e.g. Berndt et al. 2002; Gatignon, Weitz and Bansal 1990; Hahn 
et al. 1994; Shankar 1999; Shankar, Carpenter and Krishnamurti 1999). However, perceived quality provides only 
subjective information on drug quality and already incorporates the effects of marketing. Second, several studies 
derive summary measures of clinical reviews to rate drug quality at introduction or over time. They categorize the 
results of clinical reviews as positive, negative or neutral (Azoulay 2002; Ching and Ishihara 2010, Chintagunta, 
Jiang and Jin 2009). Summarizing studies in such a manner provides a time-varying measure of effectiveness but 
ignores information from clinical reviews. 
27 Recently, reviews have also cited red yeast rice as a purely natural statin. The substance has been used in the 
East for many hundreds of years and its usage, based on casual observation, is also increasing in the U.S. and all 
around the world. Precise data is unavailable, because red yeast rice is sold both as a drug and as dietary 
supplement, in various formulations.  
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EED), and the Health Technology Assessment Database (NHS HTA). We also searched all 
medical journals that belong to the top 25 percentile by impact factor (62 journals in total) 
of all medical journals in the following four International Surveys Industry (ISI) 
categories: cardiac and cardiovascular systems, critical care medicine, internal medicine, 
and peripheral vascular disease. We limit our search to the top percentile of journals to 
include only high quality reviews. We limit the sample to the top journals by impact to 
ensure we only retain reviews of high quality. 
Within these 62 journals, we searched for all articles that discussed at least one 
statin. We included two types of scientific reviews typical to the pharmaceutical industry - 
clinical studies and meta-analyses. We excluded two types of reviews: (1) reviews that do 
not provide the effectiveness of the drug versus a placebo, as we will use this placebo 
comparison as a base level to measure effectiveness (without such base level, we cannot 
calculate valence or dispersion of scientific reviews); (2) reviews of multi-interventional 
therapies (e.g. statins and fibrates) where the independent effect of the drug could not be 
separated out from the combined effect. For each review, we collected the time of 
publication and also other detailed information on its characteristics. We used two coders 
to extract data from the reviews using a standardized form. We also checked for consensus 
by having the coders code a random sample of reviews independently. Collection of a 
comprehensive body of scientific reviews on the category took almost two years due to the 
intricate process and complex nature of the content in the reviews. We also checked for a 
publication lag, i.e. the difference between completion of a review and its publication, but 
this time lag is relatively small for scientific reviews on statins. Thus, the publication date 
is a reasonable measure of the time the findings of the review become available to users 
and experts. 
Sales and Marketing Data 
To relate scientific reviews on statins to marketing expenditures and sales, we 
obtain quarterly U.S. data from IMS Health on marketing expenditures to experts and sales 
between 1997 and 2007 for each of the seven drugs. Sales are measured in thousands of 
kilograms per drug and are measured at the wholesale level (which is a close 
approximation for the prescriptions written during that period). Marketing expenditures to 
experts is measured as the sum of sales force expenditures towards physicians and 
advertising in journals aimed at physicians. Marketing expenditures to users is measured as 
the direct-to-consumer advertising expenditures for every drug, obtained from Kantar 
Media. 
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Descriptives 
We identified 171 reviews from a total of 663 scientific reviews that gave specific 
and empirical results on effectiveness measures (the reduction in LDL levels). We 
extracted a total of 470 unique drug-dosage combinations from these reviews. We 
distinguish three different sources of the reviews. We classify a review as manufacturer-
sponsored if the authors declare a link between the review and the drug manufacturer (this 
is a legal requirement in the pharmaceutical industry). We classify a review as competitor 
sponsored where a competitor performs a review on a drug, often for comparison with 
their own drug. We classify a review as independently sponsored if the review states that it 
is sponsored by a university, an entity not related to the manufacturer or if no mention is 
made of any financial sponsorship. 
Valence, dispersion and volume: The reported performance of a product may 
differ substantially across scientific reviews. Table 3.1 summarizes the entire body of 
scientific reviews per drug. Next to the maximum and minimum performance it reports the 
valence, dispersion and volume. Valence is computed as the mean effectiveness 
(percentage LDL reduction) of a drug over all scientific reviews available up to that point 
in time. Figure 3.1 shows the LDL reduction with simvastatin each review reports in the 
respective time frame, split according to the different sources of the review, i.e. 
manufacturer, competitor and independent. It shows that the differences across reviews are 
relatively independent of simvastatin’s stage in the lifecycle.  
Dispersion is computed as the standard deviation around the mean effectiveness, 
based on all scientific reviews available up to that point in time. Figure 3.2 shows the 
distribution of LDL reduction with simvastatin across the three different sources of 
scientific reviews. For all reviews and sources the distribution is approximately normal. 
The differences across reviews for simvastatin are large, from as low as 15.5% LDL 
reduction to as high as 55% and a mean around 37%. We observe similar patterns for other 
statins as well (see Table 3.1). The distribution of manufacturer-sponsored reviews shows 
the highest mean, followed by the independent reviews and the competitor sponsored 
reviews. Competitor-sponsored reviews show the lowest dispersion for a majority of the 
drugs.  
Volume is the cumulative number of scientific reviews available up to that point 
in time. Figure 3.3 shows the evolution in the volume of reviews for simvastatin. It shows 
a typical pattern for scientific reviews, where manufacturer-sponsored reviews appear first, 
followed by independent reviews, while competitor-sponsored reviews only appear after a 
competing drug has received market approval. For example, we observe a steady stream of 
reviews over the life cycle of Simvastatin interspersed with some jumps before its approval 
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by the FDA in 1991 and around the introduction of competitor atorvastatin in 1997 and the 
entry of rosuvastatin in 2003 (see Figure 3.3).  
Each scientific review can be characterized by its design. We extract various 
design characteristics of the study for each drug, which are shown in Table 3.2. The 
dosages are very comparable across drugs, except for cerivastatin which has a different 
range. The clinical reviews range from 1 to 312 weeks, with an average of 34 weeks across 
all drugs. The number of patients enrolled in a study also widely varies, ranging from 2 to 
24,000, with an average of 1,140. From Table 3.2 it is also clear that clinical study with the 
highest number of patients has compared five of the seven drugs. Each drug also has 
multiple reviews from all three sources. Table 3.2 gives the number of reviews for each 
drug split to their source. In our sample, 35% of the reviews are sponsored by a 
manufacturer. This illustrates that manufacturers are actively developing and designing 
reviews to build scientific information on their drugs, not only prior to approval (phase 1-3 
clinical trials) but also after approval (stage 4 post marketing studies). We find that 
manufacturer sponsored reviews reported the minimum performance among all three 
sources of reviews in only 1 out of 7 statins. On average, manufacturer sponsored reviews 
report a 14% higher performance than competitor sponsored and independent reviews. The 
results on dispersion are relatively equal over all statins and sources. The volume of 
manufacturer and independent sponsored reviews are the largest, while the number of 
competitor sponsored reviews is relatively small. Later entrants perform a larger number of 
competitor sponsored reviews to benchmark and showcase their superiority over existing 
products. 
Model 
We develop a vector autoregressive model with exogenous variables (VARX) 
(Dekimpe and Hanssens 1999) to estimate the effects of valence, dispersion and volume of 
the body of scientific reviews on sales, marketing expenditures to users and marketing 
expenditures to experts. The model accounts for the endogeneity of marketing 
expenditures. We test for unit roots and possible cointegration relations before estimating 
the model. In addition, we select the optimal lag length for the VAR model. These steps 
are performed as follows (see for detailed discussions Grewal et al. 2000; Nijs et al. 2001):  
(i) Test for unit roots. We conduct an Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test on the 
three dependent variables, sales, marketing to users and marketing to experts, whereby we 
control for a possible intercept and deterministic trends (Dickey and Fuller 1979). We also 
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test for the presence of potential structural breaks, as ignoring their presence influences the 
results of the ADF test in favor of a unit root (Perron 1989; Zivot and Andrews 1992). 
(ii) Test for cointegration. If a unit root of the same order is found in more than 
one variable, we perform a cointegration test for the existence of a long-term equilibrium 
among the integrated variables. Not accounting for possible cointegration results in a loss 
of long-term information and biases the estimates. We use the Johansen cointegration test 
and compare the trace test statistic or the maximum eigenvalue test statistic to its critical 
values (Johansen and Juselius 1990). If a cointegration relation is found, we estimate a 
vector error correction model (VECM), which includes the underlying long-run relations 
between the integrated variables (Dekimpe and Hanssens 2004). 
(iii) Lag length selection. The results for the unit root test, the cointegration test 
and the final model are also dependent on the number of lags included in the model. We 
select the appropriate number of lags by the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Paulsen 
1984; Pauwels, Hanssens and Siddarth 2002).  
Based on the resulting model, we calculate generalized impulse response 
functions (GIRF) to compute the dynamic effects of marketing to users and marketing to 
experts on sales and vice versa. The GIRF measures the time profile of a shock to one 
dependent variable on future values of the other dependent variables at any given point in 
time (Pesaran and Shin 1998). The approach is invariant to the ordering of the variables in 
the model.  
The exact specification of the sales response model depends on the outcomes of 
the unit root and cointegration tests and hence we present our time series model below as a 
VECM, as its representation contains the VAR model (for a detailed discussion of the 
model structure see Engle and Granger 1987; Nijs et al. 2001). We estimate the model 
using log-transformed variables as the parameters can then be interpreted as elasticities. 
The VECM(P) model for sales, marketing to users (M2U) and marketing to experts (M2X) 
for product j at time t is specified as follows: 
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 (3.1) 
with P indicating the total number of lags and dlog indicating that we take first differences 
from the log-transformed variable. When no unit root is found for one or more endogenous 
variables, the model is estimated for those variables in logs instead of first differences of 
the logs. In case evidence for cointegration is found, the first term on the right-hand side of 
the equation represents the error correction terms. Į constitutes the speed of adjustment to 
the long-term equilibrium level for each of the three endogenous variables. e is the error 
correction term resulting from a regression of each endogenous variable on the other 
endogenous variables (possibly including an intercept and deterministic trend terms). ȕ 
represent the autoregressive parameters and Șjt a 091Ȉ. In case the dependent 
variables contain a unit root of the same order but are not cointegrated, e drops out of the 
model.  
The variables in Equation (3.1) are operationalized as follows: 
Salesjt = Sales (in 000’s of kg) for product j at time t 
M2Ujt = Marketing expenditures (in $ 000’s) to users for product j at time 
t 
M2Xjt = Marketing expenditures (in $ 000’s) to experts for product j at 
time t 
Valencejt = Mean performance of product j across all scientific reviews over 
all periods up to time t 
Dispersionjt = Standard deviation in performance of product j across all 
scientific reviews over all periods up to time t 
Volumejt = Number of scientific reviews on product j over all periods up to 
time t 
Atorvastatinj = Dummy for atorvastatin, 0 otherwise  
Fluvastatinj = Dummy for fluvastatin, 0 otherwise  
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Lovastatinj = Dummy for lovastatin, 0 otherwise  
Pravastatinj = Dummy for pravastatin, 0 otherwise  
Rosuvastatinj = Dummy for rosuvastatin, 0 otherwise  
Simvastatinj = Dummy for simvastatin, 0 otherwise  
Intro_Rosut = Dummy for rosuvastatin which is 1 at the quarter of its 
introduction, 0 otherwise 
Withdrawal_Cert = Dummy for cerivastatin which is 1 at the quarter of its 
withdrawal, 0 otherwise 
 
The length of our data series does not allow us to estimate product-specific 
parameters. We include product-specific intercepts in the model, which represent a trend as 
the dependent variables are in first differences, to capture life cycle effects of the products. 
For identification, we keep cerivastatin as a base product. Our model also controls for two 
events that have a one-time impact on the data, namely the introduction of Crestor 
(rosuvastatin) in the third quarter of 2003 and the withdrawal of Baycol (cerivastatin) in 
the third quarter of 2001.  
Note that the above model allows us to obtain causal effects of scientific reviews 
on marketing expenditures and sales. Establishing a causal effect using econometric 
models can be challenging as explained in the user and expert reviews literature (Duan, Gu 
and Whinston 2008, Godes and Mayzlin 2004; Liu 2006). We model the relation between 
scientific reviews and sales and marketing in first differences. This implies that different 
outcomes across scientific reviews over time have a contemporaneous effect on sales and 
marketing. One important difference between scientific and user reviews, however, is that 
it takes substantially more time to perform a scientific review (typically 34 weeks in our 
sample) and to get it published. Hence, a contemporaneous effect of sales on scientific 
reviews is unlikely and makes us confident that we obtain causal effects of scientific 
reviews on sales and marketing expenditures. 
Results 
We first discuss the model specification tests, followed by the hypotheses testing 
and the assessment of the robustness of our results. 
Model Specification 
To model the relation between the valence, dispersion and volume of the body of 
scientific reviews, sales and marketing expenditures to users and experts, we use all 
quarters within our dataset in which a drug is available on the market (N=231). We find 
evidence of unit roots in sales, marketing to users and marketing to experts. The 
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augmented Dickey-Fuller test fails to reject the null hypothesis that a unit root is present, 
with the test statistic taking the values of 3.49 (p = 1.00) for sales, -1.96 (p = .30) for 
marketing to users and -1.92 (p = .32) for marketing to experts. We do not find significant 
evidence of one or more structural breaks in the data.  
In the second step, we test for cointegration, using the Johansen cointegration test. 
The trace statistic rejects that the cointegration rank equals at most 0 (97.39, p = .00), 
while it cannot reject that the cointegration rank equals at most 1 (7.89, p = .25). In other 
words, sales, marketing to users and marketing to experts are cointegrated, which prompts 
the use of a VEC model (Dekimpe and Hanssens 1999; 2004). For the various models 
discussed below, we have also tested for the optimal lag length based on the BIC. The 
results indicated that 1, 2 or 3 lags performed best, depending on the criterion used and the 
exact model. As the information criteria and the direction and size of the main results for 
these lag lengths were quite similar, we select 1 lag for the models we present below for 
parsimony. Finally, we inspect and test all the models below on significant autocorrelation. 
We find minor autocorrelation in sales, but none for marketing to users and marketing to 
experts, which we interpret as evidence for a stable model specification. 
Table 3.3 shows the results of our VEC(1) model on sales, marketing to users and 
marketing to experts. We find evidence for one cointegration relation. The following linear 
relation between the endogenous variables and a constant is stationary: -28.19 + 
1.00·log(Salesjq) – 2.29·log(M2Ujq) + 3.07·log(M2Xjq). Thus, in the long term, these 
variables are in equilibrium according to this relation. The log-transformation of the 
cointegration function allows us to interpret this in terms of changes in percentage. The 
cointegration relation implies that a 1% increase in kg sales of a drug leads in the long run 
to a 2.29% increase in marketing expenditures to users and to a 3.07% decrease in 
marketing expenditures to experts. The speed of adjustment of the long term equilibrium is 
given by the error correction parameters. These are between -.07 and .11, indicating that 
the adjustment is slow.  
To compute the effects of marketing to users and marketing to experts on sales, 
we compute the GIRF and we find an immediate elasticity for marketing to users of .03 
and an immediate elasticity for marketing to experts of.18. This means that a 1% increase 
in marketing to users increases the kilogram sales in that same quarter by .03% but the 
same percentage increase in marketing to experts increases the kilogram sales by.18%. 
Due to the cointegration relation, we also find that 68% of the increase in marketing to 
users is sustained in the long run, but only 51% of the increase in marketing to experts is 
sustained in the long run. This sustained increase in marketing expenditures has a 
permanent elasticity of .05 for marketing to users and of .16 for marketing to experts. 
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Impact of Scientific Reviews on Sales and Marketing 
Considering the effects of the valence, dispersion and volume of the body of 
scientific reviews on sales and marketing expenditures to users and experts, we find that 7 
out of 9 parameters are significant28. We can use these estimates to test our hypotheses. 
Confirming H1a and H1b, we find that the valence of the body of scientific reviews indeed 
increases the marketing expenditures to both users (t = 2.7) and experts (t = 2.1). 
Confirming H2, we find that the valence of the body of scientific reviews increases sales (t 
= 2.9).  
Confirming H3a and H3b, we find that a higher dispersion of the body of scientific 
reviews leads to a decrease in marketing expenditures to users (t = -3.3) and an increase in 
marketing expenditures to experts (t = 3.1). Contrary to H4, we find that a higher 
dispersion of the body of scientific reviews does not lead to a decrease in sales (t = -1.3). 
Possibly two contrary effects may be at play. On the one hand, a high dispersion may 
cause uncertainty regarding performance (i.e., scientific reviews disagreeing on the LDL 
reduction under the same condition) leading to a decrease in sales. On the other hand, a 
high dispersion also may reflect the usage of the same product under different conditions 
(i.e., increasing the number of indications or the addressable market for statins) leading to 
an increase in sales. In our sample, both effects may cancel out. 
Contrary to H5a, we do not find a significant effect of the volume of the body of 
scientific reviews on the marketing expenditures to users (t = 1.0). Confirming H5b, we find 
that a higher volume of the body of scientific reviews increases the marketing expenditures 
to experts (t = 2.2).  
Confirming H6, we find that a higher volume of the body of scientific reviews 
increases sales (t = 1.9).  
Robustness  
We test the robustness of our results in multiple ways. First, we estimated VEC 
models of higher order, which showed similar fit statistics. While the main results are 
shown for a VEC(1) model, the theoretical inference for all hypotheses are the same for a 
VEC(2) and a VEC(3) model. For illustrative purposes, we show the results for the 
VEC(2) model in Table 3.4, which has higher log likelihood (-677.21) than the VEC(1) 
model.  
Second, we have tested various operationalizations of the summary metrics of 
scientific reviews. In our current model, we used all available reviews from the past in the 
                                                        
28 To test our directional hypotheses we use a one-sided test with Į=.05. This means that t-values above 1.65 are 
significant. 
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construction of the measures. We have estimated the same model, whereby we computed 
the valence, dispersion and volume as a moving average over the last 24, 20, 16 and 12 
quarters. For illustrative purposes, we show the results for moving average 16 quarters in 
Table 3.5, which has lower log-likelihood (-694.70) than in our main model in Table 3.3. 
While we only show the model for 16 quarters, the outcomes the models with moving 
averages over more than 16 quarters confirm the robustness of our theoretical inference. 
For moving averages over shorter periods (e.g. 12 quarters), the outcomes are not stable as 
few scientific reviews appear in smaller time periods for some brands.  
Third, we tested the robustness of our results to the choice of functional form for 
our model. In our current model, we use log-transformed variables. We estimated a similar 
model in levels, which also contained unit roots for sales, marketing to users and 
marketing to experts. The results from such model led to the same theoretical inference as 
the model reported in Table 3.3. We tested the inclusion of various control variables, such 
as the time the drug has been on the market and seasonality (by including three quarter 
dummies). The theoretical inference from a model including such control variables and the 
model reported in Table 3.3 is the same. Further, we estimated the model using molecules 
other than cerivastatin as the base brand, as cerivastatin was withdrawn from the market in 
the middle of the sample period because of unacceptable levels of side effects. We find 
that our results are robust to the choice of the base brand. 
Fourth, we have found evidence that scientific reviews affect both sales and 
marketing expenditures, omitting scientific reviews from the sales response model may 
lead to biased parameter estimates for the responsiveness of sales to marketing 
expenditures. If the dimensions we use to summarize the body of scientific reviews affect 
both marketing expenditures and sales positively (negatively), then excluding scientific 
reviews leads to an overestimation (underestimation) of the effect of marketing on sales. 
Table 3.6 shows a model that omits the valence, dispersion and volume of the body of 
scientific reviews from the model of which we presented the estimates earlier in Table 3.3. 
It has a log likelihood of -700.39, implying a lower fit than in the model with scientific 
reviews. In a model omitting the valence, dispersion and volume of the body of scientific 
reviews, the immediate elasticity of marketing to users is 6% higher and the immediate 
elasticity of marketing to experts is 17% higher, as compared to their respective elasticities 
in the model of which the estimates are presented in Table 3.3. The permanent effect of 
marketing to users, respectively experts, is overestimated by 7%, respectively 19%. Also in 
all models we estimated for robustness analysis as reported here above, the effect of 
marketing is overestimated when scientific review variables are not included. 
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Implications 
The cumulative information based on scientific reviews changes significantly 
over time and is an important element in science-based industries. The different metrics of 
the body of scientific reviews have substantial effects on sales and marketing decisions. 
We conclude that scientific reviews are an important element of the marketing mix, which 
has three important implications for firms and researchers. 
First, our findings allow firms to anticipate and counteract marketing strategies of 
competitors given the results of a scientific review of a competitive product. For example, 
in the last quarter of 2002, three different scientific reviews of atorvastatin were published 
(for a total of four different patient populations). The valence reported in these reviews was 
lower than the valence reported in the past and affected the dispersion negatively. Sales of 
atorvastatin grew on 2% in that quarter,lower than the median growth during our data 
period of 3.5%. The manufacturer of the drug, Pfizer, reacted by decreasing the marketing 
expenditures substantially to users in that quarter to the lowest level in four years. While 
the marketing expenditures to experts decreased as well during that time, the decrease was 
comparatively modest. Combining the impact of the three different metrics, Pfizer’s 
reaction seems in line with our conclusions. Pfizer reacted to adverse new information 
from independent researchers about the performance of its products by making 
adjustments to both the total marketing expenditures and the allocation of the expenditures 
between users and experts. In the future, competitors may benefit from anticipating such a 
reaction from the focal firm by intensifying their own marketing efforts during such times. 
In this particular example, Bristol-Myers Squibb reacted in that quarter by spending the 
highest amount on marketing towards users ever for Pravastatin. Thus, our findings create 
higher insights for product managers in pharmaceutical firms to understand and react to 
marketing strategies of competitors. 
Second, our method and study provides insights on the value of a scientific 
review on sales. For example, a scientific review comparing the effectiveness of the higher 
dosage atorvastatin with a lower dosage simvastatin sponsored by Parke Davis (a 
subsidiary of Pfizer, the manufacturer of atorvastatin) was published in the first quarter of 
2001 in The Lancet (Smilde et al. 2001). The outcomes were above average for 
atorvastatin and increased the total dispersion over all available reviews up to that point in 
time. During that quarter, the sales of atorvastatin increased by 5.3%, direct-to-consumer 
advertising decreased by 5.7% and detailing increased by more than 25%. Firms can also 
use our model to assess the return on investments in conducting scientific reviews. In the 
example above, we estimated the impact of this scientific review on sales as the difference 
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in sales in the same period with and without the publication of that scientific review. This 
method suggests that even after accounting for the changing marketing expenditures in that 
quarter, value of the scientific review on sales of atorvastatin was approximately $32 
millions. While this example makes some simplifying assumptions including the release of 
a single review in a quarter and focus only on the impact for a single quarter, the results 
still suggest that the impact of scientific reviews on sales is significant and firms have an 
incentive to initiate more scientific reviews and especially those that are likely to provide 
more positive results. However, unlike user reviews, firms may not be able to actively 
manipulate scientific reviews to increase sales because the peer-review process followed in 
scientific journals acts as checks against fraudulent claims (Dellarocas 2006; Mayzlin 
2006). 
Third, we develop and propose metrics on how to analyze marketing strategy 
towards users and experts under conditions of changing product performance of both the 
focal product and competitors’ products. Our results show that it is important in science-
based industries to account for the changes in overall information available about product 
performance as new outcomes from scientific reviews appear over time. This is a typical 
omitted variable bias problem. We find that not including scientific reviews in the sales 
response model leads to an upward bias of the marketing effectiveness estimate. The 
implication for firms and researchers analyzing the returns on marketing expenditures in 
science-based industries is to specify a sales response model that includes the outcomes of 
scientific reviews, in addition to the marketing variables. As it can be a time-consuming 
task to collect all scientific reviews for a category, alternatively an econometric solution 
may be chosen. For example, when the outcomes of scientific reviews change over time, 
one can incorporate a time-varying constant in the model (Osinga, Leeflang and Wieringa 
2008). The problem of omitting scientific reviews from the model is similar to the bias that 
arises by not correcting for time-varying product quality (Sriram, Neelameghan and 
Chintagunta 2006). 
As we are the first to comprehensively analyze the relationship between scientific 
reviews, sales and marketing to users and experts, our paper has a few limitations that offer 
future research opportunities. First, we test our hypotheses in one industry and we would 
welcome future research that tests the role of scientific reviews in other science-based 
industries. Second, the limited number of observations per brand in our data did not allow 
us to test the impact of firms’ marketing expenditures on marketing effectiveness. Future 
research can investigate whether and how the availability of scientific research impacts the 
effectiveness of marketing expenditures. Third, we do not know firms’ objectives for 
running a review and how the design of a scientific review (e.g. comparison products) 
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affects its outcomes. Future research can investigate the use of scientific reviews as a 
marketing instrument against competitors. 
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Tables 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Drug Effectiveness (PercentageLDL Reduction) for all Statins and all 
Reviews Included in our Analysis 
 
 Atorva-statin 
Ceriva- 
statin 
Fluva-
statin 
Lova- 
statin 
Prava-
statin 
Rosuva-
statin 
Simva-
statin All 
Min 6.3 11.5 15.0 17.0 15.7 28.0 15.5 15.6 
Max 64.0 44.0 36.1 48.0 50.8 70.0 53.0 52.3 
Valence 40.5 31.4 26.5 33.0 26.6 46.7 37.1 34.5 
Dispersion 9.9 8.5 4.8 7.1 5.0 8.7 6.1 7.2 
Volume 91 26 40 62 82 90 79 67 
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of Reviews for all Statins and all Reviews Included in our Analysis 
 
Design Variable Atorva-statin 
Ceriva-
statin 
Fluva-
statin 
Lova-
statin 
Prava-
statin 
Rosuva-
statin 
Simva-
statin 
Dosage in mg 
Min 10 .2 20 10 10 5 10 
Max 80 .8 80 80 80 80 80 
Duration in 
weeks 
Mean 27 38 34 48 46 14 41 
Min 2 4 6 4 1 4 2 
Max 312 104 312 312 312 312 312 
Number of 
patients 
Mean 930 882 1,773 1,692 1,307 566 1,145 
Min 2 15 12 11 5 12 2 
Max 24,000 3,113 24,000 24,000 10,355 24,000 24,000 
Manufacturer 
funded N 36 5 17 24 14 43 30 
Competitor 
funded N 21 2 8 6 19 4 15 
Independent 
reviewer N 34 19 15 32 43 43 34 
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Table 3.3: Estimation Results for the Model for Sales, Marketing to Users and Marketing to Experts 
(Equation 3.1) 
 
VECM(1) with Scientific Reviews as Moving Average over All Quarters 
  Estimate T-value       
Cointegration 
relation 
Sales(t-1) 1.00        
Marketing to 
users (t-1) -2.29
*** -8.00       
Marketing to 
experts (t-1) 3.07
*** 7.30       
Constant -28.19*** -6.70       
  Sales  Marketing to Users  
Marketing to 
Experts 
  Estimate T-value  Estimate 
T-
value  Estimate 
T-
value 
Error Correction Error correction term -.01
* -1.9  .11*** 5.1  -.07*** -6.4 
Autoregressive 
Parameters 
Sales(t-1) -.06* -1.7  -.22 -.9  .12 1.0 
Marketing to 
users (t-1) -.01 -.7  -.11
* -1.7  -.08** -2.4 
Marketing to 
experts (t-1) -.05
** -2.4  .24 1.6  .02 .2 
Metrics for the Body 
of Scientific 
Reviews 
Valence H2(+)  H1a(+)  H1b(+) 
 9.00*** 2.9  27.02*** 2.7  17.80** 2.1 
Dispersion H4(-)  H3a(-)  H3b(+) 
 -.39 -1.3  -6.88*** -3.3  3.27*** 3.1 
Volume H6(+)  H5a (+)  H5b (+) 
 1.88* 1.9  6.54 1.0  7.41** 2.2 
Control Variables 
Atorvastatin -.07 -1.2  1.39*** 3.5  -.85*** -4.3 
Fluvastatin -.01 -.2  -.10 -.3  -.02 -.1 
Lovastatin -.01 -.3  .54* 1.8  -.44*** -2.9 
Pravastatin -.05 -1.0  .71** 2.1  -.67*** -4.0 
Rosuvastatin .10 1.3  1.87*** 3.4  -.91*** -3.3 
Simvastatin -.05 -.8  1.39*** 3.3  -.85*** -4.0 
Introduction 
Rosuvastatin 
1.34*** 9.4  .15 .1  1.94*** 3.7 
Withdrawal  
Cerivastatin 
-3.38*** -2.7  8.96 1.0  -3.42 -.8 
 N 231 
 Log likelihood -686.11 
*P-value < .10 (one-tailed test); **P-value < .05 (one-tailed test); ***P-value < .01 (one-tailed test). 
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Table 3.4: The VECM Model is Robust to the Number of Lags 
 
VECM(2) with Scientific Reviews as Moving Average over All Quarters 
  Estimate T-value       
Cointegration 
relation 
Sales(t-1) 1.00        
Marketing to 
users (t-1) -1.81
*** 4.7       
Marketing to 
experts (t-1) 1.46
*** -8.3       
Constant -11.65*** -3.7       
  Sales  Marketing to Users  
Marketing to 
Experts 
  Estimate T-value  Estimate 
T-
value  Estimate 
T-
value 
Error Correction 
Error 
correction 
term 
.00 -.6  .19*** 5.6  -.07*** -4.0 
Autoregressive 
Parameters 
 
Sales(t-1) -.06 -1.6  -.29 -1.2  .18 1.4 
Marketing to 
users (t-1) .00 -.0  .26
* 1.7  -.02 -.2 
Marketing to 
experts (t-1) -.06
** -2.5  .08 .4  -.20* -1.9 
Sales(t-2) .01 .5  -.02 -.2  -.10 -1.6 
Marketing to 
users (t-2) .00 -.6  .04 .7  -.08
** -2.5 
Marketing to 
experts (t-2) .00 -.4  -.06 -.8  -.07
** -2.16 
Metrics for the 
Body of Scientific 
Reviews 
Valence 7.68** 2.4  23.29** 2.3  24.87*** 2.7 
Dispersion -.30 -1.0  -4.55** -2.2  2.30** 2.2 
Volume 1.97** 2.0  9.60 1.4  7.72** 2.3 
Control Variables 
Atorvastatin -.01 -.2  1.23*** 3.4  -.49*** -2.7 
Fluvastatin .01 .2  -1.01*** -3.1  .31* 1.9 
Lovastatin .03 .6  -.57** -2.0  .10 .7 
Pravastatin -.01 -.1  .19 .7  -.30** -2.1 
Rosuvastatin .15** 2.0  1.91*** 3.6  -.35 -1.3 
Simvastatin .00 .1  1.23*** 3.2  -.48** -2.5 
Introduction 
Rosuvastatin 
1.34*** 9.2  -.07 -.1  1.88*** 3.7 
Withdrawal  
Cerivastatin 
-3.32*** -2.6  6.55 .7  -1.90 -.4 
 N 224 
 Log likelihood -677.21 
*P-value < .10 (one-tailed test); **P-value < .05 (one-tailed test); ***P-value < .01 (one-tailed test). 
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Table 3.5: The Results for the Scientific Reviews Are Robust to the Time over which They Are Calculated 
 
VECM(1) with Scientific Reviews as a Moving Average over 16 Quarters 
  Estimate T-value       
Cointegration 
relation 
Sales(t-1) 1.00        
Marketing to 
users (t-1) -7.15
*** 7.0       
Marketing to 
experts (t-1) 8.93
*** -8.5       
Constant -73.65*** -5.9       
  Sales  Marketing to Users  
Marketing to 
Experts 
  Estimate T-value  Estimate 
T-
value  Estimate 
T-
value 
Error Correction Error correction term .00 -1.0  .04
*** 5.8  -.02*** -5.3 
Autoregressive 
Parameters 
Sales(t-1) -.07* -1.9  -.19 -.7  .13 1.0 
Marketing to 
users (t-1) -.00 -.3  -.07
* -1.1  -.06* -1.7 
Marketing to 
experts (t-1) -.04
** -2.2  .16 1.2  -.01 -.2 
Metrics for the Body 
of Scientific 
Reviews 
Valence 1.36** 2.5  9.93* 1.8  9.50* 1.9 
Dispersion -.07 -.7  -2.21** -2.3  1.00** 2.0 
Volume .31* 1.9  .44 .57  1.32* 1.81 
Control Variables 
Atorvastatin .00 -.1  2.28*** 5.2  -.91*** -4.0 
Fluvastatin .00 .1  .25 .9  -.12 -.8 
Lovastatin .00 .0  .87*** 2.7  -.47*** -2.9 
Pravastatin -.02 -.5  1.31*** 3.6  -.74*** -4.0 
Rosuvastatin .17** 2.0  2.54*** 4.5  -.85*** -2.9 
Simvastatin -.03 -.4  2.14*** 4.6  -.93*** -3.9 
Introduction 
Rosuvastatin 1.34
*** 9.3  .20 .2  2.15*** 4.2 
Withdrawal  
Cerivastatin -3.31
** -2.5  8.67 1.0  -3.53 -.8 
 N 231 
 Log likelihood -694.70 
*P-value < .10 (one-tailed test); **P-value < .05 (one-tailed test); ***P-value < .01 (one-tailed test). 
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Table 3.6: Sales Response Model without Scientific Reviews 
 
 VECM(1) without Scientific Reviews 
  Estimate T-value       
Cointegration 
relation 
Sales(t-1) 1.00        
Marketing to 
users (t-1) -5.77
*** 7.6       
Marketing to 
experts (t-1) 7.58
*** -8.5       
Constant -63.95*** -6.5       
  Sales  Marketing to Users  
Marketing to 
Experts 
  Estimate T-value  Estimate 
T-
value  Estimate 
T-
value 
Error Correction Error correction term .00 -1.1  .05
*** 5.7  -.02*** -5.7 
Autoregressive 
Parameters 
Sales(t-1) -.07* -1.9  -.19 -.7  .12 1.0 
Marketing to 
users (t-1) -.00 -.4  -.08 -1.3  -.07
** -2.2 
Marketing to 
experts (t-1) -.04
* -1.8  .17 1.3  .00 .0 
Control Variables 
Atorvastatin .00 -.0  2.15*** -4.1  -.90*** 5.0 
Fluvastatin .00 -.0  .25 -.9  -.13 .9 
Lovastatin .00 -.0  .88*** -3.2  -.52*** 2.8 
Pravastatin -.03 -.5  1.24*** -4.2  -.77*** 3.5 
Rosuvastatin .16** 2.0  2.42*** -3.0  -.87*** 4.3 
Simvastatin -.02 -.4  2.03*** -4.1  -.95*** 4.5 
Introduction 
Rosuvastatin 
1.34*** 9.3  .28*** 4.2  2.15* .3 
Withdrawal  
Cerivastatin 
-3.34** -2.5  8.7 -.7  -3.35 1.0 
 N 231 
 Log likelihood -700.39 
*P-value < .10 (one-tailed test); **P-value < .05 (one-tailed test); ***P-value < .01 (one-tailed test). 
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Figures 
Figure 3.1: Outcomes of Reviews over Time 
(LDL Reduction with Simvastatin) 
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Outcomes of All Reviews 
(LDL Reduction with Simvastatin) 
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative Number of Reviews over Time by Source of Funding  
for Simvastatin 
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Conclusion of Dissertation 
The pharmaceutical industry has two important characteristics differentiating it 
from most other industries; it is highly regulated and it has a strong link with science. 
These characteristics have a big influence on pharmaceutical marketing research and have 
served as an inspiration of the essays in this dissertation. 
The essays investigate various substantial problems in the pharmaceutical industry 
using empirical models. The essays can be classified along two dimensions pertaining to 
the flow of pharmaceutical marketing and the type of data used (see Figure 0.1 in the 
Introduction). While most of these dimensions have been covered in this dissertation, there 
are many possibilities left for future research in these areas. Each essay ends with several 
concrete suggestions for future research, which I will not repeat here. Instead, I will 
discuss two main implications from this dissertation and three broader promising areas of 
research in pharmaceutical marketing. 
Implications 
Empirical pharmaceutical marketing research benefits from the enormous 
amounts of detailed data available. Often this data is of high quality and very structured 
due to the strong regulations in this industry. This has two important implications: (i) it 
allows in-depth industry-specific studies and (ii) it allows using the unique data from the 
industry to investigate generalizable marketing phenomena.  
First, in-depth studies on the pharmaceutical industry are important as the industry 
makes up a large part of the economy and deals with an important cause, which is the 
health of people. Essay 2 provides a good example of this. Using an advanced empirical 
model, I show that positively biased information has a detrimental impact on sales call 
effectiveness. This is not only important for firms to improve their return-on-investment to 
detailing, but also suggests that firms should behave more in line with the guidelines set by 
the authorities, which likely benefits the health of people (although the study does not give 
a definitive answer to that).  
Second, the structured and rich data in the pharmaceutical industry allow the 
researcher to uniquely investigate several marketing phenomena. These studies can build 
much needed theory on topics that transcend the pharmaceutical industry. For example, 
many theory on innovations has been build or empirically tested using pharmaceutical 
data, as due to the high quality of available datasets and its strong focus on R&D, it 
provides many real-world examples on innovations (e.g. Acemoglu and Linn 2004; 
Shankar et al. 1998; Sorescu et al. 2003). Essay 3 also provides an example of the 
Conclusion 
 
124 
 
possibility to use pharmaceutical data to investigate a generalizable marketing 
phenomenon. It investigates the role of scientific reviews on sales and marketing in 
science-based industries. Similar to the role of the movie industry in developing a 
substantial amount of theory on user and expert reviews (e.g. Eliashberg and Shugan 
1997), the accessibility of scientific reviews in the pharmaceutical industry allows 
empirical testing of its role and to build theory. 
Future Research 
In line with these implications, I suggest three important areas for future research 
in pharmaceutical marketing. First, more extensive and more detailed data becomes 
available from data providers like IMS Health, Kantar Media, SDI Health and Wolters 
Kluwer, which will provide new research opportunities and might require new modelling 
techniques. One such development is the collection of the content of pharmaceutical sales 
calls and advertisement. In this dissertation, I have performed an analysis of sales message 
content based on doctor-perceived topics discussed in the sales call. For direct-to-
consumer advertising, however, databases reporting the exact content of the 
advertisements are available (e.g. the theme, information content, etc.) and can directly be 
connected to the effectiveness of the campaign. Analyzing both the content of promotional 
efforts towards doctors and patients might provide valuable and detailed insights in the 
working of pharmaceutical promotion. This might inform both companies and regulators. 
Second, in my dissertation, I have limited my focus mainly on three important 
players in the pharmaceutical industry, i.e. firm, sales rep and doctor. However, there are 
many more players involved in this industry, such as patients, regulators, insurers, HMOs, 
etc. The omission of many of these players from the analysis is not only a limitation of my 
dissertation, but also applies to the pharmaceutical marketing literature in general. Future 
research can benefit greatly from the inclusion of multiple of these less-researched market 
players into the analysis, however this might also require the development of new models. 
An exemplary topic for this is the research into drug prices in the U.S. As this market has 
little regulations concerning prices, the formation of the price is influenced by several 
different market players, such as the firm, the insurer, patient advocacy groups and HMOs. 
However, a dearth of research concerning prices of prescription drugs can be observed in 
the literature. Illustrative of the situation, is that a relatively straightforward study of Lu 
and Comanor (1998) is often considered to be the most important pricing paper on 
prescription drugs in the U.S., while many things have changed in the market since (cf. 
Scherer 2004). 
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Finally, most empirical research on pharmaceutical marketing considers its impact 
on financial outcome variables, such as sales, prices and profits. However, little research 
empirically connects pharmaceutical marketing to health outcomes. Notable exceptions 
have studied the marketing impact on patient compliance (e.g. Wosinska 2005). Innovative 
approaches are welcome to relate pharmaceutical marketing efforts to the quality of 
doctors’ decisions and patients’ health. 
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Summary in English 
Pharmaceutical marketing effectiveness comprises the measurement of the effect 
of marketing efforts of pharmaceutical firms towards doctors and patients. These firms 
spend billions of dollars yearly to promote their prescription drugs. This dissertation 
provides empirical analyses and methods to contribute to several substantial problems on 
pharmaceutical marketing effectiveness.  
The pharmaceutical industry has two main characteristics differentiating it from 
other industries: (i) it is highly regulated as it deals with people’s health and (ii) it is a 
science-based industry. These characteristics in itself make it worthwhile to investigate this 
industry in depth. The methods and insights developed also apply, to a certain extent, to 
marketing problems in other industries.  
Using unique data in every essay, this dissertation studies the role of the firm, 
sales rep and doctor in pharmaceutical marketing. The first essay evaluates the size of the 
sales force and the allocation of sales calls among doctors. In particular, it provides a 
method to gauge a yet-to-be-enacted firm-initiated policy shift. Pharmaceutical firms 
invest heavily in their sales force, also referred to as detailing, and expenditures have more 
than doubled over the last decade to $25 billion in 2005. There is an ongoing debate in the 
academic literature in marketing about its effectiveness. Public policy administrators and 
health care providers are concerned with the social welfare implications of intensive 
detailing to doctors, which is also reflected in the negative public opionion on 
pharmaceutical marketing expenditures. In addition, multiple pharmaceutical firms such as 
AstraZeneca, GlaxoSmithKline and Wyeth speculate that sales forces have grown too big 
and some publicly announced that they are considering dramatically cutting the size of 
their sales force. One important reason why firms have not cut their detailing is that it is 
very challenging to predict the outcomes of such a drastic change in the sales force size.  
In the first essay a framework is developed– called data enrichment – to gauge the 
implications of a firm-initiated yet-to-be-enacted policy shift, which is applied to various 
downward policy shifts in detailing. It requires the combination of data on revealed 
choices from the past with stated choices obtained from managers on the future, 
concerning the detailing allocation of firms under different policy shift scenarios. For 
example, how would a firm react if a major competitor suddenly reduces its sales force by 
25% in a particular therapeutic category. The data enrichment framework not only 
provides valuable insights into the outcomes of a downward policy shift in detailing, but 
also provides a framework for future analyses of a wide range of policy shifts. 
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The results show that small detailing changes are not able to buck the trend of 
increasing sales forces, but a drastic reduction in detailing by the market leader is needed 
to generate a profitable market outcome for all players. The initiator of the shift is always 
better off and the followers show mixed outcomes on profitability. Furthermore, initiating 
a downward policy shift always reduces the size of the market.  
The second essay studies the effectiveness of the information content provided in 
sales calls. It focuses on the core of the interaction between sales representative and doctor. 
Interestingly, the marketing literature has found large heterogeneity in pharmaceutical 
sales call effectiveness. While various explanations have been given for this heterogeneity 
no one has investigated the role of the information content provided in the sales message. 
The main research questions in this essay are: (1) how responsive doctors are to 
information provided across different product attributes; (2) whether firms present a 
positively biased information set to doctors; (3) whether doctors are more or less 
responsive to positively biased information in sales calls. This requires a model that 
estimates the effectiveness at the sales call level, while controlling for the possible 
endogeneity of sales call allocation and possibly the endogenous content of the sales call. 
To estimate the effectiveness at the sales call level, while controlling for endogeneity, a 
hierarchical Bayesian VAR model is used. Positively biased information is operationalized 
by linking the information content to scientific information on the drugs.  
The results show that: (1) firms do not provide information on the right product 
attributes at their optimal frequency; (2) sales calls include discussion of positively biased 
information; (3) discussion of positively biased information lowers sales call 
responsiveness in the long term. The results suggest that firms can adjust their messaging 
to increase doctors’ responsiveness to the sales call. At the same time, this message 
adjustment can ease public concerns on the discussion of positively biased information 
with doctors. 
In the third essay, the interplay between drug sales, marketing and scientific 
reviews is studied in detail. The pharmaceutical market is a prototypical example of a 
science-based market. Products in science-based markets are largely supported by 
scientific reviews that appear prior to and during its lifecycle. As the outcomes of scientific 
reviews differ across studies and over time, this essay investigates (1) how do scientific 
reviews affect a firm’s marketing expenditures towards users and experts, and (2) to what 
extent do scientific reviews affect sales. In addition, it investigates how the exclusion of 
scientific reviews from the sales response model, as is common in the academic literature, 
influences marketing responsiveness parameters.  
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To answer these research questions, a comprehensive dataset on scientific reviews 
is employed for an important category in the pharmaceutical industry and is combined with 
brand-level sales and marketing expenditures. To analyze the dynamic relation between 
sales, marketing expenditures towards users and experts and scientific reviews, a vector 
error correction (VEC) model is used. Three metrics are used to summarize the outcomes 
of the body of scientific reviews over time: valence (the mean effect of the drug across 
reviews), dispersion (the standard deviation of the drug effectiveness across reviews) and 
the volume (the number of reviews per drug).  
The results show that these metrics have a significant effect on sales and 
marketing expenditures. Higher valence of scientific reviews increases marketing 
expenditures to both users and experts, while higher dispersion across scientific reviews 
leads to a reallocation of marketing from users towards experts. Higher volume has no 
effect on marketing to users, but increases marketing to experts. Product sales are 
positively affected by both valence and volume of scientific reviews. In addition, 
estimating the responsiveness of sales to marketing expenditures while omitting the 
various dimensions of scientific reviews leads to an upward bias in the marketing 
responsiveness parameter. 
All essays contain a strong managerially interesting component and hence this 
dissertation contains valuable implications for academics and managers. For academics: (i) 
a new alternative to gauge policy shifts is offered; (ii) a model is offered to analyze the 
effectiveness of sales message content; and (iii) scientific reviews should be considered to 
correctly measure pharmaceutical marketing effectiveness. The implications for managers 
are: (i) the market leader is able to buck the trend in increasing sales forces; (ii) sales reps 
discuss positively biased information too often, which is counterproductive in the long run; 
and (iii) scientific reviews on products are actively considered as a part of the marketing 
mix and can be used to infer competitive strategies.  
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Nederlandse Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
De effectiviteit van farmaceutische marketing omvat het meten van de invloed 
van marketingacties van farmaceutische bedrijven gericht op artsen en patiënten. Deze 
farmaceutische bedrijven geven jaarlijks miljarden euro’s uit om hun medicijnen te 
promoten. Dit proefschrift maakt gebruik van empirische analyses en methoden om 
verscheidene belangrijke en relevante problemen omtrent farmaceutische marketing te 
bestuderen. 
De farmaceutische industrie heeft twee belangrijke eigenschappen waarmee het 
zich onderscheidt van andere industrieën: (i) het is in hoge mate gereguleerd omdat het 
direct met de gezondheid van mensen te maken heeft en (ii) het is een industrie die op de 
wetenschap is gebaseerd. Deze eigenschappen tonen al de relevantie van diepgravende 
onderzoeken in deze industrie. Echter, de methoden en inzichten in dit proefschrift hebben, 
in zekere mate, ook waarde voor marketingproblemen in andere industrieën. 
Dit proefschrift bestudeert de rol van het bedrijf, de artsenbezoeker en de arts 
binnen de farmaceutische marketing. Elk essay maakt daarbij gebruik van unieke data. Het 
eerste essay analyseert het aantal artsenbezoekers dat een bedrijf heeft en hoe het bedrijf 
haar artsenbezoeken verdeeld over de artsen. In het bijzonder ontwikkelt het een methode 
om te voorspellen wat de consequenties zijn van een toekomstige drastische 
beleidsverandering die door een bedrijf wordt geïnitieerd. Farmaceutische bedrijven 
investeren flink in hun artsenbezoekers en die uitgaven zijn meer dan verdubbeld in het 
afgelopen decennium ($25 miljard in 2005). Er is een hevige discussie in de 
wetenschappelijke marketingliteratuur over de gevolgen van het intensief bezoeken van 
artsen door artsenbezoekers. Overheden en zorgaanbieders zijn bezorgd om de gevolgen 
van de intensivering van het aantal artsenbezoeken voor het maatschappelijk welzijn, 
hetgeen ook nog eens bevestigd wordt door de negatieve publieke opinie hieromtrent. 
Daarbovenop speculeren verschillende farmaceutische bedrijven zoals AstraZeneca, 
GlaxoSmithKline en Wyeth publiekelijk dat het aantal artsenbezoeken uit de klauwen is 
gelopen en sommige bedrijven hebben aangekondigd dat ze een drastische verlaging 
hiervan overwegen. Echter, een belangrijke reden waarom de meeste bedrijven dit niet in 
daden hebben omgezet is de grote onzekerheid over de gevolgen van een dergelijke 
drastische verandering. 
In dit eerste essay wordt een methode ontwikkeld – data enrichment – die de 
consequenties van een drastische beleidsverandering van een bedrijf vooraf voorspeld. 
Deze wordt toegepast om een aantal verschillende drastische verlagingen in het aantal 
artsenbezoekers van een bedrijf. De methode combineert geobserveerde data uit het 
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verleden (revealed preference data) met data verzameld van managers over beslissingen in 
toekomstige scenario’s voor een bedrijf (stated preference data) omtrent het aantal en de 
verdeling van artsenbezoeken onder artsen. Bijvoorbeeld, hoe reageert een bedrijf als een 
belangrijke concurrent het aantal artsenbezoekers binnen een bepaalde therapeutische 
categorie met 25% verlaagd. De ontwikkelde methode is niet alleen bruikbaar voor dit 
specifieke probleem, maar is ook bruikbaar voor toekomstige analyses van drastische 
beleidsveranderingen. 
De resultaten laten zien dat een kleine verlaging van het aantal artsenbezoekers 
niet leidt tot een ommekeer binnen de industrie, maar dat een forse verlaging van de 
marktleider nodig is om een ommezwaai in het aantal artsenbezoekers teweeg te brengen 
die winstgevend is voor alle bedrijven in de betreffende markt. Daarnaast blijkt dat het 
bedrijf dat zijn beleid drastisch verandert altijd beter af is, terwijl de andere bedrijven 
gemixte resultaten laten zien. Voorts leidt een daling in het aantal artsenbezoekers altijd tot 
een vermindering van de totale verkopen in de productcategorie. 
Het tweede essay bestudeert de effectiviteit van het soort informatie dat wordt 
besproken in een artsenbezoek. Het richt zich op de kern van de interactie tussen 
artsenbezoeker en arts. De academische literatuur in marketing laat een grote heterogeniteit 
zien in de schattingen van de effectiviteit van farmaceutische marketing. Verschillende 
verklaringen hiervoor zijn al gegeven, maar verrassend genoeg heeft tot nog toe niemand 
de rol van de inhoud van het artsenbezoek geanalyseerd. De hoofdvragen in dit onderzoek 
zijn: (1) Hoe reageren artsen op verschillende productkarakteristieken die besproken 
worden door de artsenbezoeker? (2) Bespreekt de artsenbezoeker voornamelijk de 
positieve informatie omtrent zijn product? (3) Zijn artsen meer of minder gevoelig voor 
positief gekleurde informatie over een product? Om dit te onderzoeken is een model nodig 
dat de effectiviteit van de marketing voor ieder artsenbezoek kan schatten en tegelijkertijd 
corrigeert voor de mogelijke endogeniteit van de allocatie van artsenbezoeken en de 
inhoud van het artsenbezoek. Hiervoor wordt een hiërarchisch Bayesiaans vector 
autoregressief (VAR) model gebruikt. Positief gekleurde informatie wordt daarin 
geoperationaliseerd door de inhoud van het artsenbezoek te linken met wetenschappelijke 
informatie over het medicijn. 
De resultaten van deze analyse laten zien dat: (1) bedrijven bespreken de 
verschillende productkarakteristieken met de arts niet op hun optimale frequentie, (2) de 
inhoud van artsenbezoeken bevat positief gekleurde informatie omtrent het product en (3) 
het bespreken van positief gekleurde informatie werkt op de lange termijn negatief op de 
responsiviteit van de arts op het artsenbezoek. Dit alles suggereert dat bedrijven de inhoud 
van hun artsenbezoeken kunnen verbeteren en tegelijkertijd kan de aanpassing in het soort 
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informatie dat wordt besproken de zorgen van overheden wegnemen dat artsenbezoekers 
voornamelijk de positieve punten van een product bediscussiëren met de arts. 
Het derde essay bestudeert de wisselwerking tussen het aantal voorgeschreven 
medicijnen, de marketinguitgaven voor die medicijnen en wetenschappelijke studies over 
die medicijnen. De farmaceutische industrie is een modelvoorbeeld van een industrie die 
op de wetenschap is gebaseerd. Producten in dit soort industrieën worden ondersteund 
door wetenschappelijke studies die voorafgaand en tijdens de levenscyclus van een 
medicijn verschijnen. De uitkomsten van die studies aangaande een bepaald medicijn zijn 
verschillend, zodat het totale wetenschappelijk bewijs voor een product over de tijd 
verandert. Dit essay onderzoekt daarom (1) hoe wetenschappelijke studies naar een 
product de marketing uitgaven van een bedrijf richting gebruikers van het product en 
experts beïnvloeden en (2) in welke mate beïnvloeden deze wetenschappelijke studies de 
verkopen van het product. Als een logische vervolgvraag daarop bestudeert het essay ook 
hoe het niet meenemen van wetenschappelijke studies in een model om de 
marketingeffectiviteit te meten de schattingen van de marketingeffectiviteit verandert. 
Om deze vragen te beantwoorden wordt een uitgebreide dataset van 
wetenschappelijke studies naar producten binnen een belangrijke farmaceutische categorie 
gebruikt. Deze data worden gecombineerd met verkoopcijfers en marketinguitgaven voor 
de producten binnen de categorie. Om het dynamische effect van wetenschappelijke 
productstudies op verkopen en marketinguitgaven te meten, wordt een vector error 
correctie (VEC) model gebruikt. Drie maatstaven worden gebruikt om, op basis van de 
wetenschappelijke studies, alle informatie omtrent de kwaliteit van het product samen te 
vatten: de gemiddelde effectiviteit, de spreiding in de effectiviteit en het aantal studies dat 
verschenen is voor een product.  
De resultaten laten zien dat alle drie de maatstaven een significante invloed 
hebben op de verkopen en de marketinguitgaven. Een hoger gemiddelde van de prestaties 
van een product leidt tot een stijging van de marketinguitgaven aan gebruikers en experts. 
Een hogere spreiding leidt tot een verschuiving van marketing aan gebruikers naar 
marketing aan experts. Een hoger aantal studies zorgt alleen voor een stijging in de 
marketinguitgaven richting experts. De verkopen van een medicijn worden positief 
beïnvloed door een hoger gemiddelde van de prestaties van het medicijn op basis van 
wetenschappelijke studies, alsmede het aantal studies. Ten slotte laat het onderzoek ook 
zien dat als de onderzoeker de invloed van wetenschappelijke studies over een product niet 
meeneemt in het model, zoals gewoonlijk gebeurt, er een te hoge schatting van het effect 
van marketing uit het model komt. 
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Elk essay bevat a substantiële component die relevant is voor managers en 
zodoende bevat het proefschrift belangrijke lessen voor zowel onderzoek als managers. 
Voor onderzoekers: (i) een nieuwe alternatieve methode is besproken om de gevolgen van 
een drastische beleidsverschuiving van een bedrijf te voorspellen, (ii) een model is uit de 
doeken gedaan om de effectiviteit van de inhoud van een artsenbezoek te meten en (iii) 
wetenschappelijke studies naar een product moeten worden meegenomen in een model om 
de effectiviteit van farmaceutische marketing te meten. Enkele lessen voor managers zijn 
als volgt: (i) de marktleider is in staat om de trend van het groeiende aantal 
artsenbezoekers te doorbreken, (ii) artsenbezoekers bespreken te vaak positief gekleurde 
informatie met de arts, hetgeen contraproductief is op de lange termijn en (iii) 
wetenschappelijke studies naar producten zijn een onderdeel van de marketingstrategie van 
een bedrijf en kunnen gebruikt worden om de strategie van de concurrent te voorspellen. 
 135 
 
References 
Acemoglu, D. and J. Linn (2004), “Market Size in Innovation: Theory and Evidence from 
the Pharmaceutical Industry,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3), 1049-
1090. 
Ailawadi, K. L., P. K. Kopalle and S. A. Neslin (2005), “Predicting Competitive Response 
to a Major Policy Change: Combining Game-Theoretic and Empirical Analyses,” 
Marketing Science, 24(1), 12-24. 
———, D. R. Lehmann and S. A. Neslin (2001), “Market Response to a Major Policy 
Change in the Marketing Mix: Learning from Procter & Gamble’s Value Pricing 
Strategy,” Journal of Marketing, 65(1), 44-61. 
Albers, S., M. K. Mantrala and S. Sridhar (2010), “Personal Selling Elasticities: A Meta-
Analysis,” Journal of Marketing Research, 47(5), 840–853. 
Albuquerque, P. and B. J. Bronnenberg (2009), “Estimating Demand Heterogeneity Using 
Aggregated Data: An Application to the Frozen Pizza Category,” Marketing 
Science, 28(2), 356-372. 
Allan, G. M., J. Lexchin and N. Wiebe (2007), “Physician Awareness of Drug Cost: A 
Systematic Review,” PLoS Medicine, 4(9), 1486-1496. 
Alexander, G. C., L. P. Casalino and D. O. Meltzer (2005), “Physician Strategies to 
Reduce Patients’ Out-of-Pocket Prescription Costs,” Archives of Internal 
Medicine, 165(6), 633-636. 
Anderson, B. L., G. K. Silverman, G. F. Loewenstein, S. Zinberg and J. Schulkin (2009), 
“Factors Associated With Physicians’ Reliance on Pharmaceutical Sales 
Representatives,” Academic Medicine, 84(8), 994–1002. 
Anderson, S. P. and R. Renault (2006), “Advertising Content,” American Economic 
Review, 96(1), 93–113. 
Azoulay, P. (2002), “Do Pharmaceutical Sales Respond to Scientific Evidence?” Journal 
of Economics & Management Strategy, 11(4), 551–594. 
References 
 
136 
 
Basuroy, S., S. Chatterjee and S. A. Ravid (2003), “How Critical Are Critical Reviews? 
The Box Office Effects of Film Critics, Star Power, and Budgets,” Journal of 
Marketing, 67(4), 103-117. 
Ben-Akiva, M., M. A. Bradley, T. Morikawa, J. Benjamin, T. P. Novak, H. Oppewal, and 
V. Rao (1994), “Combining Revealed and Stated Preferences Data,” Marketing 
Letters, 5(4), 335-350. 
Berndt, E. R., A. Bhattacharjya, D. N. Mishol, A. Arcelus and T. Lasky (2002), “An 
Analysis of the Diffusion of New Antidepressants: Variety, Quality, and 
Marketing Efforts,” The Journal of Mental Health Policy and Economics, 5(1), 3-
19. 
———, R. S. Pindyck, P. Azoulay (2003), “Consumption Externalities and Diffusion in 
Pharmaceutical Markets: Antiulcer Drugs,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 
51(2), 243-270. 
Bertrand, M., D. Karlan, S. Mullainathan, E. Shafir and J. Zinman (2010), “What's 
Advertising Content Worth? Evidence from a Consumer Credit Marketing Field 
Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(1), 263–305. 
Bronnenberg, B. J., P. E. Rossi and N. J. Vilcassim (2005), “Structural Modeling and 
Policy Simulation,” Journal of Marketing Research, 42(1), 22-26. 
BusinessWeek (2007), “The Doctor Won’t See You Now”, by Arlene Weintraub, February 
5. 
Chandy, R. K., G. J. Tellis, D. J. MacInnis and P. Thaivanich (2001), “What to Say When: 
Advertising Appeals in Evolving Markets,” Journal of Marketing Research, 
38(4), 399–414. 
Chen, Y. and J. Xie (2008), “Online Consumer Review: Word of Mouth as a New Element 
of Marketing Communication Mix,” Management Science, 54(3), 477-491. 
Chen, T., B. Sun and V. Singh (2009), “An Empirical Investigation of the Dynamic Effect 
of Marlboro’s Permanent Pricing Shift,” Marketing Science, 28(4), 740-758. 
References 
 
137 
 
Chevalier, J. A. and D. Mayzlin (2006), “The Effect of Word of Mouth on Sales: Online 
Book Reviews,” Journal of Marketing Research, 43(3), 345-354. 
Chib, S. and R. Winkelmann (2001), “Markov Chain Monte Carlo Analysis of Correlated 
Count Data,” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 19(4), 428-435. 
Ching, A. and M. Ishihara (2010), “The Effects of Detailing on Prescribing Decisions 
under Quality Uncertainty,” Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 8(2), 123-
165. 
Chintagunta, P. K., J. P. Dubé and V. Singh (2003), “Balancing Profitability and Customer 
Welfare in a Supermarket Chain,” Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 1(1), 
111-147. 
———, T. Erdem, P. E. Rossi and M. Wedel (2006), “Structural Modeling in Marketing: 
Review and Assessment”, Marketing Science, 25(6), 604-616. 
———, S. Gopinath and S. Venkataraman (2010), “The Effects of Online User Reviews 
on Movie Box Office Performance: Accounting for Sequential Rollout and 
Aggregation Across Local Markets,” Marketing Science, 29(5), 944-957. 
———, R. Jiang and G. Z. Jin (2009), “Information, Learning, and Drug Diffusion: The 
Case of Cox-2 Inhibitors,” Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 7(4), 399-443. 
Chu, J., P. K. Chintagunta and N. J. Vilcassim (2007), “Assessing the Economic Value of 
Distribution Channels: An Application to the Personal Computer Industry,” 
Journal of Marketing Research, 44(1), 29-41. 
Churchill, G. A., N. M. Ford, O. C. Walker, M. W. Johnston and J. F. Tanner (2000), Sales 
force Management, 6th edition, Irwin/McGraw-Hill.  
Cockburn, I. M. and A. H Anis (2001), “Hedonic Analysis of Arthritis Drugs,” in D. M. 
Cutler and E. R. Berndt, eds., Medical Care Output and Productivity, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 439-458. 
Cooper, L. G. (2000), “Strategic Marketing Planning for Radically New Products,” 
Journal of Marketing, 64(1), 1-16. 
References 
 
138 
 
Darby, M. R. and L. G. Zucker (2003), “Grilichesian Breakthroughs: Inventions of 
Methods of Inventing and Firm Entry in NanoTechnology,” NBER working paper 
9825. 
Darke, P. R. and R. J. B. Ritchie (2007), “The Defensive Consumer: Advertising 
Deception, Defensive Processing, and Distrust,” Journal of Marketing Research, 
44(1), 113-127. 
Dekimpe, M. G. and D. M. Hanssens (1999), “Sustained Spending and Persistent 
Response: A New Look at Long-Term Marketing Profitability,” Journal of 
Marketing Research, 36(4), 397-412. 
——— and ——— (2004), “Persistence Modeling for Assessing Marketing Strategy 
Performance,” in Assessing Marketing Strategy Performance, D. R. Lehmann and 
C. Moorman, eds., Marketing Science Institute. 
Dellarocas, C. (2006), “Strategic Manipulation of Internet Forums: Implications for 
Consumers and Firms,” Management Science, 52(10), 1577-1593. 
———, N. F. Awad and X. Zhang (2004), “Exploring the Value of Online Reviews to 
Organizations: Implications for Revenue Forecasting and Planning,” in J. I. 
DeGross (ed.), Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Conference on 
Information Systems, 379-386. 
———, X. Zhang and N. F. Awad (2007), “Exploring the Value of Online Product 
Reviews in Forecasting Sales: The Case of Motion Pictures,” Journal of 
Interactive Marketing, 21(4), 23-45. 
Deng, Z., B. Lev and F. Narin (1999), “Science and Technology as Predictors of Stock 
Performance,” Financial Analysts Journal, 55(3), 20-32. 
Dhar, V. and E. A. Chang (2009), “Does Chatter Matter? The Impact of User-Generated 
Content on Music Sales,” Journal of Interactive Marketing, 23(4), 300-307. 
Dickey, D. A. and W. A. Fuller (1979), “Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive 
Time Series with a Unit Root,” Journal of American Statistical Association, 
74(366), 427-431. 
References 
 
139 
 
DiMasi, J. A., R. W. Hansen and H. G. Grabowski (2003), “The Price of Innovation: New 
Estimates of Drug Development Costs,” Journal of Health Economics, 22(2), 
151-185. 
——— and H. G. Grabowski (2007), “The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech 
Different?” Managerial and Decision Economics, 28(4-5), 469-479. 
Doney, P. M. and J. P. Cannon (1997), “An Examination of the Nature of Trust in Buyer – 
Seller Relationships,” Journal of Marketing, 61(2), 25-51. 
Dong, X. J., P. Manchanda and P. K. Chintagunta (2009a), “Quantifying the Benefits of 
Individual-Level Targeting in the Presence of Firm Strategic Behavior,” Journal 
of Marketing Research, 46(2), 207-221. 
———, ——— and ——— (2009b), “Can Ignoring Cross-Category Prescription 
Behavior Lead to Incorrect Inferences Regarding Physician Segmentation?” 
working paper. 
Donohue, J. M., M. Cevasco and M. B. Rosenthal (2007), “A Decade of Direct-to-
Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs,” New England Journal of Medicine, 
357(7), 673-681. 
Dranove, D. and G. Zhe Jin (2010), “Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and 
Practice,” Journal of Economic Literature, 48(4), 935-963. 
Duan, W., B. Gu and A. B. Whinston (2008), “Do Online Reviews Matter? – An Empirical 
Investigation of Panel Data,” Decision Support Systems, 45(4), 1007-1016. 
Dubé, J. P., G. J. Hitsch and P. Manchanda (2005), “An Empirical Model of Advertising 
Dynamics,” Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 3(2), 107-144. 
Eliashberg, J. and S. M. Shugan (1997), “Film Critics: Influencers or Predictors?” Journal 
of Marketing, 61(2), 68-78. 
Engle, R. F. and C. W. J. Granger (1987), “Co-integration and Error Correction: 
Representation, Estimation, and Testing,” Econometrica, 55(2), 251-276. 
References 
 
140 
 
Etgar, M. and S. A. Goodwin (1982), “One-Sided versus Two-Sided Comparative Message 
Appeals for New Brand Introductions,” Journal of Consumer Research, 8(4), 
460–465. 
Fischer, M. and S. Albers (2010), “Patient- or Physician-Oriented Marketing: What Drives 
Primary Demand for Prescription Drugs?” Journal of Marketing Research, 47(1), 
103–121. 
Fok, D., C. Horváth, R. Paap and P. H. Franses (2006), “A Hierarchical Bayes Error 
Correction Model to Explain Dynamic Effects of Price Changes,” Journal of 
Marketing Research, 43(3), 443–461. 
France, K. R. and P. F. Bone (2009), “Conveying Level of Science: Tests of Iconic and 
Comparative Formats,” Marketing Letters, 20(4), 385-397. 
Fugh-Berman, A. and S. Ahari (2007), “Following the Script: How Drug Reps Make 
Friends and Influence Doctors,” PLoS Medicine, 4(4), 621–625. 
Gatignon, H., B. Weitz and P. Bansal (1990), “Brand Introduction Strategies and 
Competitive Environments,” Journal of Marketing Research, 27(4), 390-401. 
Godes, D. and D. Mayzlin (2004), “Using Online Conversations to Study Word-of-Mouth 
Communication,” Marketing Science, 23(4), 545-560. 
Gönül, F. F., F. Carter, E. Petrova and K. Srinivasan (2001), “Promotion of Prescription 
Drugs and Its Impact on Physicians’ Choice Behavior,” Journal of Marketing, 
65(3), 79-90. 
Gonzalez, J., C. Sismeiro, S. Dutta and P. Stern (2008), “Can Branded Drugs Benefit from 
Generic Entry? The Role of Detailing and Price in Switching to Non-
Bioequivalent Molecules,” International Journal of Research in Marketing, 25(4), 
247-260. 
Green, E. J. and R. H. Porter (1984), “Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price 
Information,” Econometrica, 52(1), 87-100. 
Greene, William H. (2003), Econometric Analysis, 5th edition, Prentice Hall, New York. 
References 
 
141 
 
Grewal, R., J. A. Mills, R. Mehta and S. Mujumdar (2001), “Using Cointegration Analysis 
for Modeling Marketing Interactions in Dynamic Environments: Methodological 
Issues and an Empirical Illustration,” Journal of Business Research, 51(2), 127-
144. 
Grupp, H. (1996), “Spillover Effects and the Science of Innovations Reconsidered: An 
Empirical Approach,” Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 6(2), 175-197. 
Gupta, S., D. C. Jain and M. S. Sawhney (1999), “Modeling the Evolution of Markets with 
Indirect Network Externalities: An Application to Digital Television,” Marketing 
Science, 18(3), 396-416. 
Hahn, M., S. Park, L. Krishnamurthi and A. A. Zoltners (1994), “Analysis of New Product 
Diffusion Using a Four-Segment Trial-Repeat Model,” Marketing Science, 13(3), 
224-247. 
Hanssens, D. M. and B. A. Weitz (1980), “The Effectiveness of Industrial Print 
Advertisements across Product Categories,” Journal of Marketing Research, 
17(3), 294–306. 
———, L. J. Parsons and R. L. Schultz (2001), Market Response Models: Econometric 
and Time Series Analysis, 2nd edn., Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, Ma. 
Heil, O. P. and T. S. Robertson (1991), “Toward a Theory of Competitive Marketing 
Signaling: A Research Agenda,” Strategic Management Journal, 2(6), 403-418. 
Hodgkinson, G. P. and M. P. Healey (2008), “Toward a (Pragmatic) Science of Strategic 
Intervention: Design Propositions for Scenario Planning,” Organization Studies, 
29(3), 435-457. 
Holbrook, D., W. M. Cohen, D. A. Hounshell and S. Klepper (2000), “The Nature, 
Sources, and Consequences of Firm Differences in the Early History of the 
Semiconductor Industry,” Strategic Management Journal, 21(10-11), 1017-1041. 
Huffington Post (2008), “The First Amendment Gone Wild: Big Pharma's "Right" to Find 
Out What Doctors Are Prescribing,” by R. Weissman, January 8. 
References 
 
142 
 
Hurwitz, M. A. and R. E. Caves (1988), “Persuasion or Information? Promotion and the 
Shares of Brand Name and Generic Pharmaceuticals,” Journal of Law and 
Economics, 31(2), 299-320. 
IIzuka, T. and G. Z. Jin (2007), “Direct to Consumer Advertising and Prescription 
Choice,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 55(4), 771. 
Im, K. S., M. H. Pesaran and Y. Shin (2003), “Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous 
Panels,” Journal of Econometrics, 115(1), 53–74. 
Imbens, G. W. and T. Lancaster (1994), “Combining Micro and Macro Data in 
Microeconometric Models,” Review of Economic Studies, 61(4), 655-680. 
Ippolito, P. M. and A. D. Mathios (1990), “The Regulation of Science-Based Claims in 
Advertising,” Journal of Consumer Policy, 13(4), 413-445. 
Johansen, S. and K. Juselius (1990), “Maximum Likelihood Estimation and Inference on 
Cointegration – with Applications to the Demand for Money,” Oxford Bulletin on 
Economics and Statistics, 52(2), 169-210. 
John, G., M. W. Allen and S. Dutta (1999), “Marketing in Technology-Intensive Markets: 
Toward a Conceptual Framework,” Journal of Marketing, 63(Special Issue), 78-
91. 
Koop, G. (1992), “Aggregate Shocks and Macroeconomic Fluctuations: A Bayesian 
Approach,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 7(4), 395–411. 
Kremer, S. T. M., T. H. A. Bijmolt, P. S. H. Leeflang and J. E. Wieringa (2008), 
“Generalizations on the Effectiveness of Pharmaceutical Promotional 
Expenditures,” International Journal of Research in Marketing, 25(4), 234–246. 
Leeflang, P. S. H. and D. R. Wittink. (1996) “Competitive Reaction Versus Consumer 
Response: Do Managers Overreact?” International Journal of Research in 
Marketing, 13(2), 103-119. 
——— and J. E. Wieringa (2010), “Modeling the Effects of Pharmaceutical Marketing,” 
Marketing Letters, 21(2), 121-133. 
References 
 
143 
 
Levin, I. P., S. L. Schneider and G. J. Gaeth (1998), “All Frames Are Not Created Equal: 
A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects,” Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes, 76 (2), 149–188. 
Lexchin, J., L. A. Bero, B. Djulbegovic and O. Clark (2003), “Pharmaceutical Industry 
Sponsorship and Research Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review,” British 
Medical Journal, 326(7400), 1167-70.  
Liao, J. K. and U. Laufs (2005), “Pleiotropic Effects of Statins,” Annual Review of 
Pharmacology and Toxicology, 45, 89-118. 
Little, J. D. C. (1970), “Models and Managers: The Concept of a Decision Calculus,” 
Management Science, 16(8), 466-485. 
Liu, Y. (2006), “Word of Mouth for Movies: Its Dynamics and Impact on Box Office 
Revenue,” Journal of Marketing, 70(3), 74-89. 
Lodish, L. M., M. Abraham, S. Kalmenson, J. Livelsberger, B. Lubetkin, B. Richardson 
and M. E. Stevens (1995), “How T.V. Advertising Works: A Meta-Analysis of 
389 Real World Split Cable T.V. Advertising Experiments,” Journal of Marketing 
Research, 32(2), 125–139. 
Lohtia, R., N. Donthu and E. K. Hershberger (2003), “The Impact of Content and Design 
Elements on Banner Advertising Click-through Rates,” Journal of Advertising 
Research, 43(4), 410–418.  
Louviere, J. J., D. A. Hensher and J. D. Swait (2000), “Stated Choice Methods and 
Analysis,” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Lu, Z. J. and W. S. Comanor (1998), “Strategic Pricing of New Pharmaceuticals,” The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 80(1), 108-118. 
Lucas, R. E., Jr. (1976), “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique” in The Phillips 
Curve and Labor Markets (K. Brunner and A.H. Meltzer, eds.), Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 19-
46. 
References 
 
144 
 
Luo, X. (2009), “Quantifying the Long-Term Impact of Negative Word of Mouth on Cash 
Flows and Stock Prices,” Marketing Science, 28(1), 148–165. 
Manchanda, P. and P. K. Chintagunta (2004), “Responsiveness of Physician Prescription 
Behavior to Salesforce Effort: An Individual Level Analysis,” Marketing Letters, 
15(2-3), 129–145. 
——— and E. Honka (2005), “The Effects and Role of Direct-to-Physician Marketing in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative Review,” Yale Journal of Health 
Policy, Law, and Ethics, 5(2), 785–822. 
———, P. E. Rossi and P. K. Chintagunta (2004), “Response Modeling with Nonrandom 
Marketing-Mix Variables,” Journal of Marketing Research, 41(4), 467–478. 
Mansfield, E. (1991), “Academic Research and Industrial Innovation,” Research Policy, 
20(1), 1-12. 
Mark, T. L. and J. D. Swait (2004), “Using Stated Preference and Revealed Preference 
Modeling to Evaluate Prescribing Decisions,” Health Economics, 13(6), 563-573. 
Mayzlin, D. (2006), “Promotional Chat on the Internet,” Marketing Science, 25(2), 155-
163. 
McFadden, D. L. and K. E. Train (1996), “Consumers’ Evaluation of New Product: 
Learning from Self and Others,” Journal of Political Economy, 104(4), 683-703. 
McNutt, R. A. (2004), “Shared Medical Decision Making: Problems, Process, Progress,” 
Journal of American Medical Association, 292(20), 2516-2518. 
Meier, B. (2007), “In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million,” New York 
Times, May 10. 
Mizik, N. and R. Jacobson (2004), “Are Physicians ‘Easy Marks’? Quantifying the Effects 
of Detailing and Sampling on New Prescriptions,” Management Science, 50(12), 
1704-1715. 
Moe, W. and M. Trusov (2011), “Measuring the Value of Social Dynamics in Online 
Product Ratings Forums,” Journal of Marketing Research, forthcoming.  
References 
 
145 
 
Molloy, W., D. Strang, G. Guyatt, J. Lexchin, M. Bédard, S. Dubois and R. Russo (2002), 
“Assessing the Quality of Drug Detailing,” Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 
55(8), 825–832. 
Montgomery, D. B., M. C. Moore, J. E. Urbany (2005), “Reasoning About Competitive 
Reactions: Evidence From Executives,” Marketing Science, 24(1), 138–149. 
Montoya, R., O. Netzer and K. Jedidi (2009), “Dynamic Marketing Resource Allocation 
for Long-Term Profitability: A Pharmaceutical Application,” working paper. 
Munos, B. (2009), “Lesson from 60 Years of Pharmaceutical Innovation,” Nature Reviews 
Drug Discovery, 8(December), 959-968. 
Narayanan, S., R. Desiraju and P. K. Chintagunta (2004), “Return on Investment 
Implications for Pharmaceutical Promotional Expenditures: The Role of 
Marketing-Mix Interactions,” Journal of Marketing, 68(4), 90-105.  
———, P. Manchanda and P. K. Chintagunta (2005), “Temporal Differences in the Role 
of Marketing Communication in New Product Categories,” Journal of Marketing 
Research, 42(3), 278-290. 
Narin, F. (2000), “Assessing Technological Competencies,” in From Knowledge 
Management to Strategic Competence: Measuring Technological, Market and 
Organisational Innovation, Joe Tidd, ed. London: Imperial College Press, 155-
195.  
———, K. S. Hamilton and D. Olivastro (1997), “The Increasing Linkage between U.S. 
Technology and Public Science,” Research Policy, 26(3), 317-330. 
Neslin, S. A. (2001), “ROI Analysis of Pharmaceutical Promotion,” unpublished study 
conducted for the Association of Medical Publications available at 
www.rxpromoroi.org. 
Nevo, A. (2000), “Mergers with Differentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-to-Eat 
Cereal Industry,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 31(3), 395-421. 
New York Times (2006a), “New Chief at Pfizer Will Reduce Sales Force,” by Alex 
Berenson, November 29. 
References 
 
146 
 
New York Times (2006b), “For Science’s Gatekeepers, a Credibility Gap,” written by 
Lawrence K. Altman, May 2. 
Nijs, V. R., M. G. Dekimpe, Jan-Benedict E. M. Steenkamp and Dominique M. Hanssens 
(2001), “The Category-Demand Effects of Price Promotions,” Marketing Science, 
20(1), 1-22. 
Orme, B. and R. Johnson (2006), “External Effect Adjustments in Conjoint Analysis,” 
Working paper, Sawtooth Software. 
Osinga, E. C., P. S. H. Leeflang and J. E. Wieringa (2010), “Early Marketing Matters: A 
Time-Varying Parameter Approach to Persistence Modeling,” Journal of 
Marketing Research, 47(1), 173-185.  
Paulsen, J. (1984), “Order Determination of Multivariate Autoregressive Time Series with 
Unit Roots,” Journal of Time Series Analysis, 5(2), 115-127. 
Pauwels, K., D. M. Hanssens and S. Siddarth (2002), “The Long-Term Effects of Price 
Promotions on Category Incidence, Brand Choice, and Purchase Quantity,” 
Journal of Marketing Research, 39(4), 421-439. 
Pavitt, K. (1984), “Sectoral Patterns of Technical Change: Towards a Taxonomy and a 
Theory,” Research Policy, 13(6), 343-373. 
Perron, P. (1989), “The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit Root Hypothesis,” 
Econometrica, 57(6), 1361-1401. 
Pesaran, H. H. and Y. Shin (1998), “Generalized Impulse Response Analysis in Linear 
Multivariate Models,” Economic Letters, 58(1), 17-29.  
Phelps R., C. Chan and S. C. Kapsalis (2001), “Does Scenario Planning Affect 
Performance? Two Exploratory Studies,” Journal of Business Research, 51(3), 
223-232. 
Philadelphia Inquirer (2005), “Glaxo Seeks Cease-Fire in 'Arms Race' in Sales,” by T. 
Ginsberg, February 11. 
References 
 
147 
 
Pisano, G. P. (2006), “Science Business: The Promise, the Reality, and the Future of 
Biotech,” Harvard Business School Press. 
Reiss, P. C. and F. A. Wolak (2007), “Structural Econometric Modeling: Rationales and 
Examples from Industrial Organization,” in James J. Heckman and Edward 
Leamer, eds.: Handbook of Econometrics, 6(1), 4277-4415. 
Roughead, E. E., A. L. Gilbert and K. J. Harvey (1998), “Self-Regulatory Codes of 
Conduct: Are They Effective in Controlling Pharmaceutical Representatives’ 
Presentations to General Medical Practitioners?” International Journal of Health 
Services, 28(2), 269-279. 
Scherer, F. M. (2004), “The Pharmaceutical Industry – Prices and Progress,” New England 
Journal of Medicine, 351(9), 927-932. 
——— and D. Ross (1990), “Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance,” 
Third Edition, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1993), “Multiple Scenario Development: Its Conceptual and 
Behavioral Foundation,” Strategic Management Journal, 14(3), 193-213. 
——— (1995), “Scenario Planning: A Tool for Strategic Thinking,” Sloan Management 
Review, 36(2), 25-40. 
Shankar, V. (1999), “New Product Introduction and Incumbent Response Strategies: Their 
Interrelationship and the Role of Multimarket Contact,” Journal of Marketing 
Research, 36(3), 327-344. 
——— (2008), “Strategic Marketing Decision Models for the Pharmaceutical Industry,” in 
Handbook of Marketing Decision Models, Ed. Berend Wierenga, Springer U.S. 
———, G. S. Carpenter and L. Krishnamurthi (1998), “Late Mover Advantage: How 
Innovative Late Entrants Outsell Pioneers,” Journal of Marketing Research, 
35(1), 54-70. 
———, ——— and ——— (1999), “The Advantages of Entry in the Growth Stage of the 
Product Life Cycle: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Marketing Research, 
36(2), 269-276. 
References 
 
148 
 
Singh, S. N. and C. A. Cole (1993), “The Effects of Length, Content, and Repetition on 
Television Commercial Effectiveness,” Journal of Marketing Research, 30(1), 
91–104. 
Slotegraaf, R. J. and K. Pauwels (2008), “The Impact of Brand Equity and Innovation on 
the Long-Term Effectiveness of Promotions,” Journal of Marketing Research, 
45(3), 293–306. 
Smilde, T. J., S. van Wiesen, H. Wollersheim, M. D. Trip, J. J. P. Kastelein and A. F. H. 
Stalenhoef (2001), “Effect of Aggressive versus Conventional Lipid Lowering on 
Atherosclerosis Progression in Familial Hypercholesterolaemia (ASAP): a 
Prospective, Randomised, Double-Blind Trial,” The Lancet, 357(9256), 577-581. 
Sood, A. and S. Stremersch (2010), “Deviation Among Technology Reviews: An 
Informative Enrichment of Technology Evolution Theory for Marketing,” 
research report, ERIM, repub.eur.nl/resource/pub_17766. 
Sorescu, A. B., R. K. Chandy and J. C. Prabhu (2003), “Sources and Financial 
Consequences of Radical Innovation: Insights from Pharmaceuticals,” Journal of 
Marketing, 67(4), 82-102. 
Sriram, S., P. K. Chintagunta and R. Neelamegham (2006), “Effects of Brand Preference, 
Product Attributes, and Marketing Mix Variables in Technology Product 
Markets,” Marketing Science, 25(5), 440-456. 
Steenkamp, J. B. E. M., V. R. Nijs, D. M. Hanssens, and M. G. Dekimpe (2005), 
“Competitive Reactions to Advertising and Promotion Attacks,” Marketing 
Science, 24(1), 35-54. 
Steinman, M. A., G. M. Harper, M. Chren, C. S. Landefeld and L. A. Bero (2007), 
“Characteristics and Impact of Drug Detailing for Gabapentin,” PLoS Medicine, 
4(4), 743–751. 
Stremersch, S. and A. Lemmens (2009), “Sales Growth of New Pharmaceuticals Across 
the Globe: The Role of Regulatory Regimes,” Marketing Science, 28(4), 690-708. 
——— and W. Van Dyck (2009), “Marketing of the Life Sciences: A New Framework 
and Research Agenda for a Nascent Field,” Journal of Marketing, 73(4), 4-30. 
References 
 
149 
 
Sun, M. (2010), “How Does Variance of Product Ratings Matter,” working paper. 
Swait, J. D. and R. L. Andrews (2003), “Enriching Scanner Panel Models with Choice 
Experiments,” Marketing Science, 22(4), 442-460. 
——— and J. J. Louviere (1993), “The Role of the Scale Parameter in the Estimation and 
Comparison of Multinomial Logit Models,” Journal of Marketing Research, 
30(3), 305-314. 
Tellis, G. J. and J. Johnson (2007), “The Value of Quality,” Marketing Science, 26(6), 758-
773. 
———, E. Yin and R. Niraj (2009), “Does Quality Win? Network Effects Versus Quality 
in High-Tech Markets,” Journal of Marketing Research, 46(2), 135-149. 
Thomas, G. P., and G. F. Soldow (1988), “A Rules-Based Approach to Competitive 
Interaction,” Journal of Marketing, 52(2), 63-74. 
Tipton, M. M., S. G. Bharadwaj and D. C. Robertson (2009), “Regulatory Exposure of 
Deceptive Marketing and Its Impact on Firm Value,” Journal of Marketing, 73(6), 
227-243. 
USA Today/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard School of Public Health (2008), “The 
Public on Prescription Drugs and Pharmaceutical Companies”, Jan. 3-23, 2008. 
Van Heerde, H. J., M. G. Dekimpe and W. P. Putsis Jr. (2005), “Marketing Models and the 
Lucas Critique,” Journal of Marketing Research, 42(1), 15-21. 
———, E. Gijsbrechts and K. Pauwels (2008), “Winners and Losers in a Major Price 
War,” Journal of Marketing Research, 45(5), 499-518. 
Van Huyck, J. B., R. C. Battalio and R. O. Beil (1990), “Tacit Coordination Games, 
Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure,” American Economic Review, 
80(1), 234-248. 
Venkataraman, S. and S. Stremersch (2007), “The Debate on Influencing Doctors’ 
Decisions: Are Drug Characteristics the Missing Link?” Management Science, 
53(11), 1688–1701. 
References 
 
150 
 
Wall Street Journal (2003), “As Drug-Sales Teams Multiply, Doctors Start to Tune Them 
Out,” by S. Hensley, June 13. 
Wedel, M. and R. Pieters (2000), “Eye Fixations on Advertisements and Memory for 
Brands: A Model and Findings,” Marketing Science, 19(4), 297–312. 
Weintraub, A. (2007), “The Doctor Won’t See You Now,” BusinessWeek (February 5). 
Weitz, B. A. (1981), “Effectiveness in Sales Interactions: A Contingency Framework,” 
Journal of Marketing, 45(1), 85-103. 
——— and K. D. Bradford (1999), “Personal Selling and Sales Management: A 
Relationship Marketing Perspective,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 27(2), 241–254. 
Whitehead, J. C., S. K. Pattanayak, G. L. Van Houtven and B. R. Gelso (2008), 
“Combining Revealed and Stated Preference Data to Estimate the Nonmarket 
Value of Ecological Services: An Assessment of the State of the Science,” 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 22(5), 872-908. 
Wittink, D. R., L. Krishnamurthi and D. J. Reibstein (1989), “The Effects of Differences in 
the Number of Attribute Levels on Conjoint Results,” Marketing Letters, 1(2), 
113-123. 
Wosinska, M. (2005), “Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and Drug Therapy Compliance,” 
Journal of Marketing Research, 42(3), 323-332. 
Wotruba, T. R. (1991), “The Evolution of Personal Selling,” Journal of Personal Selling 
and Sales Management, 11(3), 1-12. 
Zhu, F. and X. Zhang (2010), “Impact of Online Consumer Reviews on Sales: The 
Moderating Role of Product and Consumer Characteristics,” Journal of 
Marketing, 74(2), 133-148. 
Ziegler, M. G., P. Lew and B. C. Singer (1995), “The Accuracy of Drug Information From 
Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives,” Journal of American Medical Association, 
273(16), 1296-1298. 
References 
 
151 
 
Zivot, E. and D. W. K. Andrews (1992), “Further Evidence on the Great Crash, the Oil-
Price Shock and the Unit-Root Hypothesis," Journal of Business and Economic 
Statistics, 10(3), 251-287. 
Zucker, L. G., M. R. Darby and J. S. Armstrong (2002), “Commercializing Knowledge: 
University Science, Knowledge Capture, and Firm Performance in 
Biotechnology,” Management Science, 48(1), 138-153. 
———, ——— and M. B. Brewer (1998), “Intellectual Human Capital and the Birth of 
U.S. Biotechnology Enterprises,” American Economic Review, 88(1), 290-306. 
  
  
 
  
 153 
 
About the Author 
Eelco Kappe was born in 1984 in ‘s-Gravenhage in The 
Netherlands. In 2006, he completed his master’s degree in 
econometrics (major quantitative marketing) cum laude at the 
Erasmus University Rotterdam and started as a Ph.D. candidate 
in the marketing department at the Erasmus School of 
Economics. His dissertation involves the study of pharmaceutical 
marketing effectiveness and combines the usage of cutting-edge 
econometric methods with unique data sources. His research is 
characterized by a strong managerial focus combined with rigorous empirical analyses. 
He has presented his work at several international conferences, such as the 
marketing science conference in Singapore, Vancouver, Detroit and Cologne and the 
marketing dynamics conference in New York. He visited various doctoral consortia among 
which the AMA doctoral consortium at Georgia State University in Atlanta. He also 
worked a few months on his research at Quintiles and in fall 2009 he visited IESE 
Business School in Barcelona. The studies resulting from his dissertation are currently 
under review at Management Science, Marketing Science, and the Journal of Marketing. 
Eelco continues his career in academia and in August 2011 he will start as an 
assistant professor at the marketing department of Pennsylvania State University. Besides 
his academic work, Eelco is an active sportsman and likes to travel.  
  
 
  
  
 
ERASMUS  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE  OF  MANAGEMENT  (ERIM) 
 
 
ERIM PH.D. SERIES 
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
 
 
ERIM Electronic Series Portal: http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
 
 
 
 
Acciaro, M., Bundling Strategies in Global Supply Chains, Promotor: Prof.dr. H.E. 
Haralambides, EPS-2010-197-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-240-3, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/19742 
Agatz, N.A.H., Demand Management in E-Fulfillment, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van 
Nunen, EPS-2009-163-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-200-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/15425 
Alexiev, A., Exploratory Innovation: The Role of Organizational and Top Management 
Team Social Capital, Promotors: Prof.dr. F.A.J. van den Bosch & Prof.dr. H.W. 
Volberda, EPS-2010-208-STR, ISBN: 978-90-5892-249-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/20632 
Althuizen, N.A.P., Analogical Reasoning as a Decision Support Principle for Weakly 
Structured Marketing Problems, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. B. Wierenga, EPS-2006-095-MKT, 
ISBN: 90-5892-129-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8190 
Alvarez, H.L., Distributed Collaborative Learning Communities Enabled by Information 
Communication Technology, Promotor: Prof.dr. K. Kumar, EPS-2006-080-LIS, ISBN: 
90-5892-112-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7830 
Appelman, J.H., Governance of Global Interorganizational Tourism Networks: Changing 
Forms of Co-ordination between the Travel Agency and Aviation Sector, Promotors: 
Prof.dr. F.M. Go & Prof.dr. B. Nooteboom, EPS-2004-036-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-060-7, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1199 
Asperen, E. van, Essays on Port, Container, and Bulk Chemical Logistics Optimization, 
Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker, EPS-2009-181-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-222-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/17626 
  
 
Assem, M.J. van den, Deal or No Deal? Decision Making under Risk in a Large-Stake 
TV Game Show and Related Experiments, Promotor: Prof.dr. J. Spronk, EPS-2008-138-
F&A, ISBN: 978-90-5892-173-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13566 
Baquero, G, On Hedge Fund Performance, Capital Flows and Investor Psychology, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. M.J.C.M. Verbeek, EPS-2006-094-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-131-X, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8192 
Berens, G., Corporate Branding: The Development of Corporate Associations and their 
Influence on Stakeholder Reactions, Promotor: Prof.dr. C.B.M. van Riel, EPS-2004-039-
ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-065-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1273 
Berghe, D.A.F. van den, Working Across Borders: Multinational Enterprises and the 
Internationalization of Employment, Promotors: Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder & Prof.dr. 
E.J.J. Schenk, EPS-2003-029-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-05-34, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1041 
Berghman, L.A., Strategic Innovation Capacity: A Mixed Method Study on Deliberate 
Strategic Learning Mechanisms, Promotor: Prof.dr. P. Mattyssens, EPS-2006-087-MKT, 
ISBN: 90-5892-120-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7991 
Bezemer, P.J., Diffusion of Corporate Governance Beliefs: Board Independence and the 
Emergence of a Shareholder Value Orientation in the Netherlands, Promotors: 
Prof.dr.ing. F.A.J. van den Bosch & Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2009-192-STR, ISBN: 
978-90-5892-232-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/18458 
Bijman, W.J.J., Essays on Agricultural Co-operatives: Governance Structure in Fruit and 
Vegetable Chains, Promotor: Prof.dr. G.W.J. Hendrikse, EPS-2002-015-ORG, ISBN: 90-
5892-024-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/867 
Binken, J.L.G., System Markets: Indirect Network Effects in Action, or Inaction?, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. S. Stremersch, EPS-2010-213-MKT, ISBN: 978-90-5892-260-1, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/21186 
Blitz, D.C., Benchmarking Benchmarks, Promotors: Prof.dr. A.G.Z. Kemna & Prof.dr. 
W.F.C. Verschoor, EPS-2011-225-F&A, ISBN: 978-90-5892-268-7, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/22624 
Bispo, A., Labour Market Segmentation: An investigation into the Dutch hospitality 
industry, Promotors: Prof.dr. G.H.M. Evers & Prof.dr. A.R. Thurik, EPS-2007-108-ORG, 
ISBN: 90-5892-136-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10283 
Blindenbach-Driessen, F., Innovation Management in Project-Based Firms, Promotor: 
Prof.dr. S.L. van de Velde, EPS-2006-082-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-110-7, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7828 
  
 
Boer, C.A., Distributed Simulation in Industry, Promotors: Prof.dr. A. de Bruin & 
Prof.dr.ir. A. Verbraeck, EPS-2005-065-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-093-3, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6925 
Boer, N.I., Knowledge Sharing within Organizations: A situated and Relational 
Perspective, Promotor: Prof.dr. K. Kumar, EPS-2005-060-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-086-0, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6770 
Boer-Sorbán, K., Agent-Based Simulation of Financial Markets: A modular, Continuous-
Time Approach, Promotor: Prof.dr. A. de Bruin, EPS-2008-119-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-155-
0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10870 
Boon, C.T., HRM and Fit: Survival of the Fittest!?, Promotors: Prof.dr. J. Paauwe & 
Prof.dr. D.N. den Hartog, EPS-2008-129-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-162-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/12606 
Borst, W.A.M., Understanding Crowdsourcing: Effects of Motivation and Rewards on 
Participation and Performance in Voluntary Online Activities, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. 
J.C.M. van den Ende & Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck, EPS-2010-221-LIS, ISBN: 978-
90-5892-262-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/ 21914 
Braun, E., City Marketing: Towards an Integrated Approach, Promotor: Prof.dr. L. van 
den Berg, EPS-2008-142-MKT, ISBN: 978-90-5892-180-2, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13694 
Brito, M.P. de, Managing Reverse Logistics or Reversing Logistics Management? 
Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker & Prof.dr. M. B. M. de Koster, EPS-2004-035-LIS, 
ISBN: 90-5892-058-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1132 
Brohm, R., Polycentric Order in Organizations: A Dialogue between Michael Polanyi 
and IT-Consultants on Knowledge, Morality, and Organization, Promotors: Prof.dr. G. 
W. J. Hendrikse & Prof.dr. H. K. Letiche, EPS-2005-063-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-095-X, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6911 
Brumme, W.-H., Manufacturing Capability Switching in the High-Tech Electronics 
Technology Life Cycle, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen & Prof.dr.ir. L.N. Van 
Wassenhove, EPS-2008-126-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-150-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/12103 
Budiono, D.P., The Analysis of Mutual Fund Performance: Evidence from U.S. Equity 
Mutual Funds, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. M.J.C.M. Verbeek, EPS-2010-185-F&A, ISBN: 978-
90-5892-224-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/18126 
  
 
Burgers, J.H., Managing Corporate Venturing: Multilevel Studies on Project Autonomy, 
Integration, Knowledge Relatedness, and Phases in the New Business Development 
Process, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. F.A.J. Van den Bosch & Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-
2008-136-STR, ISBN: 978-90-5892-174-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13484 
Campbell, R.A.J., Rethinking Risk in International Financial Markets, Promotor: Prof.dr. 
C.G. Koedijk, EPS-2001-005-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-008-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/306 
Carvalho de Mesquita Ferreira, L., Attention Mosaics: Studies of Organizational  
Attention, Promotors: Prof.dr. P.M.A.R. Heugens & Prof.dr. J. van Oosterhout, EPS-
2010-205-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-242-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/19882  
Chen, C.-M., Evaluation and Design of Supply Chain Operations Using DEA, Promotor: 
Prof.dr. J.A.E.E. van Nunen, EPS-2009-172-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-209-0, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16181 
Chen, H., Individual Mobile Communication Services and Tariffs, Promotor: Prof.dr. 
L.F.J.M. Pau, EPS-2008-123-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-158-1, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/11141 
Chen, Y., Labour Flexibility in China’s Companies: An Empirical Study, Promotors: 
Prof.dr. A. Buitendam & Prof.dr. B. Krug, EPS-2001-006-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-012-7, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/307  
Damen, F.J.A., Taking the Lead: The Role of Affect in Leadership Effectiveness, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2007-107-ORG, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10282 
Daniševská, P., Empirical Studies on Financial Intermediation and Corporate Policies, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. C.G. Koedijk, EPS-2004-044-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-070-4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1518 
Defilippi Angeldonis, E.F., Access Regulation for Naturally Monopolistic Port 
Terminals: Lessons from Regulated Network Industries, Promotor: Prof.dr. H.E. 
Haralambides, EPS-2010-204-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-245-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/19881 
Delporte-Vermeiren, D.J.E., Improving the Flexibility and Profitability of ICT-enabled 
Business Networks: An Assessment Method and Tool, Promotors: Prof. mr. dr.  P.H.M. 
Vervest & Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck, EPS-2003-020-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-040-2, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/359 
Derwall, J.M.M., The Economic Virtues of SRI and CSR, Promotor: Prof.dr. C.G. 
Koedijk, EPS-2007-101-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-132-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8986 
  
 
Desmet, P.T.M., In Money we Trust? Trust Repair and the Psychology of Financial 
Compensations, Promotors: Prof.dr. D. De Cremer & Prof.dr. E. van Dijk, EPS-2011-
232-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-274-8,  http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Diepen, M. van, Dynamics and Competition in Charitable Giving, Promotor: Prof.dr. 
Ph.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2009-159-MKT, ISBN: 978-90-5892-188-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14526 
Dietvorst, R.C., Neural Mechanisms Underlying Social Intelligence and Their 
Relationship with the Performance of Sales Managers, Promotor: Prof.dr. W.J.M.I. 
Verbeke, EPS-2010-215-MKT, ISBN: 978-90-5892-257-1, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/21188 
Dietz, H.M.S., Managing (Sales)People towards Perfomance: HR Strategy, Leadership 
& Teamwork, Promotor: Prof.dr. G.W.J. Hendrikse, EPS-2009-168-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-
5892-210-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16081 
Dijksterhuis, M., Organizational Dynamics of Cognition and Action in the Changing 
Dutch and US Banking Industries, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. F.A.J. van den Bosch & Prof.dr. 
H.W. Volberda, EPS-2003-026-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-048-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1037 
Eijk, A.R. van der, Behind Networks: Knowledge Transfer, Favor Exchange and 
Performance, Promotors: Prof.dr. S.L. van de Velde & Prof.dr.drs. W.A. Dolfsma, EPS-
2009-161-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-190-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14613 
Elstak, M.N., Flipping the Identity Coin: The Comparative Effect of Perceived, Projected 
and Desired Organizational Identity on Organizational Identification and Desired 
Behavior, Promotor: Prof.dr. C.B.M. van Riel, EPS-2008-117-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-148-
2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10723 
Erken, H.P.G., Productivity, R&D and Entrepreneurship, Promotor: Prof.dr. A.R. Thurik, 
EPS-2008-147-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-179-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14004 
Essen, M. van, An Institution-Based View of Ownership, Promotos: Prof.dr. J. van 
Oosterhout & Prof.dr. G.M.H. Mertens, EPS-2011-226-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-269-4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/22643 
Fenema, P.C. van, Coordination and Control of Globally Distributed Software Projects, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. K. Kumar, EPS-2002-019-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-030-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/360 
Feng, L., Motivation, Coordination and Cognition in Cooperatives, Promotor: Prof.dr. 
G.W.J. Hendrikse, EPS-2010-220-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-261-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/21680 
  
 
Fleischmann, M., Quantitative Models for Reverse Logistics, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. 
J.A.E.E. van Nunen & Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker, EPS-2000-002-LIS, ISBN: 35-4041-711-7, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1044 
Flier, B., Strategic Renewal of European Financial Incumbents: Coevolution of 
Environmental Selection, Institutional Effects, and Managerial Intentionality, Promotors: 
Prof.dr.ir. F.A.J. van den Bosch & Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2003-033-STR, ISBN: 
90-5892-055-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1071 
Fok, D., Advanced Econometric Marketing Models, Promotor: Prof.dr. Ph.H.B.F. 
Franses, EPS-2003-027-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-049-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1035 
Ganzaroli, A., Creating Trust between Local and Global Systems, Promotors: Prof.dr. K. 
Kumar & Prof.dr. R.M. Lee, EPS-2002-018-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-031-3, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/361 
Gertsen, H.F.M., Riding a Tiger without Being Eaten: How Companies and Analysts 
Tame Financial Restatements and Influence Corporate Reputation, Promotor: Prof.dr. 
C.B.M. van Riel, EPS-2009-171-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-214-4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16098 
Gilsing, V.A., Exploration, Exploitation and Co-evolution in Innovation Networks, 
Promotors: Prof.dr. B. Nooteboom & Prof.dr. J.P.M. Groenewegen, EPS-2003-032-ORG, 
ISBN: 90-5892-054-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1040 
Gijsbers, G.W., Agricultural Innovation in Asia: Drivers, Paradigms and Performance, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2009-156-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-191-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14524 
Gong, Y., Stochastic Modelling and Analysis of Warehouse Operations, Promotors: 
Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster & Prof.dr. S.L. van de Velde, EPS-2009-180-LIS, ISBN: 978-
90-5892-219-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16724 
Govers, R., Virtual Tourism Destination Image: Glocal Identities Constructed, Perceived 
and Experienced, Promotors: Prof.dr. F.M. Go & Prof.dr. K. Kumar, EPS-2005-069-
MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-107-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6981 
Graaf, G. de, Tractable Morality: Customer Discourses of Bankers, Veterinarians and 
Charity Workers, Promotors: Prof.dr. F. Leijnse & Prof.dr. T. van Willigenburg, EPS-
2003-031-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-051-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1038 
Greeven, M.J., Innovation in an Uncertain Institutional Environment: Private Software 
Entrepreneurs in Hangzhou, China, Promotor: Prof.dr. B. Krug, EPS-2009-164-ORG, 
ISBN: 978-90-5892-202-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/15426 
  
 
Groot, E.A. de, Essays on Economic Cycles, Promotors: Prof.dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses & 
Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2006-091-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-123-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8216 
Guenster, N.K., Investment Strategies Based on Social Responsibility and Bubbles, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. C.G. Koedijk, EPS-2008-175-F&A, ISBN: 978-90-5892-206-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
Gutkowska, A.B., Essays on the Dynamic Portfolio Choice, Promotor: Prof.dr. A.C.F. 
Vorst, EPS-2006-085-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-118-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7994 
Hagemeijer, R.E., The Unmasking of the Other, Promotors: Prof.dr. S.J. Magala & 
Prof.dr. H.K. Letiche, EPS-2005-068-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-097-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6963 
Hakimi, N.A, Leader Empowering Behaviour: The Leader’s Perspective: Understanding 
the Motivation behind Leader Empowering Behaviour, Promotor: Prof.dr. D.L. van 
Knippenberg, EPS-2010-184-ORG, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/17701 
Halderen, M.D. van, Organizational Identity Expressiveness and Perception 
Management: Principles for Expressing the Organizational Identity in Order to Manage 
the Perceptions and Behavioral Reactions of External Stakeholders, Promotor: Prof.dr. 
S.B.M. van Riel, EPS-2008-122-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-153-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10872 
Hartigh, E. den, Increasing Returns and Firm Performance: An Empirical Study, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2005-067-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-098-4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6939 
Hensmans, M., A Republican Settlement Theory of the Firm: Applied to Retail Banks in 
England and the Netherlands (1830-2007), Promotors: Prof.dr. A. Jolink& Prof.dr. S.J. 
Magala, EPS-2010-193-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-235-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/19494 
Hermans. J.M., ICT in Information Services; Use and Deployment of the Dutch Securities 
Trade, 1860-1970, Promotor: Prof.dr. drs. F.H.A. Janszen, EPS-2004-046-ORG, ISBN 
90-5892-072-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1793 
Hernandez Mireles, C., Marketing Modeling for New Products, Promotor: Prof.dr. P.H. 
Franses, EPS-2010-202-MKT, ISBN 90-5892-237-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/19878 
Hessels, S.J.A., International Entrepreneurship: Value Creation Across National 
Borders, Promotor: Prof.dr. A.R. Thurik, EPS-2008-144-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-181-
9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13942 
  
 
Heugens, P.P.M.A.R., Strategic Issues Management: Implications for Corporate 
Performance, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. F.A.J. van den Bosch & Prof.dr. C.B.M. van Riel, 
EPS-2001-007-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-009-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/358 
Heuvel, W. van den, The Economic Lot-Sizing Problem: New Results and Extensions, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. A.P.L. Wagelmans, EPS-2006-093-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-124-7, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1805 
Hoedemaekers, C.M.W., Performance, Pinned down: A Lacanian Analysis of Subjectivity 
at Work, Promotors: Prof.dr. S. Magala & Prof.dr. D.H. den Hartog, EPS-2008-121-
ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-156-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10871 
Hooghiemstra, R., The Construction of Reality: Cultural Differences in Self-serving 
Behaviour in Accounting Narratives, Promotors: Prof.dr. L.G. van der Tas RA & Prof.dr. 
A.Th.H. Pruyn, EPS-2003-025-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-047-X, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/871 
Hu, Y., Essays on the Governance of Agricultural Products: Cooperatives and Contract 
Farming, Promotors: Prof.dr. G.W.J. Hendrkse & Prof.dr. B. Krug, EPS-2007-113-ORG, 
ISBN: 90-5892-145-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10535 
Huang, X., An Analysis of Occupational Pension Provision: From Evaluation to 
Redesigh, Promotors: Prof.dr. M.J.C.M. Verbeek & Prof.dr. R.J. Mahieu, EPS-2010-196-
F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-239-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/19674 
Huij, J.J., New Insights into Mutual Funds: Performance and Family Strategies, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. M.C.J.M. Verbeek, EPS-2007-099-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-134-4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9398 
Huurman, C.I., Dealing with Electricity Prices, Promotor: Prof.dr. C.D. Koedijk, EPS-
2007-098-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-130-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9399 
Iastrebova, K, Manager’s Information Overload: The Impact of Coping Strategies on 
Decision-Making Performance, Promotor: Prof.dr. H.G. van Dissel, EPS-2006-077-LIS, 
ISBN: 90-5892-111-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7329 
Iwaarden, J.D. van, Changing Quality Controls: The Effects of Increasing Product 
Variety and Shortening Product Life Cycles, Promotors: Prof.dr. B.G. Dale & Prof.dr. 
A.R.T. Williams, EPS-2006-084-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-117-4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7992 
Jalil, M.N., Customer Information Driven After Sales Service Management: Lessons from 
Spare Parts Logistics, Promotor: Prof.dr. L.G. Kroon, EPS-2011-222-LIS, ISBN: 978-
90-5892-264-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/22156 
  
 
Jansen, J.J.P., Ambidextrous Organizations, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. F.A.J. Van den Bosch 
& Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2005-055-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-081-X, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6774 
Jaspers, F.P.H., Organizing Systemic Innovation, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. J.C.M. van den 
Ende, EPS-2009-160-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-197-), http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14974 
Jennen, M.G.J., Empirical Essays on Office Market Dynamics, Promotors: Prof.dr. C.G. 
Koedijk & Prof.dr. D. Brounen, EPS-2008-140-F&A, ISBN: 978-90-5892-176-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13692 
Jiang, T., Capital Structure Determinants and Governance Structure Variety in 
Franchising, Promotors: Prof.dr. G. Hendrikse & Prof.dr. A. de Jong, EPS-2009-158-
F&A, ISBN: 978-90-5892-199-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14975 
Jiao, T., Essays in Financial Accounting, Promotor: Prof.dr. G.M.H. Mertens, EPS-2009-
176-F&A, ISBN: 978-90-5892-211-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16097 
Jong, C. de, Dealing with Derivatives: Studies on the Role, Informational Content and 
Pricing of Financial Derivatives, Promotor: Prof.dr. C.G. Koedijk, EPS-2003-023-F&A, 
ISBN: 90-5892-043-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1043 
Kaa, G. van, Standard Battles for Complex Systems: Empirical Research on the Home 
Network, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. J. van den Ende & Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck, EPS-
2009-166-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-205-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16011 
Kagie, M., Advances in Online Shopping Interfaces: Product Catalog Maps and 
Recommender Systems, Promotor: Prof.dr. P.J.F. Groenen, EPS-2010-195-MKT, ISBN: 
978-90-5892-233-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/19532 
Karreman, B., Financial Services and Emerging Markets, Promotors: Prof.dr. G.A. van 
der Knaap & Prof.dr. H.P.G. Pennings, EPS-2011-223-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-266-3,  
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/ 22280 
Keizer, A.B., The Changing Logic of Japanese Employment Practices: A Firm-Level 
Analysis of Four Industries, Promotors: Prof.dr. J.A. Stam & Prof.dr. J.P.M. 
Groenewegen, EPS-2005-057-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-087-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6667 
Kijkuit, R.C., Social Networks in the Front End: The Organizational Life of an Idea, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. B. Nooteboom, EPS-2007-104-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-137-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10074 
Kippers, J., Empirical Studies on Cash Payments, Promotor: Prof.dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses, 
EPS-2004-043-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-069-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1520 
  
 
Klein, M.H., Poverty Alleviation through Sustainable Strategic Business Models: Essays 
on Poverty Alleviation as a Business Strategy, Promotor: Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur, 
EPS-2008-135-STR, ISBN: 978-90-5892-168-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13482 
Knapp, S., The Econometrics of Maritime Safety: Recommendations to Enhance Safety at 
Sea, Promotor: Prof.dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2007-096-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-127-1, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7913 
Kole, E., On Crises, Crashes and Comovements, Promotors: Prof.dr. C.G. Koedijk & 
Prof.dr. M.J.C.M. Verbeek, EPS-2006-083-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-114-X, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7829 
Kooij-de Bode, J.M., Distributed Information and Group Decision-Making: Effects of 
Diversity and Affect, Promotor: Prof.dr. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2007-115-ORG, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10722 
Koppius, O.R., Information Architecture and Electronic Market Performance, Promotors: 
Prof.dr. P.H.M. Vervest & Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck, EPS-2002-013-LIS, ISBN: 
90-5892-023-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/921 
Kotlarsky, J., Management of Globally Distributed Component-Based Software 
Development Projects, Promotor: Prof.dr. K. Kumar, EPS-2005-059-LIS, ISBN: 90-
5892-088-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6772 
Krauth, E.I., Real-Time Planning Support: A Task-Technology Fit Perspective, 
Promotors: Prof.dr. S.L. van de Velde & Prof.dr. J. van Hillegersberg, EPS-2008-155-
LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-193-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14521 
Kuilman, J., The Re-Emergence of Foreign Banks in Shanghai: An Ecological Analysis, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. B. Krug, EPS-2005-066-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-096-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6926 
Kwee, Z., Investigating Three Key Principles of Sustained Strategic Renewal: A 
Longitudinal Study of Long-Lived Firms, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. F.A.J. Van den Bosch & 
Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2009-174-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-212-0, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16207 
Lam, K.Y., Reliability and Rankings, Promotor: Prof.dr. P.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2011-
230-MKT, ISBN: 978-90-5892-272-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/22977 
Langen, P.W. de, The Performance of Seaport Clusters: A Framework to Analyze Cluster 
Performance and an Application to the Seaport Clusters of Durban, Rotterdam and the 
Lower Mississippi, Promotors: Prof.dr. B. Nooteboom & Prof. drs. H.W.H. Welters, EPS-
2004-034-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-056-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1133 
  
 
Larco Martinelli, J.A., Incorporating Worker-Specific Factors in Operations 
Management Models, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. J. Dul & Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster, EPS-
2010-217-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-263-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/21527 
Le Anh, T., Intelligent Control of Vehicle-Based Internal Transport Systems, Promotors: 
Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster & Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker, EPS-2005-051-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-
079-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6554 
Le-Duc, T., Design and Control of Efficient Order Picking Processes, Promotor: Prof.dr. 
M.B.M. de Koster, EPS-2005-064-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-094-1, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6910 
Leeuwen, E.P. van, Recovered-Resource Dependent Industries and the Strategic Renewal 
of Incumbent Firm: A Multi-Level Study of Recovered Resource Dependence 
Management and Strategic Renewal in the European Paper and Board Industry, 
Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. F.A.J. Van den Bosch & Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2007-109-
STR, ISBN: 90-5892-140-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10183 
Lentink, R.M., Algorithmic Decision Support for Shunt Planning, Promotors: Prof.dr. 
L.G. Kroon & Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen, EPS-2006-073-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-104-2, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7328 
Li, T., Informedness and Customer-Centric Revenue Management, Promotors: Prof.dr. 
P.H.M. Vervest & Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck, EPS-2009-146-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-
5892-195-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14525 
Liang, G., New Competition: Foreign Direct Investment and Industrial Development in 
China, Promotor: Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2004-047-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-073-
9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1795 
Liere, D.W. van, Network Horizon and the Dynamics of Network Positions: A Multi-
Method Multi-Level Longitudinal Study of Interfirm Networks, Promotor: Prof.dr. P.H.M. 
Vervest, EPS-2007-105-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-139-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10181 
Loef, J., Incongruity between Ads and Consumer Expectations of Advertising, Promotors: 
Prof.dr. W.F. van Raaij & Prof.dr. G. Antonides, EPS-2002-017-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-
028-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/869 
Londoño, M. del Pilar, Institutional Arrangements that Affect Free Trade Agreements: 
Economic Rationality Versus Interest Groups, Promotors: Prof.dr. H.E. Haralambides & 
Prof.dr. J.F. Francois, EPS-2006-078-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-108-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7578 
 
  
 
Lovric, M., Behavioral Finance and Agent-Based Artificial Markets, Promotors: Prof.dr. 
J. Spronk & Prof.dr.ir. U. Kaymak, EPS-2011-229-F&A, ISBN: 978-90-5892-258-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/ 22814 
Maas, A.A., van der, Strategy Implementation in a Small Island Context: An Integrative 
Framework, Promotor: Prof.dr. H.G. van Dissel, EPS-2008-127-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-
5892-160-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/12278 
Maas, K.E.G., Corporate Social Performance: From Output Measurement to Impact 
Measurement, Promotor: Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2009-182-STR, ISBN: 978-
90-5892-225-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/17627 
Maeseneire, W., de, Essays on Firm Valuation and Value Appropriation, Promotor: 
Prof.dr. J.T.J. Smit, EPS-2005-053-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-082-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6768 
Mandele, L.M., van der, Leadership and the Inflection Point: A Longitudinal Perspective, 
Promotors: Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda & Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2004-042-STR, 
ISBN: 90-5892-067-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1302 
Markwat, T.D., Extreme Dependence in Asset Markets Around the Globe, Promotor: 
Prof.dr. D.J.C. van Dijk, EPS-2011-227-F&A, ISBN: 978-90-5892-270-0, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/22744 
Meer, J.R. van der, Operational Control of Internal Transport, Promotors: Prof.dr. 
M.B.M. de Koster & Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker, EPS-2000-001-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-004-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/859 
Mentink, A., Essays on Corporate Bonds, Promotor: Prof.dr. A.C.F. Vorst, EPS-2005-
070-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-100-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7121 
Meuer, J., Configurations of Inter-Firm Relations in Management Innovation: A Study in 
China’s Biopharmaceutical Industry, Promotor: Prof.dr. B. Krug, EPS-2011-228-ORG, 
ISBN: 978-90-5892-271-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/22745 
Meyer, R.J.H., Mapping the Mind of the Strategist: A Quantitative Methodology for 
Measuring the Strategic Beliefs of Executives, Promotor: Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, 
EPS-2007-106-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-141-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10182 
Miltenburg, P.R., Effects of Modular Sourcing on Manufacturing Flexibility in the 
Automotive Industry: A Study among German OEMs, Promotors: Prof.dr. J. Paauwe & 
Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2003-030-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-052-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1039 
  
 
Moerman, G.A., Empirical Studies on Asset Pricing and Banking in the Euro Area, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. C.G. Koedijk, EPS-2005-058-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-090-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6666 
Moitra, D., Globalization of R&D: Leveraging Offshoring for Innovative Capability and 
Organizational Flexibility, Promotor: Prof.dr. K. Kumar, EPS-2008-150-LIS, ISBN: 978-
90-5892-184-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14081 
Mol, M.M., Outsourcing, Supplier-relations and Internationalisation: Global Source 
Strategy as a Chinese Puzzle, Promotor: Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2001-010-
ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-014-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/355 
Mom, T.J.M., Managers’ Exploration and Exploitation Activities: The Influence of 
Organizational Factors and Knowledge Inflows, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. F.A.J. Van den 
Bosch & Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2006-079-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-116-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765 
Moonen, J.M., Multi-Agent Systems for Transportation Planning and Coordination, 
Promotors: Prof.dr. J. van Hillegersberg & Prof.dr. S.L. van de Velde, EPS-2009-177-
LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-216-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16208 
Mulder, A., Government Dilemmas in the Private Provision of Public Goods, Promotor: 
Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2004-045-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-071-2, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1790 
Muller, A.R., The Rise of Regionalism: Core Company Strategies Under The Second 
Wave of Integration, Promotor: Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2004-038-ORG, ISBN: 
90-5892-062-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1272 
Nalbantov G.I., Essays on Some Recent Penalization Methods with Applications in 
Finance and Marketing, Promotor: Prof. dr P.J.F. Groenen, EPS-2008-132-F&A, ISBN: 
978-90-5892-166-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13319 
Nederveen Pieterse, A., Goal Orientation in Teams: The Role of Diversity, Promotor: 
Prof.dr. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2009-162-ORG, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/15240 
Nguyen, T.T., Capital Structure, Strategic Competition, and Governance, Promotor: 
Prof.dr. A. de Jong, EPS-2008-148-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-178-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14005 
Nielsen, L.K., Rolling Stock Rescheduling in Passenger Railways: Applications in Short-
term Planning and in Disruption Management, Promotor: Prof.dr. L.G. Kroon, EPS-
2011-224-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-267-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/22444 
  
 
Niesten, E.M.M.I., Regulation, Governance and Adaptation: Governance 
Transformations in the Dutch and French Liberalizing Electricity Industries, Promotors: 
Prof.dr. A. Jolink & Prof.dr. J.P.M. Groenewegen, EPS-2009-170-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-
5892-208-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16096 
Nieuwenboer, N.A. den, Seeing the Shadow of the Self, Promotor: Prof.dr. S.P. Kaptein, 
EPS-2008-151-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-182-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14223  
Nijdam, M.H., Leader Firms: The Value of Companies for the Competitiveness of the 
Rotterdam Seaport Cluster, Promotor: Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2010-216-ORG, 
ISBN: 978-90-5892-256-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/21405 
Ning, H., Hierarchical Portfolio Management: Theory and Applications, Promotor: 
Prof.dr. J. Spronk, EPS-2007-118-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-152-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10868 
Noeverman, J., Management Control Systems, Evaluative Style, and Behaviour: 
Exploring the Concept and Behavioural Consequences of Evaluative Style, Promotors: 
Prof.dr. E.G.J. Vosselman & Prof.dr. A.R.T. Williams, EPS-2007-120-F&A, ISBN: 90-
5892-151-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10869 
Noordegraaf-Eelens, L.H.J., Contested Communication: A Critical Analysis of Central 
Bank Speech, Promotor: Prof.dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2010-209-MKT, ISBN: 978-90-
5892-254-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/21061 
Nuijten, I., Servant Leadership: Paradox or Diamond in the Rough? A Multidimensional 
Measure and Empirical Evidence, Promotor: Prof.dr. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2009-
183-ORG, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/21405 
Oosterhout, J., van, The Quest for Legitimacy: On Authority and Responsibility in 
Governance, Promotors: Prof.dr. T. van Willigenburg & Prof.mr. H.R. van Gunsteren, 
EPS-2002-012-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-022-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/362 
Oosterhout, M., van, Business Agility and Information Technology in Service 
Organizations, Promotor: Prof,dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck, EPS-2010-198-LIS, ISBN: 90-
5092-236-6,  http://hdl.handle.net/1765/19805 
Oostrum, J.M., van, Applying Mathematical Models to Surgical Patient Planning, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. A.P.M. Wagelmans, EPS-2009-179-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-217-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16728 
Otgaar, A.H.J., Industrial Tourism: Where the Public Meets the Private, Promotor: 
Prof.dr. L. van den Berg, EPS-2010-219-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-259-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/21585 
  
 
Paape, L., Corporate Governance: The Impact on the Role, Position, and Scope of 
Services of the Internal Audit Function, Promotors: Prof.dr. G.J. van der Pijl & Prof.dr. 
H. Commandeur, EPS-2007-111-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-143-7, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10417 
Pak, K., Revenue Management: New Features and Models, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. R. 
Dekker, EPS-2005-061-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-092-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/362/6771 
Pattikawa, L.H, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Evidence from Drug 
Introduction in the U.S., Promotors: Prof.dr. H.R.Commandeur, EPS-2007-102-MKT, 
ISBN: 90-5892-135-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9626 
Peeters, L.W.P., Cyclic Railway Timetable Optimization, Promotors: Prof.dr. L.G. Kroon 
& Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen, EPS-2003-022-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-042-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/429 
Pietersz, R., Pricing Models for Bermudan-style Interest Rate Derivatives, Promotors: 
Prof.dr. A.A.J. Pelsser & Prof.dr. A.C.F. Vorst, EPS-2005-071-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-
099-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7122 
Pince, C., Advances in Inventory Management: Dynamic Models, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. R. 
Dekker, EPS-2010-199-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-243-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/19867  
Poel, A.M. van der, Empirical Essays in Corporate Finance and Financial Reporting, 
Promotors: Prof.dr. A. de Jong & Prof.dr. G.M.H. Mertens, EPS-2007-133-F&A, ISBN: 
978-90-5892-165-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13320 
Popova, V., Knowledge Discovery and Monotonicity, Promotor: Prof.dr. A. de Bruin, 
EPS-2004-037-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-061-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1201 
Potthoff, D., Railway Crew Rescheduling: Novel Approaches and Extensions, Promotors: 
Prof.dr. A.P.M. Wagelmans & Prof.dr. L.G. Kroon, EPS-2010-210-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-
250-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/21084 
Pouchkarev, I., Performance Evaluation of Constrained Portfolios, Promotors: Prof.dr. J. 
Spronk & Dr. W.G.P.M. Hallerbach, EPS-2005-052-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-083-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6731 
Prins, R., Modeling Consumer Adoption and Usage of Value-Added Mobile Services, 
Promotors: Prof.dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses & Prof.dr. P.C. Verhoef, EPS-2008-128-MKT, 
ISBN: 978/90-5892-161-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/12461 
Puvanasvari Ratnasingam, P., Interorganizational Trust in Business to Business E-
Commerce, Promotors: Prof.dr. K. Kumar & Prof.dr. H.G. van Dissel, EPS-2001-009-
LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-017-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/356 
  
 
Quak, H.J., Sustainability of Urban Freight Transport: Retail Distribution and Local 
Regulation in Cities, Promotor: Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster, EPS-2008-124-LIS, ISBN: 
978-90-5892-154-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/11990 
Quariguasi Frota Neto, J., Eco-efficient Supply Chains for Electrical and Electronic 
Products, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen & Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck, 
EPS-2008-152-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-192-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14785 
Radkevitch, U.L, Online Reverse Auction for Procurement of Services, Promotor: 
Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck, EPS-2008-137-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-171-0, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13497 
Rinsum, M. van, Performance Measurement and Managerial Time Orientation, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. F.G.H. Hartmann, EPS-2006-088-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-121-2, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7993 
Roelofsen, E.M., The Role of Analyst Conference Calls in Capital Markets, Promotors: 
Prof.dr. G.M.H. Mertens & Prof.dr. L.G. van der Tas RA, EPS-2010-190-F&A, ISBN: 
978-90-5892-228-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/18013 
Romero Morales, D., Optimization Problems in Supply Chain Management, Promotors: 
Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen & Dr.  H.E. Romeijn, EPS-2000-003-LIS, ISBN: 90-
9014078-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/865 
Roodbergen, K.J., Layout and Routing Methods for Warehouses, Promotors: Prof.dr. 
M.B.M. de Koster & Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen, EPS-2001-004-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-
005-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/861 
Rook, L., Imitation in Creative Task Performance, Promotor: Prof.dr. D.L. van 
Knippenberg, EPS-2008-125-ORG, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/11555 
Rosmalen, J. van, Segmentation and Dimension Reduction: Exploratory and Model-
Based Approaches, Promotor: Prof.dr. P.J.F. Groenen, EPS-2009-165-MKT, ISBN: 978-
90-5892-201-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/15536 
Roza, M.W., The Relationship between Offshoring Strategies and Firm Performance: 
Impact of Innovation, Absorptive Capacity and Firm Size, Promotors: Prof.dr. H.W. 
Volberda & Prof.dr.ing. F.A.J. van den Bosch, EPS-2011-214-STR, ISBN: 978-90-5892-
265-6,  http://hdl.handle.net/1765/22155 
Rus, D., The Dark Side of Leadership: Exploring the Psychology of Leader Self-serving 
Behavior, Promotor: Prof.dr. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2009-178-ORG, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16726 
  
 
Samii, R., Leveraging Logistics Partnerships: Lessons from Humanitarian 
Organizations, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen & Prof.dr.ir. L.N. Van 
Wassenhove, EPS-2008-153-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-186-4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14519 
Schaik, D. van, M&A in Japan: An Analysis of Merger Waves and Hostile Takeovers, 
Promotors: Prof.dr. J. Spronk & Prof.dr. J.P.M. Groenewegen, EPS-2008-141-F&A, 
ISBN: 978-90-5892-169-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13693 
Schauten, M.B.J., Valuation, Capital Structure Decisions and the Cost of Capital, 
Promotors: Prof.dr. J. Spronk & Prof.dr. D. van Dijk, EPS-2008-134-F&A, ISBN: 978-
90-5892-172-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13480 
Schellekens, G.A.C., Language Abstraction in Word of Mouth, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. A. 
Smidts, EPS-2010-218-MKT, ISBN: 978-90-5892-252-6,  
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/21580 
Schramade, W.L.J., Corporate Bonds Issuers, Promotor: Prof.dr. A. De Jong, EPS-2006-
092-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-125-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8191 
Schweizer, T.S., An Individual Psychology of Novelty-Seeking, Creativity and Innovation, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2004-048-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-077-1, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1818 
Six, F.E., Trust and Trouble: Building Interpersonal Trust Within Organizations, 
Promotors: Prof.dr. B. Nooteboom & Prof.dr. A.M. Sorge, EPS-2004-040-ORG, ISBN: 
90-5892-064-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1271 
Slager, A.M.H., Banking across Borders, Promotors: Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder & 
Prof.dr. D.M.N. van Wensveen, EPS-2004-041-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-066–6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1301 
Sloot, L., Understanding Consumer Reactions to Assortment Unavailability, Promotors: 
Prof.dr. H.R. Commandeur, Prof.dr. E. Peelen & Prof.dr. P.C. Verhoef, EPS-2006-074-
MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-102-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7438 
Smit, W., Market Information Sharing in Channel Relationships: Its Nature, Antecedents 
and Consequences, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. G.H. van Bruggen & Prof.dr.ir. B. Wierenga, 
EPS-2006-076-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-106-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7327 
Sonnenberg, M., The Signalling Effect of HRM on Psychological Contracts of 
Employees: A Multi-level Perspective, Promotor: Prof.dr. J. Paauwe, EPS-2006-086-
ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-119-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7995 
  
 
Sotgiu, F., Not All Promotions are Made Equal: From the Effects of a Price War to 
Cross-chain Cannibalization, Promotors: Prof.dr. M.G. Dekimpe & Prof.dr.ir. B. 
Wierenga, EPS-2010-203-MKT, ISBN: 978-90-5892-238-0, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/19714 
Speklé, R.F., Beyond Generics: A closer Look at Hybrid and Hierarchical Governance, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. M.A. van Hoepen RA, EPS-2001-008-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-011-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/357 
Srour, F.J., Dissecting Drayage: An Examination of Structure, Information, and Control 
in Drayage Operations, Promotor: Prof.dr. S.L. van de Velde, EPS-2010-186-LIS, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/18231 
Stam, D.A., Managing Dreams and Ambitions: A Psychological Analysis of Vision 
Communication, Promotor: Prof.dr. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2008-149-ORG, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14080 
Stienstra, M., Strategic Renewal in Regulatory Environments: How Inter- and Intra-
organisational Institutional Forces Influence European Energy Incumbent Firms, 
Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. F.A.J. Van den Bosch & Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2008-145-
STR, ISBN: 978-90-5892-184-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13943 
Sweldens, S.T.L.R., Evaluative Conditioning 2.0: Direct versus Associative Transfer of 
Affect to Brands, Promotor: Prof.dr. S.M.J. van Osselaer, EPS-2009-167-MKT, ISBN: 
978-90-5892-204-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16012 
Szkudlarek, B.A., Spinning the Web of Reentry: [Re]connecting reentry training theory 
and practice, Promotor: Prof.dr. S.J. Magala, EPS-2008-143-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-
177-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13695 
Tempelaar, M.P., Organizing for Ambidexterity: Studies on the Pursuit of Exploration 
and Exploitation through Differentiation, Integration, Contextual and Individual 
Attributes, Promotors: Prof.dr.ing. F.A.J. van den Bosch & Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-
2010-191-STR, ISBN: 978-90-5892-231-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/18457 
Teunter, L.H., Analysis of Sales Promotion Effects on Household Purchase Behavior, 
Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. B. Wierenga & Prof.dr. T. Kloek, EPS-2002-016-MKT, ISBN: 90-
5892-029-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/868 
  
 
Tims, B., Empirical Studies on Exchange Rate Puzzles and Volatility, Promotor: Prof.dr. 
C.G. Koedijk, EPS-2006-089-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-113-1, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8066 
Tiwari, V., Transition Process and Performance in IT Outsourcing: Evidence from a 
Field Study and Laboratory Experiments, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck & 
Prof.dr. P.H.M. Vervest, EPS-2010-201-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-241-0,  
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/19868 
Tuk, M.A., Is Friendship Silent When Money Talks? How Consumers Respond to Word-
of-Mouth Marketing, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. A. Smidts & Prof.dr. D.H.J. Wigboldus, EPS-
2008-130-MKT, ISBN: 978-90-5892-164-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/12702 
Tzioti, S., Let Me Give You a Piece of Advice: Empirical Papers about Advice Taking in 
Marketing, Promotors: Prof.dr. S.M.J. van Osselaer & Prof.dr.ir. B. Wierenga, EPS-2010-
211-MKT, ISBN: 978-90-5892-251-9, hdl.handle.net/1765/21149 
Vaccaro, I.G., Management Innovation: Studies on the Role of Internal Change Agents, 
Promotors: Prof.dr. F.A.J. van den Bosch & Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2010-212-
STR, ISBN: 978-90-5892-253-3, hdl.handle.net/1765/21150 
Valck, K. de, Virtual Communities of Consumption: Networks of Consumer Knowledge 
and Companionship, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. G.H. van Bruggen & Prof.dr.ir. B. Wierenga, 
EPS-2005-050-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-078-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6663 
Valk, W. van der, Buyer-Seller Interaction Patterns During Ongoing Service Exchange, 
Promotors: Prof.dr. J.Y.F. Wynstra & Prof.dr.ir. B. Axelsson, EPS-2007-116-MKT, 
ISBN: 90-5892-146-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10856 
Verheijen, H.J.J., Vendor-Buyer Coordination in Supply Chains, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. 
J.A.E.E. van Nunen, EPS-2010-194-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-234-2, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/19594 
Verheul, I., Is There a (Fe)male Approach? Understanding Gender Differences  
in Entrepreneurship, Promotor: Prof.dr. A.R. Thurik, EPS-2005-054-ORG, ISBN: 90-
5892-080-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/2005 
Verwijmeren, P., Empirical Essays on Debt, Equity, and Convertible Securities, 
Promotors: Prof.dr. A. de Jong & Prof.dr. M.J.C.M. Verbeek, EPS-2009-154-F&A, 
ISBN: 978-90-5892-187-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14312 
Vis, I.F.A., Planning and Control Concepts for Material Handling Systems, Promotors: 
Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster & Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker, EPS-2002-014-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-
021-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/866 
  
 
Vlaar, P.W.L., Making Sense of Formalization in Interorganizational Relationships: 
Beyond Coordination and Control, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. F.A.J. Van den Bosch & 
Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2006-075-STR, ISBN 90-5892-103-4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7326 
Vliet, P. van, Downside Risk and Empirical Asset Pricing, Promotor: Prof.dr. G.T. Post, 
EPS-2004-049-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-07-55, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1819 
Vlist, P. van der, Synchronizing the Retail Supply Chain, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. 
van Nunen & Prof.dr. A.G. de Kok, EPS-2007-110-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-142-0, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10418 
Vries-van Ketel E. de, How Assortment Variety Affects Assortment Attractiveness: 
A Consumer Perspective, Promotors: Prof.dr. G.H. van Bruggen & Prof.dr.ir. A. Smidts, 
EPS-2006-072-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-101-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7193 
Vromans, M.J.C.M., Reliability of Railway Systems, Promotors: Prof.dr. L.G. Kroon, 
Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker & Prof.dr.ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen, EPS-2005-062-LIS, ISBN: 90-
5892-089-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6773 
Vroomen, B.L.K., The Effects of the Internet, Recommendation Quality and Decision 
Strategies on Consumer Choice, Promotor: Prof.dr. Ph.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2006-090-
MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-122-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8067 
Waal, T. de, Processing of Erroneous and Unsafe Data, Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker, 
EPS-2003-024-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-045-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/870 
Waard, E.J. de, Engaging Environmental Turbulence: Organizational Determinants for 
Repetitive Quick and Adequate Responses, Promotors: Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda & Prof.dr. 
J. Soeters, EPS-2010-189-STR, ISBN: 978-90-5892-229-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/18012 
Wall, R.S., Netscape: Cities and Global Corporate Networks, Promotor: Prof.dr. G.A. 
van der Knaap, EPS-2009-169-ORG, ISBN: 978-90-5892-207-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16013 
Watkins Fassler, K., Macroeconomic Crisis and Firm Performance, Promotors: Prof.dr. 
J. Spronk & Prof.dr. D.J. van Dijk, EPS-2007-103-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-138-3, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10065 
Weerdt, N.P. van der, Organizational Flexibility for Hypercompetitive Markets: 
Empirical Evidence of the Composition and Context Specificity of Dynamic Capabilities 
and Organization Design Parameters, Promotor: Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2009-
173-STR, ISBN: 978-90-5892-215-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16182 
  
 
Wennekers, A.R.M., Entrepreneurship at Country Level: Economic and Non-Economic 
Determinants, Promotor: Prof.dr. A.R. Thurik, EPS-2006-81-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-115-
8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7982 
Wielemaker, M.W., Managing Initiatives: A Synthesis of the Conditioning and 
Knowledge-Creating View, Promotors: Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda & Prof.dr. C.W.F. Baden-
Fuller, EPS-2003-28-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-050-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1042 
Wijk, R.A.J.L. van, Organizing Knowledge in Internal Networks: A Multilevel Study, 
Promotor: Prof.dr.ir. F.A.J. van den Bosch, EPS-2003-021-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-039-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/347 
Wolters, M.J.J., The Business of Modularity and the Modularity of Business, Promotors: 
Prof. mr. dr. P.H.M. Vervest & Prof.dr.ir. H.W.G.M. van Heck, EPS-2002-011-LIS, 
ISBN: 90-5892-020-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/920 
Wubben, M.J.J., Social Functions of Emotions in Social Dilemmas, Promotors: Prof.dr. 
D. De Cremer & Prof.dr. E. van Dijk, EPS-2009-187-ORG, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/18228 
Xu, Y., Empirical Essays on the Stock Returns, Risk Management, and Liquidity Creation 
of Banks, Promotor: Prof.dr. M.J.C.M. Verbeek, EPS-2010-188-F&A, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/18125 
Yang, J., Towards the Restructuring and Co-ordination Mechanisms for the Architecture 
of Chinese Transport Logistics, Promotor: Prof.dr. H.E. Harlambides, EPS-2009-157-
LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-198-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14527 
Yu, M., Enhancing Warehouse Perfromance by Efficient Order Picking, Promotor: 
Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster, EPS-2008-139-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-167-3, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13691 
Zhang, X., Strategizing of Foreign Firms in China: An Institution-based Perspective, 
Promotor: Prof.dr. B. Krug, EPS-2007-114-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-147-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10721 
Zhang, X., Scheduling with Time Lags, Promotor: Prof.dr. S.L. van de Velde, EPS-2010-
206-LIS, ISBN: 978-90-5892-244-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/19928 
Zhou, H., Knowledge, Entrepreneurship and Performance: Evidence from Country-level 
and Firm-level Studies, Promotors: Prof.dr. A.R. Thurik & Prof.dr. L.M. Uhlaner, EPS-
2010-207-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-248-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/20634 
Zhu, Z., Essays on China’s Tax System, Promotors: Prof.dr. B. Krug & Prof.dr. G.W.J. 
Hendrikse, EPS-2007-112-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-144-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10502 
  
 
Zwart, G.J. de, Empirical Studies on Financial Markets: Private Equity, Corporate 
Bonds and Emerging Markets, Promotors: Prof.dr. M.J.C.M. Verbeek & Prof.dr. D.J.C. 
van Dijk, EPS-2008-131-F&A, ISBN: 978-90-5892-163-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/12703 
 
 
 
EELCO KAPPE
The Effectiveness of
Pharmaceutical MarketingEELC
O
 K
A
P
P
E
-  T
h
e
 E
ffe
ctiv
e
n
e
ss o
f P
h
a
rm
a
ce
u
tica
l M
a
rk
e
tin
g
ERIM PhD Series
Research in Management
E
ra
sm
u
s 
R
e
se
a
rc
h
 I
n
st
it
u
te
 o
f 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
-
239
E
R
IM
D
e
si
g
n
 &
 l
a
yo
u
t:
 B
&
T
 O
n
tw
e
rp
 e
n
 a
d
vi
e
s 
 (
w
w
w
.b
-e
n
-t
.n
l)
  
  
P
ri
n
t:
 H
a
ve
k
a
  
 (
w
w
w
.h
a
ve
k
a
.n
l)THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING
Pharmaceutical marketing effectiveness comprises the measurement of marketing efforts
of pharmaceutical firms towards doctors and patients. These firms spend billions of dollars
yearly to promote their prescription drugs. This dissertation provides empirical analyses and
methods to contribute to several substantial problems on pharmaceutical marketing effec -
tiveness. Using unique data in every essay, it studies the role of the firm, sales rep and
doctor in pharmaceutical marketing. The first essay evaluates the size of the sales force and
the allocation of sales calls among doctors. In particular, it provides a method to gauge a
yet-to-be-enacted firm-initiated policy shift. The second essay studies the effectiveness of
the information content provided in sales calls. The main questions evolve around the
discussion of positively biased drug information and the responsiveness of doctors to that.
In the third essay, the interplay between drug sales, marketing and scientific reviews is
studied in detail. 
The essays reveal important implications for academics and managers. For academics: (i)
a new alternative to gauge policy shifts is offered; (ii) a model is offered to analyze the
effectiveness of sales message content; and (iii) scientific reviews should be considered to
correctly measure pharmaceutical marketing effectiveness. The implications for managers
are: (i) the market leader is able to buck the trend in increasing sales forces; (ii) sales reps
discuss positively biased information too often, which is counterproductive in the long run;
and (iii) scientific reviews on products should be actively considered as a part of the
marketing mix.
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hundred senior researchers and PhD candidates are active in the different research pro -
grammes. From a variety of acade mic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu nity is
united in striving for excellence and working at the fore front of creating new business
knowledge.
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